

THE
SECRETARIES of STATE
1681-1782

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BY

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PREFACE

THIS study is the result of researches made by me while I was holding a Senior Studentship granted by the General Board of Faculties of Oxford University and a Senior Demyship granted by the President and Fellows of Magdalen College. I wish to express my gratitude for this assistance to the General Board of Faculties and to the President and Fellows of Magdalen College, to whom I am further indebted for their kindness in purchasing a photostat of part of the Shelburne MSS. for my use.

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INTRODUCTORY SURVEY

THIS study is an attempt to give a brief account of the office of Secretary of State in England from 1681 to 1782. For the sake of clarity, however, it seems proper first to give a succinct description of the secretaryship in 1680.¹

The secretaryship has at times been held by one person and is now held by eight; but it always has been and is one office. Any Secretary could and can perform any secretarial duty; for all Secretaries are competent to discharge the same functions. But recently, for instance, the Home Office was administered, for a brief space, by the Secretary in charge of the Foreign Office. The division of duties between the Secretaries is purely a matter of convenience and is regulated by the King's pleasure, which need not be expressed in any formal manner.

Originally the Secretaries of State had been the King's private secretaries. Not for some time were they regarded as public servants, that is, as Ministers. That they so came to be regarded was, in all probability, largely due to their connexion with the signet. The signet is one of the royal seals and is in the custody of the Secretaries. Now in 1535 a statute provided that 'every grant gift or writing to pass under the Great Seal' should first pass the signet. Further, the signet was used to seal sign manual warrants, which at the time when this study begins, were regularly countersigned by a Secretary of State.² The method of appointing Secretaries is now by the delivery of the seals, namely the signet, the lesser seal, and the cachet. But, between 1578 and the middle of the nineteenth century, letters patent were issued for their appointment. Even then, however, the delivery of the seals marked the entry of a new Secretary into his office. Once he had received the seals he could act, even though the letters patent had not been issued and he had not taken the oath of office.³

There were four clerks of the signet, appointed by the Crown, who had originally attended at Court in turn for the purpose of

¹ For the earlier period see F. M. G. Evans, *The Principal Secretary of State 1558-1680*. I am much indebted to this work.

² For a description of the method of issuing letters patent see Evans, 196-7. The method did not change until the nineteenth century.

³ For the text of the oath see Evans, 365-6. For proof that the oath did not change see P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., George I, i. 46.

making the necessary entries and collecting the customary fees, when documents passed the signet. But in the seventeenth century their duties were performed by deputy and continued so to be performed until the clerkships were abolished in the nineteenth century.

Strictly speaking, each Secretary received two signets, one larger, one smaller, the latter often being known as the 'lesser' or 'second' seal. They also received a third seal, the 'cachet', which was used for sealing letters to sovereign princes. But the Secretaries' ordinary letters were sealed with their private seals.¹ According to the late Sir W. Anson the uses of the first two seals at the beginning of the present century were as follows: 'In the Foreign Office the instruments which authorize the affixing of the Great Seal to powers to treat and ratifications of treaties pass under the signet as well as the sign manual and are countersigned by the Secretary of State. In the Colonial Office the signet is affixed to Commissions and also to Instructions; these last pass the sign manual but are not countersigned by the Secretary of State. The second seal is used for royal warrants and commissions, countersigned by the Secretaries of State.'

The duties of the Secretaries of State in 1680 were most numerous. Only a brief indication of them can be given here.² The Secretaries then acted as Ministers for foreign, domestic, Irish, and Colonial affairs. They were also connected in various ways with military and naval matters. There had been for some time, in 1680, two Secretaries holding office jointly. But for reasons of administrative convenience business was, to some extent, divided between them. One was in charge of what was called the 'Southern Department' or 'Province', the other of the Northern. The Secretary for the Southern Department corresponded with British envoys in France, Switzerland, Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and Turkey. Furthermore, Ireland, the Colonies, and the Channel Islands were also regarded as being within his Department. The Secretary for the Northern Depart-

¹ Evans, 205. For the use of the seals in the early twentieth century see Anson, *Law and Custom of the Constitution*, II. i. 169-70. There are now preserved in the Home Office Museum a number of private seals used by Secretaries in the nineteenth century. The subject of the seals is most complicated. I have not been able to discover the distinction, if any, in the use of the greater and lesser signet during the period 1681-1782. I am inclined to think it was much the same as that described by Sir W. Anson as existing in 1907.

² For a more particular account see the various chapters of Part II.

ment corresponded with British envoys in the Empire, Holland, Scandinavia, Poland, and Russia. Domestic affairs, however, were common to both Secretaries, nor was any attempt made to separate their functions. Moreover, in other spheres, it was not unusual for a Secretary to transact business, which, according to the above rule, should have fallen to his colleague. The Secretaries have always been regarded as equal and, at the beginning of this period and during the greater part of it, the division of duties was not a hard and fast division.

Until 1706 the senior Secretary held the Southern, the junior the Northern Department. When the senior Secretary quitted office the other moved to the Southern Department. To this rule, however, there were two exceptions. When, in May 1699, the Earl of Jersey was appointed the colleague of James Vernon, the Northern Province was assigned to the latter and the Southern to the former. This departure from precedent was due to Vernon's wish. For Vernon, who possessed neither rank nor wealth nor great ambition, desired to avoid the conduct of negotiation with France, then a delicate matter, and also feared he would be exposed to envy if he were put above Jersey.¹ Jersey, however, was dismissed in June 1700, and when a second Secretary, namely Sir Charles Hedges, was once more appointed, in November of that year, he was given the Northern Province, while Vernon took the Southern.² But Vernon disliked this arrangement and was able to exchange the Southern for the Northern Province when Manchester succeeded Hedges, at the beginning of 1702.³ Henceforth the old rule was observed until the appointment of the third Earl of Sunderland, in 1706, when it was settled that each Secretary should remain in charge of the Province first assigned to him, until death, dismissal, or resignation.⁴

Subsequently transferences of a Secretary from one Department to another were rare and, usually, significant. In this connexion it should be said that, after the accession of George I, the Northern Province was held to be the more important.⁵ We

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Bath MSS.* iii. 344.

² *Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III*, iii. 76, 84. This work will henceforth be cited as *Vernon Corr.*, a more fitting designation.

³ *Vernon Corr.* iii. 163.

⁴ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Bath MSS.* i. 132, Sunderland to Rivers, Dec. 4, 1706; Addison, *Works* (Bohn ed.), v. 354, Addison to Stepney, Dec. 10, 1706.

⁵ P.R.O., Bachet's Transcripts, 203, f. 315^r, Iberville to Louis XIV, Oct. 8.

find, accordingly, that Stanhope, after his victory over Townshend in 1716, exchanged the Southern for the Northern Department. Again, in 1748, Newcastle, then the most considerable man in the Ministry, effected a similar exchange in his favour.¹ In 1754, Newcastle, then First Lord of the Treasury, rewarded the fidelity of his adherent, Holderness, by securing his transference from the Southern to the Northern Department.² Pitt, moreover, when he became Secretary in 1756, endeavoured, though in vain, to remove Holderness and get the Northern Province for himself.³ After the accession of George III, however, neither Province appears to have been regarded as more desirable than the other and, though transferences still occurred, they were made for different reasons. If Conway moved from the Southern to the Northern Province in 1766, it was because he was weary of Colonial business.⁴ Two subsequent changes appear to have been due to considerations of foreign policy. In order to facilitate the conduct of delicate negotiations with France Weymouth, in 1768, and Rochford, in 1770, were shifted to the Southern Province, since each held pacific views at the relevant time.⁵

In Part II of this study an attempt is made to describe certain specific aspects of the Secretaries' works. Here, however, it seems convenient to say something of the general importance of the secretaryship during the period 1681 to 1782 and of the character of the men who held it.⁶ No attempt, however, will be made to give a detailed account of each Secretary.⁷

1714. 'Townshend a préféré le département qu'avoit M. Bromley . . . a celui du sud . . . quoique ce dernier est toujours estimé le plus beau. Les spéculatifs croient qu'en effet le premier deviendra le plus considérable et le plus lucratif a cause des alliances qu'il y aura a traiter en Allemagne et dans le nord en cas de guerre, au lieu qu'en ce cas il n'y aurait presque rien a faire dans le département du midy.'

¹ Chesterfield, *Letters*, ii. 849; *Marchmont Papers*, i. 278.

² Yorke, *Hardwicke*, ii. 191-2.

³ Walpole, *George II*, ii. 266-7.

⁴ Walpole, *George III*, ii. 228 sqq.

⁵ Both transferences excited much speculation. See Walpole, *George III*, iii. 167-8; *ibid.* iv. 156 sqq.; *Corr. of George III*, ii. 848, 851-4; Goebel, *The Struggle for the Falkland Isles*, chapters vi-viii. Walpole's statements can hardly be accepted at their face value, but may contain some truth.

⁶ It is proper for me to say that I only refer in Part I to the Secretaries for the Northern and Southern Departments. For those Secretaries whose province was Scotland or the Colonies see Part II, Chapter I.

⁷ To do so would simply be to give once more information which is already easily accessible. The more important Secretaries are dealt with fairly fully in the general histories and in separate biographies. There are also lives of all the Secretaries, save Lord Conway and Lord Suffolk, in the *Dict. Nat. Biog.* For these two

Charles II and James II chose their Secretaries according to their pleasure, without much regard to public opinion. Charles was capable of being his own foreign minister, while James never allowed any of his servants a free hand in foreign affairs. Charles II, in fact, when he could not find able Secretaries, who shared his views, was ready to appoint mediocrities, who were rather clerks than Ministers. Hence, early in 1681, when he found it expedient to dismiss the competent Sunderland, he took in his stead Lord Conway, a man who was indeed loyal, but ignorant and incapable.¹ Sir Leoline Jenkins, the other Secretary was, it is true, a better man and one much respected for his probity.² But Jenkins inclined to the policy of Halifax and never had much influence. Nor, with one exception, did the subsequent Secretaries, prior to the Revolution, count for a great deal. Godolphin only held the seals for a brief space and gladly resigned them in order to secure a financial office.³ The only task of importance committed to Middleton was the management of the Commons during the short Parliament of 1685, and this task he performed none too well.⁴ Preston, appointed in October 1688, had no chance to prove himself.

Very different were the fortunes of Lord Sunderland.⁵ Restored to office at the beginning of 1683 through the favour of the Duke of York, the Duchess of Portsmouth, and the French Ambassador, he speedily acquired a leading position in the Ministry.⁶ We find that, towards the end of Charles's reign, his

see the *Complete Peerage*. I have, however, indicated in my bibliography the value of certain sources for the lives of the Secretaries.

¹ P.R.O., Bachet's Transcripts, 148, f. 39^r, Barrillon to Louis XIV, Feb. 3, 1681. Barrillon says of Conway: 'Ce n'est pas un homme qui ayt esté dans les affaires ny dans l'employ.' See also North, *Lives of the Norths*, ii. 301; Burnet, ii. 339; Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, i. 42-3.

² Burnet, ii. 339; North, *Lives of the Norths*, ii. 301-2; Ailesbury, i. 41-2; Foxcroft, *Halifax*, i. 398.

³ Burnet, ii. 444; Elliot, *Godolphin*, 96.

⁴ Bramston, *Autobiography*, 196, 199. It may be added that, since Middleton refused to become a Romanist and was opposed to Sunderland, he fell into disfavour with James and only escaped dismissal because no successor could be found. See *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Downshire MSS.*, i. i. 182; Buckingham, *Works*, i. 111; Luttrell, i. 392; Mazure, *Histoire de la Révolution de 1688*, ii. 169.

⁵ This was Robert Spencer, second Earl of Sunderland, who died in 1702. His son Charles, the third Earl, was also Secretary from 1706 to 1710 and from 1717 to 1718.

⁶ P.R.O., Bachet's Transcripts, 154, f. 289^r, Barrillon to Louis XIV, Feb. 1, 1683: 'Madame de Portsmouth m'a dit qu'elle se donneroit l'honneur d'écrire a Vostre Majesté . . . pour l'assurer que Mylord Sunderland sera dans les memes sentiments qu'elle est pour les interets de Vostre Majesté.' Ibid., f. 291^r, same

confidential advisers were the Duchess of Portsmouth, Godolphin, and Sunderland.¹ The accession of James II still further increased the Secretary's power. Sunderland speedily became the favourite of the new king, and money and honours were bestowed on him in abundance. James not only granted Sunderland numerous fines and forfeitures but even stated that petitioners for the royal favour would do well to secure the Secretary's support, a tolerably plain hint that Sunderland could be bribed with the King's consent.² At the end of 1685, moreover, Sunderland, though he continued to be Secretary, was appointed Lord President in the room of Halifax. Now the secretaryship, though becoming more and more important, was scarcely as yet reckoned one of the greater offices by the world at large and it was rather out of the ordinary for a man of Sunderland's rank to hold the seals. The nomination to the Presidency was therefore a species of promotion, though it was a post of dignity rather than of business.³

Foreign policy during the years immediately preceding the Revolution was closely controlled by the sovereign. Sunderland, however, had some influence in this sphere, while other Secretaries had little or none. Unlike them, he was reckoned to possess an excellent understanding of foreign affairs.⁴ Yet Sunderland's insinuating manners and his aptitude for accommodating himself to his master's temper were probably his most powerful recommendations with James. Such was Sunderland's influence that James largely excluded Middleton from a knowledge of diplomatic secrets.⁵ For all that, however, Sunderland's position was essentially weak. Since he depended entirely on the King's favour, he could only continue in office by humouring James. Thus he was often forced to execute measures of which he disapproved, while his own sagacious advice was

to same, Feb. 8, 1683: 'Sunderland est en possession de sa charge avec toute sorte d'agrément de la part de Mr. le Duc d'York.'

¹ Klopp, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart*, iii. 6.

² Macaulay, ii. 455.

³ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS.* i. i. 68. Fox, Appendix CXLIV.

⁴ P.R.O., Bachel's Transcripts, 148, f. 41^r, Barrillon to Louis XIV, Feb. 6, 1681; Burnet, ii. 338-9. Bentinck, it may be added, later expressed the opinion that Sunderland was the only Englishman who understood foreign affairs. See Klopp, vi. 167, citing Auersperg's dispatch of Oct. 22, 1697.

⁵ Clarke, *James II*, ii. 98-100. The statements there are to some extent corroborated by the *Letter Book of Sir George Etherage*, 58. See also the letters to Sunderland in *State Papers Foreign*, Holland, 220. It would seem that Sunderland directly intervened in Middleton's Province.

neglected. Hence, though Sunderland, at this period of his life, is interesting as a character he is not important as a statesman. Neither Charles nor James gave him the power which a great Minister would have had in a later age. Thus Sunderland never became more than a highly successful flatterer, loaded with riches and honours, but with a very limited and intermittent influence on policy.¹

With the Revolution begins a new period in the history of the secretaryship. Whatever may have been the inclinations of William III, he was usually compelled to select his Ministers with some regard to public opinion. Yet the Secretaries of State gained less thereby than might have been expected. William was able to keep the control of foreign policy in his own hands without exciting much opposition either from the Secretaries themselves or from Parliament.² William's choice of his Secretaries was not therefore restricted by the necessity of appointing men skilled in diplomacy. Nottingham and Shrewsbury, his first nominees, were selected because they were men of rank and weight, whose inclusion in the Ministry would tend to conciliate public opinion.³ William, in fact, found it prudent to construct a coalition Ministry and the joining of a Tory with a Whig in the secretaryship was typical of his policy. That there should be dissension in a Ministry so constructed and, in particular, between the Secretaries, was inevitable, but the gain, probably, at first exceeded the loss. The time soon came, however, when increased administrative efficiency and, consequently, a united Ministry were needed.⁴ William therefore changed his plan. Putting himself in the hands of the Whigs, he appointed none but Whig Secretaries. But he showed a tendency to give the seals to men who were in no way considerable. In spite of a certain disapproval William appointed one mediocrity after another. In favour of Shrewsbury alone did he make an exception, when he reappointed him in 1694. Even when

¹ See Sunderland's apologia in Sidney, *Diary and Correspondence*, ii. 370 sqq. The document is illuminating.

² The discovery of the Partition Treaties caused a storm in Parliament. But until then little attempt was made to impede William's management of foreign policy. Moreover, granted that the Treaties were unpopular, the Tories attacked the Treaties mainly with a view to ruining the Whig leaders. Otherwise, it is hard to explain the immunity of the insignificant Jersey and Vernon.

³ *Supplement to Burnet* (ed. O. Airey), 288, 314.

⁴ See some interesting remarks by Henry Guy in *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Bentinck*, ii. 37.

William drew away from the Whigs and nearer to the Tories, the type of his Secretaries did not change.¹

Great things could not be expected from men so chosen. The energy and zeal of Nottingham are deserving of praise, but none of the other Secretaries are remarkable, unless for their defects.² Shrewsbury's querulousness must have been a source of annoyance to his colleagues and to his master alike, while, during his second term of office at least, he was culpably negligent of business.³ William himself had no very high opinion of his loyal and hard-drinking friend Sidney.⁴ Trenchard, appointed largely on account of his Parliamentary skill, perhaps did the Government some service in the Commons for a time, but eventually involved it in much discredit, when important political prosecutions instigated by him broke down, owing to the proven falsity of the testimony on which he had relied.⁵ Trumbull had little to do and was not very diligent in doing that little.⁶ Vernon, who, as an under-secretary, had done much to supplement Shrewsbury's deficiencies, took the seals with the greatest reluctance and in no way distinguished himself as Secretary.⁷ Equally undistinguished were Jersey, Hedges, and Manchester.

As has been said, William's Secretaries had scarcely any

¹ *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Bentinck*, ii. 39. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 30000 D, f. 313^v, Bonnet's dispatch of Nov. 5-16, 1700: 'Personne ne s'attendoit a cela (sc. Hedges's appointment). Il est a la verité du partis des Tories, mais on se promettoit une personne de qualité et de credit.'

² As to Nottingham see the remarks in Ailesbury, i. 246-8.

³ Shrewsbury's correspondence shows him continually complaining of one thing or another. As to his negligence see Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28895, f. 7^v, Trumbull to Ellis, Feb. 1, 1695-6. Defoe's life of Shrewsbury contains some interesting observations on the Duke's enigmatic character. See pp. 54, 66.

⁴ Burnet, iv. 8, with Dartmouth's note, Macky (p. 34) says Sidney was 'for many years drunk once a day'. See also Macaulay, iii. 719-20.

⁵ Ranke, v. 66; Klopp, vii. 3 and 4; *Letter to Trenchard*, passim.

⁶ See Trumbull's letters to his under-secretary, Ellis, in Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28895, e.g. f. 24^r, letter of June 1, 1696: 'The enclosed returns . . . pray give to the Clerke of the Council in waiting to be laid before the Council the first time they meet, which, I was assured, would not be this week, and the next I intend to be there, though I fear I shall then and always continue under Sir John Nicholas' censure of doing business very scurvily.' Ibid., f. 26^r, letter of June 4, 1696: 'I find myself a very unfortunate squire, for, when I am in Town, I have nothing to do, and yet nobody will suffer me to be idle out of it.' Trumbull, be it said, liked to make frequent visits to his country house.

⁷ For Shrewsbury's relations with Vernon see *Vernon Corr.*, passim. See also Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 30000 A, f. 382, Bonnet's dispatch of Dec. 3-13, 1697: 'Aussi dit on que Milord Shrewsbury sera fâché de voir perdre dans son office un homme aussi expeditif.' Cf. *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Buckle MSS.* ii. 2. 586.

influence on foreign policy. Nay more, they were often kept in ignorance of the most important diplomatic transactions. William arranged the entry of Britain into the Grand Alliance without the direct assistance and, perhaps, without the official knowledge of either Secretary.¹ On the rare occasions when Nottingham ventured to make a suggestion about foreign affairs to his master, he did so in the language of humble apology.²

In 1696 Shrewsbury counselled William to make peace with France, though he professed not to know whether tolerable terms could be obtained. Yet, during the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Ryswick, Shrewsbury was scarcely consulted and, at times indeed, was not even informed of what was passing.³ The only English Minister whose opinion on foreign affairs William seems to have valued was Somers.⁴ On one occasion a foreign envoy in London reported that the King did not wish him to do business with Shrewsbury. Later on the same envoy complained that there was no Ministry in England and said he did not know to whom he should apply.⁵ When Louis XIV sent Tallard as envoy to London in 1698, he instructed him that the Secretaries were little more than clerks.⁶

With the making of the two Partition Treaties the Secretaries had some connexion, though one of a peculiar kind. When the terms of the first treaty had been settled by William and Tallard, Vernon was confronted with the accomplished fact and directed to ascertain the views of a few leading Whigs who were Privy Councillors. Those thus consulted, namely Somers, Orford, Montague, and Shrewsbury, gave expression to a feeble acquiescence. But in one matter even greater precautions were taken to ensure secrecy. Vernon was directed to prepare a commission authorizing plenipotentiaries to conclude the treaty and to leave a blank where the names of the plenipotentiaries

¹ *Lexington Papers*, 40; Klopp, iv. 491-2, 528; Koch, *Die Friedensbestrebungen Wilhelms III.*, 2, 5.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Finch MSS.* ii. 419-20.

³ See the correspondence relative to the peace in *Shrewsbury Corr.*; also the narrative of Koch, *Die Friedensbestrebungen Wilhelms III.*

⁴ *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Bentinck*, i. 235-6.

⁵ Klopp, vii. 44-5; *ibid.* 206 n.

⁶ P.R.O., Bachet's Transcripts, 180, f. 10^r, Tallard's Instructions, Mar. 2, 1698: 'Les secrétaires d'État, à l'exception du Duc de Shrewsbury, n'ont esté proprement que des commis employés à faire des expéditions, sans avoir aucune part au secret. Les conseils ne s'assemblent que pour la forme et les affaires importantes n'y sont point traitées; aussy tout se réduit au Roy d'Angleterre; et sa faveur ne paroît partagée qu'entre les Comtes de Portland et d'Albemarle.'

should have been inserted. This Vernon did and Somers, the Chancellor, affixed the Great Seal to the document without the knowledge of the Lords Justices, as a body, and without a warrant. His sole authority for using the Seal was a letter from the King, though he later procured a warrant to authorize the doing of what he had already done.¹

Even more irregular was the procedure with regard to the conclusion of the second Partition Treaty. In the actual negotiations, which preceded the Treaty, Jersey was given a very small share.² Provoked by this neglect he sought his revenge by intriguing with Albemarle against the Treaty, though he eventually yielded to his master's wish.³ Had Jersey been a man of determination, however, his opposition might well have been formidable. As it was, he does not appear to have objected to the fact that no written 'Instructions' were given to William's representatives. Nay more, he even participated in an irregular attempt to make use of the Great Seal. According to an account, which is probably correct, Jersey presented himself before Somers and asked for the loan of the Great Seal. When Somers asked him whether he spoke as a friend or as a Minister, Jersey replied that he spoke in the latter capacity. He was thereupon requested to produce a warrant, but proved unable to do so. Since Somers was obdurate, Jersey withdrew for the time being, but soon returned with a warrant, on the receipt of which Somers handed over the Seal.⁴

Vernon and Jersey were indeed fortunate to escape impeach-

¹ *Letters of William III and Louis XIV* (ed. Grimblot), ii. 119 sqq.; *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Bentinck*, ii. 88-91, 103; Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, v. 1246-8, 1282; Ranke, v. 162; Klopp, viii. 222. For proof that Somers got the warrant see *Commons Journals*, xii. 484.

² He had some correspondence on the subject with our envoy in France and, at one time, was called over to Holland to assist William. See Cole, *Memoirs*, 89; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 30000 C, Bonnet's dispatch of Sept. 19-29, 1699.

³ In these intrigues Albemarle was apparently the leader and Jersey the follower. See P.R.O., Bachel's Transcripts, 185, f. 8, Tallard to Louis, Jan. 10, 1700; *ibid.*, f. 31^v, same to same, Feb. 9: 'Il [*sc.* Albemarle] a mesme entrainé M. de Jersey, fâché naturellement en son particulier, de ce qu'on ne luy parla de la plus importante affaire qui soit sur le tapis, qu'autant qu'il faut pour l'honneur.' Tallard adds that the Austrian envoy was always calling on Albemarle and Jersey. Cf. Klopp, viii. 383, Auersperg wrote on Nov. 13, 1699, that Jersey had told him he disliked the Partition Treaty.

⁴ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 30000 E, ff. 89^r-90^v, Bonnet's dispatch of Mar. 17-28, 1701. Bonnet's account does not make it plain whether the Great Seal was needed for the full powers of the plenipotentiaries who signed the Treaty, or for the ratification of the Treaty itself. But there seems to be no reason for rejecting his story as fabulous.

ment when Parliament assailed those responsible for the Treaties. But their very insignificance served to protect them. Men who had no influence were not worth attacking.

William's somewhat cavalier treatment of his Secretaries was made easier by the fact that he was not always dependent on them to convey his commands to British envoys. During his numerous and lengthy absences from England William was rarely attended by a Secretary of State. When William was out of the country, our envoys received his directions not, as a rule, from a Secretary of State, but from the person who acted as the King's private secretary. When William went to Ireland, in 1690, he took with him a certain Robert Southwell, who was indeed to act as a Secretary of State, but as a Secretary of Ireland, not of England. A memorandum amongst Southwell's papers shows that he was, at first, in some doubt as to the exact nature of his duties. If he was only an Irish Secretary how could he deal with non-Irish business? How, for instance, was diplomatic correspondence to be managed? But these difficulties were soon surmounted. For, while in attendance on the King, Southwell corresponded about diplomatic business, not only with Nottingham, but also with envoys at foreign courts.¹ During William's two visits to the Continent in 1691, however, he was attended by a Secretary, namely by Nottingham during the first visit, and by Sidney during the second.²

In subsequent years William took abroad with him, instead of a Secretary of State, William Blathwayt, the then Secretary at War, whom he employed to conduct diplomatic correspondence. William Blathwayt was one of that class of public functionaries who are invaluable while they are alive and are forgotten as soon as they are dead. Such men do not form great plans; they simply do what they are bid promptly and efficiently. Though during his busy career Blathwayt was closely connected with military, colonial, and diplomatic affairs, though his signature appears at the foot of innumerable documents, he had little to do with policy. William, who employed him continually, said he 'was dull, but had a good method'. Boling-

¹ For Southwell's office see Wood, 'The Office of Secretary of State for Ireland' in *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, vol. xxxviii, section C. 4. Southwell's memorandum is in Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 38861, ff. 123-4. There are several references to Southwell's diplomatic correspondence in *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, Finch MSS. ii.

² e.g. Luttrell, ii. 162, 296; Klopp, v. 280.

broke, who knew him, thought him a poor creature.¹ A man of this kind was admirably suited to the needs of a king who was no more fond of consulting his Ministers about foreign affairs than Napoleon was fond of consulting his Marshals about strategy. Just as Napoleon selected a human machine for his chief of staff, so William selected a human machine for his private secretary. Blathwayt was to William what Berthier was to Napoleon. When the King was abroad with Blathwayt, British envoys were ordered to correspond both with Blathwayt and with a Secretary of State in England, and the former correspondence was by far the more important. Blathwayt, moreover, also kept up a correspondence with the Secretaries in London. They informed the King through him of what was happening at home, and through him were acquainted with the King's pleasure.²

The reign of William III was not a period of great Secretaries. The amount of work that fell to them was not always considerable, and though William on several occasions had only one Secretary, the public service did not suffer.³ With the accession of Anne, however, a new state of things began.

When Harley became Secretary of State, in 1704, Daniel Defoe gave him some advice, which serves very well as a commentary on the history of the secretaryship during several ensuing decades. There must be a 'Prime Minister', argued Defoe, and, unless Harley gained this position, he could not be a real Secretary of State. On the other hand, Harley could not fail to become Prime Minister if he really discharged the duties of his office.⁴ Defoe was not talking nonsense. Though William had

¹ Foxcroft, *Halifax*, ii. 226; *Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS.* v. 202.

² For Blathwayt see the article on him in the *Dict. Nat. Biog.* Specimens of his diplomatic correspondence may be found in almost all the published collections of dispatch for the period. E.g. in the *Lexington Papers*. His relations with the Secretaries are well illustrated by his correspondence with Shrewsbury, calendared in *Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch MSS.* ii. Cf. also Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28895, f. 24, Trumbull to Ellis, June 1, 1696: 'I read this evening another forreigne pacquet, which . . . wants very little in returne, since all the correspondence goes to Mr. Blathwayt.' Blathwayt, of course, was never a Secretary of State. For his duties as Secretary at War see Part II, Chapter II.

³ For particulars see Appendix XII. See also Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 30000 D, f. 217, Bonnet's dispatch of June 28-July 9, 1700: 'Il est asses inutile qu'il y ait deux Secretaires d'Etat en été; le Roi se sert en Hollande de M. Blathwayt pour Secretaire d'Etat.'

⁴ F. G. Warner, 'An Unpublished Paper by Daniel Defoe' (*Eng. Hist. Rev.* xxii. 130 sqq.).

been in his grave for little more than two years, a great deal had happened since his death. No longer was it possible for the sovereign to have two nonentities as Secretaries of State; no longer was foreign policy almost exclusively directed by the sovereign. The fact that William's successor was a woman and a woman with rather dull wits had accelerated a change in any case inevitable.

Anne's inability to keep business in her own hands contributed largely to the steady growth of ministerial power. After the death of William one Secretary at least was effectively concerned with most great questions of foreign policy. During the first years of Anne's reign indeed Marlborough and Godolphin had very great power; but even they were usually compelled to have recourse to the co-operation of a Secretary in diplomatic transactions. If, however, the leading members of the Ministry were to control policy, foreign and domestic, a new problem was thereby created. Who was to be Prime Minister? Doubtless a Prime Minister, in the modern sense of the term, did not exist in the period covered by this study. But during a great part of it there was a pre-eminent member of the Ministry to whom his contemporaries did not hesitate to apply the term Prime Minister, if only by way of abuse. The degree of pre-eminence enjoyed by this person cannot easily be defined and was certainly subject to variation. Does not the importance of Prime Ministers vary in the present century? To speak only of the dead, were Lord Salisbury, Lord Balfour, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and Lord Oxford, all and at all times equally powerful?

Walpole is generally called the first English Prime Minister. But, during the generation preceding his rise to that position, there was an almost continual struggle for the first place in the Ministry, though no one man gained a decisive victory. It mattered little that public opinion was generally hostile to the existence of a Prime Minister. Circumstances made it necessary that the Ministry should have a head, whether or no men shut their eyes to the fact. The leadership might indeed sometimes be put into commission, so to say. In 1704 Godolphin and Marlborough were aptly called 'Prime Ministers' by a contemporary diarist.¹ But for obvious reasons this could not happen often. In

¹ Clerk, *Memoirs*, 53. The term 'Prime Minister' was, of course, not new in Anne's reign; but it then acquired a new meaning. Before, it had been used to

practice it became increasingly necessary that the supremacy of one Minister should be admitted. This, however, did not come to pass until after a long conflict. The conflict was between the more important members of the Ministry, that is, between the holders of certain great offices of business; positions such as those of Lord Steward and Master of the Horse were of no great consequence and were usually held by persons whose chief qualification for office was the possession of a title. The Lord President and also the Lord Privy Seal were normally too old or too insignificant to overshadow their colleagues. Even Carteret counted for little when Lord President; even the intrigues of Newcastle were of little moment when he held the Privy Seal. The Lord Chancellor, on the other hand, was almost always a great figure. His office required a man of legal ability and legal ability often goes with political ability. But, as a rule, the man who becomes Lord Chancellor aspires first and foremost to a legal reputation. Though some of the Chancellors during the eighteenth century possessed the qualities of a statesman, it is safe to say that none of them ever wished to become Prime Minister. There remain, among the chief Ministers, the heads of the Treasury and Admiralty and the Secretaries of State. With foreign policy each of these was closely concerned; for, plainly, the relations of British with other states must affect the navy and finance. It so happened, however, that the head of the Admiralty was never a serious competitor for the premiership. That office was usually held by a sailor or by some peer, who was, politically, of the second rank. But among the remaining three there was the keenest rivalry. The Secretaries had to deal directly with almost everything except finance and the more technical questions of military and naval administration. Granted that finance is of the greatest moment, can it be said that the duties of the head of the Treasury were more important than those of the Secretaries?

In the struggle between these three Ministers for the first place the head of the Treasury enjoyed one great advantage; in his own department he had no equal. The Treasury, indeed, was always in commission after Shrewsbury's brief tenure of the white staff in 1714. None the less, the First Lord was usually the master of his junior colleagues. Poulett, it is true, was

designate the sovereign's favourite Minister. Now and later it denoted rather the Minister who led the Ministry and the sovereign.

certainly controlled by Harley, and Newcastle, on a famous occasion, was embarrassed by the opposition of Legge. But these are trifling exceptions. The junior Lords were almost always content to draw their salaries and sign their names, when necessary, without demur. Moreover, when the First Lord was not a peer, he was also Chancellor of the Exchequer. That, however, was not all. Having himself a seat in the House of Commons he took good care the Secretaries should be members of the Upper House.¹ The Secretary, on the other hand, who desired to become Prime Minister, had generally to encounter opposition from his colleague. Though he often contrived to manage foreign business in the other Province as well as in his own, it was rather difficult to do so. There was always a risk that the Secretaries would work against each other. Hence the continued efforts of every ambitious Secretary to secure a complacent colleague.

In the period under discussion there was also to a certain degree a struggle between Parliament and the sovereign. There was not indeed a battle such as the seventeenth century had witnessed. But, until the accession of George III at least, Parliament, by a slow and almost unconscious pressure, gained ground at the expense of the sovereign. Anne because of her sex, and her two immediate successors because of their German origin, could not act as earlier rulers had acted. George III, though during the first portion of his reign he to some extent restored the power of the Crown, had to take the greatest trouble to secure a majority in Parliament for his Ministers. When Anne came to the throne, however, many failed to realize what was about to happen. It was then almost as important to secure her favour as to obtain the support of Parliament. Both during her reign and later it often happened that one party in an inter-ministerial struggle relied on the Crown and the other on Parliament. But, of the two Houses of Parliament, the Lower counted for more and more, the Upper for less and less. Walpole, who saw this and remained in the Commons, had his reward. Now the increase in the power of the Commons made it more difficult for a Secretary of State to become Prime Minister. After all, the principal departmental business of the Secretaries was diplomacy. While the foreign policy of most nations was controlled by the sovereigns, it was expedient that

¹ See *infra*, p. 26.

the Ministers, who negotiated with them, should be men of rank. It is not a mere chance that from 1782 until very recent times the British Foreign Secretary has almost always been a peer or the son of a peer. During the years 1702 to 1782, when two Secretaries divided foreign business between them, one was always a peer and usually both. The few commoners who held the secretaryship were, with one or two exceptions, appointed because their services were required in the Lower House. Outside Parliament they were, as a rule, expected to do what others told them to do. Pitt, indeed, was more than a Parliamentarian. But Pitt was as much a Prime Minister as any before his famous son. Since, excepting the elder Pitt, the great Secretaries were either peers at the time of their appointment or were created peers soon afterwards, they were driven to rely on the Crown rather than on Parliament for support, unless they could connect themselves with a Parliamentary group. But, though a Secretary, who was a peer, might have a great interest in the Commons and might perhaps be able to command a majority there, he was helpless unless a capable leader could be secured for his followers. Those, however, who were competent to lead the Lower House were seldom ready to act as another man's lieutenants.

Throughout the period 1702-82 then, we find, now a Secretary of State, now the head of the Treasury in possession of pre-eminent power in the Ministry. The importance of the secretaryship varies continually. Godolphin and his ally Marlborough endeavoured, as long as they could, to secure the appointment of Secretaries who were supporters of their policy. In this attempt, however, they met with but indifferent success. In order to obtain Parliamentary support they procured the grant of the seals to men who were sometimes sufficiently strong and independent to give trouble. They were indeed able to overcome the opposition of Nottingham and Harley, but, eventually, Sunderland, appointed to appease the Whigs, became to a certain extent their master. After the reaction of 1710, Harley and St. John fought each other for the control of the Ministry. Nor did the accession of George I cause such struggles to cease, though the parties to them changed. Stanhope quarrelled with Townshend and, after his victory, became the leading member of the Ministry.¹ Stanhope died in 1721,

¹ Harley, Townshend, and Stanhope were all called 'Prime Minister' or 'first

and then there was a contest between Townshend and Carteret for the control of foreign policy, culminating in the triumph of Townshend and the dismissal of Carteret. Townshend subsequently directed foreign policy for some years, until the opposition of Walpole to his plans compelled him to resign.¹

Walpole's premiership dates from the resignation of Townshend in 1730, not from his return to the Treasury in 1721. It was not until the former date that Walpole really managed foreign policy and, in consequence, dominated the Secretaries of State. Walpole maintained his superiority till the eve of the war with Spain, when it was weakened by the attacks of Newcastle. After the fall of Walpole, Newcastle made a bid for the first place and, with the aid of his brother, Pelham, was able to overthrow Carteret. Later, however, differences arose between Newcastle and Pelham and, though the alliance between them was never broken, there were frequent disputes, in which Pelham often got the worst.² When Pelham died in 1754, Newcastle succeeded him at the Treasury and speedily became involved in difficulties. To secure Secretaries who were both subservient to his will and competent to perform their duties proved an impossible task.

Our initial failures in the Seven Years War forced him to resign and, though he soon returned to the Treasury, he returned as a member of a Ministry dominated by William Pitt, the Secretary for the Southern Department.

Minister'. See P.R.O., Bachet's Transcripts, 197, f. 369^r, Instructions to Mesnager, Aug. 3, 1711: 'Le Grand Tresorier . . . fait aujourd'hui les fonctions de Premier Ministre.' For Townshend and Stanhope see Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 148, and *The Rise and Fall of Count Hotspur*, 76. Bonnet, however, thus spoke of Stanhope, Sunderland, and Cadogan in 1718: 'Sie sind, schreibt Bonnet, wie drei souverane in ihren amtsbezirken, Stanhope in den auswärtigen geschäften, Sunderland in den finanzen, Cadogan in militärischen dingen.' Thus Michael (*Englische Geschichte*, ii. i. 556) paraphrasing a passage in Bonnet's dispatch of May 2-13, 1718.

¹ As to Townshend's position see Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 504 sqq., Palm to the Emperor, Dec. 13, 1726.

² For Newcastle in the years 1731-48 see Vaucher, *Walpole et Fleury*; Lodge, *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*; Yorke, *Hardwicke*, vol. i. Newcastle wrote thus to Hardwicke on Nov. 7, 1743: 'My brother has been long taught to think by Lord Orford that he is the only person fit to succeed him and that he has a credit with the King upon that foot, and this leads him into Lord Orford's old method of being the first person upon all occasions. This is not mere form, for I do apprehend that my brother does think that the superior interest in the closet and situation in the House of Commons gives him great advantages over everybody else. They are indeed great advantages, but may be counterbalanced, especially if it is considered over whom these advantages are given.' See Yorke, i. 341-2.

Between the resignation of Pitt in 1761 and the end of the period covered by this study there were few strong Ministers. The recently published correspondence of George III shows that the King then exercised a great control over policy.¹ Though there are still disputes in plenty between the holders of the great offices, though the struggle between them still continues, the efforts of the combatants seem weaker and their successes and failures less conspicuous. The chief Minister was usually the First Lord of the Treasury. But no First Lord was as powerful as Walpole had been for any length of time. Bute was entirely the King's man, and North, though sometimes difficult to manage, generally did as his master wished. Rockingham was always in a weak position, and Grafton was a poor creature. Grenville, indeed, was a man of strong will; but, to begin with at least, Grenville had little or no superiority over the Secretaries.² Nor was there any Secretary during these years who can fairly be called an outstanding figure.

What manner of men were the Secretaries during the period 1702-82? Roughly speaking, they can be divided into three classes; men who had acquired diplomatic experience as envoys prior to their appointment, members of the Commons eminent for their Parliamentary talents, and men of rank and political influence, but without marked abilities, whose ambition it was found expedient to gratify by the grant of a secretaryship. With the exception of Bolingbroke, all those who distinguished themselves in the conduct of foreign affairs belonged to the first category. The converse of this proposition, however, is not true. Service and even creditable service as an envoy did not fit a man to be a good Secretary of State, as the career of Harrington showed. Those, however, who lacked that experience were often most ignorant of foreign affairs. George II complained bitterly of Pitt and Fox in this respect, and not without good reason. It was fortunate for England that they had as their colleague the ex-envoy Holdernes, whose assistance enabled them to avoid more than one difficulty.³ If some of the Secretaries were unfamiliar with foreign affairs, very few of them

¹ George I and George II certainly had much power, especially in foreign affairs, but, I think, not so much as George III.

² As to this see Walpole, *George III*, i. 214; *Corr. of George III*, i. Nos. 139-40. Men spoke of Grenville and the Secretaries as 'the triumvirate'.

³ Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, 81-8; Riker, *Fox*, ii. 99-100; Walpole, *George II*, ii. 267; *Grenville Papers*, i. 176; Lodge, *Great Britain and Prussia*, 110.

were acquainted with any foreign language save French. Carteret and Robinson alone appear to have known German, though Chesterfield had at least some knowledge of Dutch.¹ Lord Suffolk did not even know French properly, yet George III gave him the seals, though not without some hesitation.²

To find examples of incompetent Secretaries is not hard. Harley was culpably negligent in the conduct of business. He so arranged matters that the unhappy clerks in his office could not begin work until midnight or a little before and so were unable to leave till dawn. Even when there was nothing to do, they were kept in attendance until about three in the morning. The most secret dispatches were left about for any clerk to read.³ We are told that Addison had the greatest difficulty in composing a dispatch, and, strange though this seems, it is apparently true.⁴ Bedford was indolent and spent as much time as he could at his country seat of Woburn.⁵ Grafton and Richmond were young and inexperienced at the time of their appointment, and even in that not very exigent age some men felt that descent from Charles II was not by itself a sufficient qualification for office. Grafton, however, was taken to please Chatham, while Richmond had influential friends who thought that the responsibilities of the secretaryship would develop habits of industry in him. It is to the credit of George III that he did not wish to turn the secretaryship into a school for young gentlemen of quality.⁶

It was not a mere chance that so many Secretaries lacked first-rate ability. When a Secretary aspired to be chief Minister he usually strove to have an undistinguished colleague, from whom no threat to his pre-eminence could be apprehended. Similarly, the First Lord of the Treasury, as a rule, preferred the seals to be given to mediocrities. We find accordingly that

¹ Ballantyne, *Carteret*, 401, 405; Walpole, *George II*, i. 388; Chesterfield, *Letters*, ii. 920-1.

² *Corr. of George III*, ii. 880, 882-90, 892-3, 896, 957-8; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 34412, f. 177^r, Suffolk to Eden, July 5, 1772.

³ Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, vi. 670 sqq., Report of the Committee of Lords appointed to examine Gregg. The Lords were of course biased against Harley and something must be allowed for this; substantially, however, their report seems to be correct.

⁴ Spence, *Anecdotes*, 175; King, *Anecdotes*, 111-12; Hearne, *Collections*, vi. 105; Noble, *Continuation of Granger*, ii. 240.

⁵ Yorke, *Hardwicke*, i. 661; Coxe, *Pelham*, ii. 365-6.

⁶ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 35428, f. 23^r; *ibid.* 32975, ff. 89^r, 255^r; Walpole, *George III*, ii. 145, 161, 323-5; *Corr. of George III*, i. 309-11.

Nottingham in 1702 refused to accept the Southern Department unless the Northern was given to Hedges, in whom he hoped to find a loyal follower.¹ A few years later Harley worked for the appointment of the colourless Dartmouth as Sunderland's successor, while he was anything but pleased to see the brilliant St. John take the place of Boyle.² Sunderland, in 1717, procured the appointment of the inefficient Addison as his colleague.³ After the fall of Walpole, Newcastle did not rest until he had obtained a completely subservient fellow Secretary in the person of Holderness. Many thought Holderness very ill-qualified to hold the seals, but this mattered little to Newcastle. The Duke claimed that he should be the 'acting Secretary'. Carteret, Harrington, Chesterfield, and Bedford had all contested this claim and had all succumbed to Newcastle's enmity. With the appointment of Holderness Newcastle at last achieved his end.⁴

The reasons, however, for the rather low level of capacity among the Secretaries during George III's reign are of a somewhat different character. Though most of the men appointed were not very good it is hard to see where better could have been found. As it was, the King had at times the greatest difficulty in getting Ministers to serve him. Nor would it be fair to say that George might have obtained excellent Ministers from the Whig Opposition. Pitt's great mind was often clouded by disease. Shelburne excited the distrust of all who tried to work with him. Burke's best friends did not think him suitable for high office. Fox alone remains among the greater figures, and Fox, be it said, was still a young man when the triumph of the Opposition caused him to be made Secretary in 1782. Thus George was forced to fall back on such men as the dissolute Weymouth, the indolent and careless Hillsborough, and the decrepit Halifax.⁵

¹ *Vernon Corr.* iii. 200, 218-19, 224; Burnet, v. 10; Tindal, iii. 534.

² 'Lord Coningsby's History of Parties' (Brit. Mus., Lansdowne MSS. 885, f. 66v). Dartmouth, says Coningsby, 'could not write true English and was an utter stranger to all business, but, because a servile creature of Harley's, he was chosen to fill this great employment'. The Austrian envoy said of Dartmouth 'mit ihm reden oder gar nicht reden ist einerlei'. See Klopp, xiii. 441; also *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Portland MSS.* v. 157. For St. John see Macpherson, *State Papers*, ii. 551.

³ *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Egmont's Diary*, i. 105.

⁴ For Holderness see Yorke, *Hardwicke*, ii. 101-2; Coxe, *Pelham*, ii. 387. For Newcastle's claims see Yorke, i. 679-80; Lodge, *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, 308, n.1.

⁵ As to Weymouth see Walpole, *George III*, iii. 96-7; Junius (Bohn ed.), i. 109.

A Minister who was struggling for supremacy might, as has been said, rely for support on the Crown or on Parliament or on both. In this connexion some mention must here be made of the royal visits to Hanover and the connexion of the Secretaries with the House of Commons.

The first two Georges were in the habit of paying fairly frequent and lengthy visits to their German dominions. Now on each of these visits—except in 1736—they were attended by a Secretary of State. It was not possible for the Hanoverians to disregard their Ministers, as William had done, and act through the medium of a Blathwayt. It so happened, then, that the position of Secretary in attendance was one of great influence; for, while the King was abroad, British envoys were directed to correspond both with the Secretary in attendance and with a Secretary in London. The Secretary in Hanover, being somewhat out of the control of his fellow Ministers, was thus able to exercise an unusual degree of power in matters of foreign policy. He enjoyed, moreover, special opportunities of increasing his credit with the King and undermining that of the other Ministers. These opportunities were generally taken, and Hanover became the scene of many a pretty piece of intrigue.

Since Hanover was in the Northern Province the Secretary for that Department was the proper person to attend the King and, in point of fact, he was generally chosen to do so. In 1716, however, Townshend excused himself from the duty on the plea that his wife was pregnant, and Stanhope took his place.¹ Stanhope, whose views on foreign policy differed from those of Townshend, gained the complete confidence of George I during the visit and, before the King returned to England, Townshend was dismissed. In 1723, Townshend and Carteret both followed the King to Hanover, apparently because each feared to let the other go alone and neither was strong enough to prevent the other from going. It was indeed while they were in Germany that the struggle between them was virtually decided.² On subsequent visits the functions of Secretary in

For Hillsborough see *Corr. of George III*, v. 3588. For Halifax see Cumberland, *Memoirs*, i. 392-3; *Corr. of George III*, ii. 885 sqq.

¹ Coxe, *Walpole*, i. 95.

² There is a good account of their quarrels in the introduction to *British Diplomatic Instructions. France 1721-7*. The following words written by Townshend at this time well describe the state of things in Hanover, both during this and many later visits: 'If there be any place in the world where faction and intrigue are

attendance were discharged by the Secretary for the Northern Department alone, until the year 1736, when the King's antipathy to Harrington, who then occupied that position, led to another departure from precedent. On this occasion George II took with him Horatio Walpole the elder, who though holding no office virtually discharged the functions of Secretary in attendance.¹ The fact that Horatio Walpole was the brother of the Prime Minister doubtless facilitated the adoption of so peculiar a procedure. Afterwards, however, the old practice was followed until the visit of 1748. Newcastle, the then Secretary for the Northern Province, loathed the prospect of a sea voyage and showed himself very reluctant to go abroad. He refused, none the less, to allow his colleague, Bedford, to accompany the King, though the latter urged his claim to do so if Newcastle remained at home. His Majesty therefore was at first attended by Andrew Stone, Newcastle's trusted secretary. But eventually Newcastle summoned up all his courage and set forth for Hanover. His brother, Pelham, very pertinently observed at the time that the way to rule the King was to attend him on his trips abroad, a remark which sufficiently explains Newcastle's final resolve to go.²

When one Secretary was abroad, the other normally performed such duties pertaining to either Department as had to be done in England. In 1716, however, an extra Secretary, Sir Paul Methuen, was appointed and given charge of the Southern Department during Stanhope's absence. It had originally been intended that Methuen should resign on Stanhope's return, but owing to the vacancy caused by Townshend's dismissal, Methuen was kept in office for some little time longer, while the Northern Department was given to Stanhope.³ Again, during the joint absence of Townshend and Carteret, in 1723, their place in England was taken by Robert Walpole, who was appointed a Secretary in due form.⁴

The growing importance of the House of Commons in the eighteenth century made it more and more necessary for the Government to have competent representatives there, in order to

natural and in fashion it is here.' See Brit. Mus., Stowe MSS. 251, f. 22^v, Townshend to R. Walpole, Aug. 6, 1723. ¹ Coxe, *Lord Walpole*, i. 361-2.

² Chesterfield, *Letters*, ii. 866; Yorke, *Hardwicke*, i. 661; Lodge, *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, 321, 359.

³ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Polwarth MSS.* i. 35; Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 155-6.

⁴ Shelburne MSS. 134, p. 201.

secure the proper conduct of business. It usually happened therefore that one at least of the greater Ministers was chosen from the Commons. Hence it was that several skilled Parliamentarians were able to obtain a secretaryship, which otherwise they might not have done. Those very gifts, however, which made them so useful in the Lower House were also apt to make them embarrassingly strong colleagues, as was shown in more cases than one.

Harley was perhaps the first Secretary to be appointed solely for his Parliamentary ability. At the time of his appointment he was Speaker, and he continued to be Speaker until the dissolution of 1705. In those days the Speaker was hardly expected to be impartial and, though it was unprecedented for the same man to be both Speaker and Minister, the innovation aroused very little opposition.¹ Harley, however, soon began to intrigue against Godolphin and Sunderland and was only driven out of office after a severe struggle. Boyle, Harley's successor, was also a Parliamentarian, but, fortunately for the other Ministers, an unambitious tranquil man who did his work in the Commons and was content to follow where others led.² St. John became Secretary in 1710, because it was dangerous to deny him the office he coveted. So valuable were his services in the Commons that the grant of his much desired peerage was delayed for a year in order that he might continue to conduct business there.³ On the other hand, it was just because he was so strong in the Lower House that St. John was able to take over the management of the peace negotiations contrary to Harley's wish.

Harley, when he came into office in 1710, was desirous of finishing the war, but it seems to have been contrary to his original intentions that the Secretaries should have much to do with the making of peace. Negotiations were started through the medium of Gaultier, a French priest, who had contrived to remain in London during the war. Gaultier's chief dealings were with Jersey, who acted as Harley's agent, and neither Secretary was in the secret at first. Even when the Cabinet were informed the Secretaries were still excluded from the conduct of the negotiations.⁴ Early in 1711, however, Harley was

¹ Coxe, *Marlborough*, i. 312 sqq.; *Vernon Corr.* iii. 259, 270-1.

² Budgell, *Lives of the Boyles*, 154-5; Burnet, v. 355; *Vernon Corr.* iii. 347, 350.

³ *Hist MSS. Com.*, *Portland MSS.* v. 465; Swift, *Journal to Stella*, Feb. 23, 1711-12.

⁴ P.R.O., Bache's Transcripts, 197, f. 330^r sqq., 'Memoire pour l'Angleterre',

wounded by Guiscard and, as a result, was for some time prevented from doing much business. St. John, who held the Northern Department, seized the opportunity to intervene.¹ This involved an encroachment upon Dartmouth's Province; none the less St. John could not be prevented from taking over the conduct of the negotiations. It is true that Utrecht, where the formal peace conference was held, was in the Northern Province; but the really important negotiations were those conducted by St. John directly with Paris. It would, however, have been obviously inconvenient to have divided the business between two Secretaries. In any case St. John was too strong to be restricted and moreover proved himself an excellent diplomat.²

St. John, then, was the Minister mainly responsible for the peace, though Harley continued to take a certain part in the negotiations. Dartmouth, on the other hand, had very little to do with them.³ In August 1712, however, St. John was sent to Paris on a brief mission in connexion with the peace. On his return Dartmouth was ordered, probably owing to the influence of Harley, to undertake an important part of the correspondence with the French capital. But it would seem that St. John none the less continued to carry on a good deal of the correspondence, much to the relief of Torcy, the French Foreign Secretary. So, although St. John was irritated, the real change was small. Moreover, at the beginning of 1713 St. John was restored to

Apr. 16, 1711; *ibid.*, f. 349^r, 'Memorandum du Marquis de Torcy', July 21, 1711; *ibid.*, f. 364, 'Instruction pour le Sieur Mesnager', Aug. 3, 1711.

¹ P.R.O., Bachet's Transcripts, 197, f. 349^v, Torcy's memorandum: 'Pendant cet interval St. Jean . . . s'estoit introduit dans cette affaire, quoyque l'intention de ceux qui s'en mesloient n'eut pas esté de luy en donner connoissance; Depuis qu'il a esté introduit il n'a pas esté possible de l'exclure, quoyque Harley l'eut désiré. Gautier assure cependant que St. Jean est bien intentionné.'

² P.R.O., Bachet's Transcripts, 202, f. 141^r, Iberville to Louis XIV, Jan. 20, 1714: 'C'est un grand plaisir d'avoir a traiter avec un Ministre de ce caractere, en qui l'on trouve la franchise d'un ami particulier jointe a beaucoup d'esprit et une pénétration infinie; de sorte . . . qu'on fait plus d'affaires avec luy en une heure, qu'on n'en feroit a trois avec d'autres.'

³ P.R.O., Bachet's Transcripts, 200, f. 264^v, 'Mémoire pour servir d'instruction au Sieur Duc d'Aumont', Nov. 6, 1712: 'L'un et l'autre (*sc.* Harley and St. John) ont dirigé en Angleterre la négociation de la paix.' Some correspondence between Harley and Torcy may be found in Bachet's Transcripts. *Ibid.*, f. 265: 'Dartmouth n'a fait d'autre figure dans cette négociation que de porter envie au Vicomte Bolingbroke, qu'il voyait chargé d'une affaire, qui naturellement estoit du département du Comte de Dartmouth.' See also the letters in P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Entry Books, 25 and 26. These last show how slight was Dartmouth's connexion with the negotiations.

something like his old position.¹ This episode in St. John's career well illustrates the advantages which a Secretary might derive from the possession of pre-eminent Parliamentary gifts.

The need for the presence of capable Ministers in the Commons gave rise to several problems during the reign of George I. At first indeed Walpole and Stanhope managed Government business in the Lower House. But, after the resignation of the one and the promotion to the peerage of the other, difficulties arose. The choice of Addison as Secretary proved unfortunate, for Addison seldom or never spoke in Parliament.² So Addison, after a brief tenure of office, was forced to resign, and his place was given to Craggs. Now Craggs was a man of humble origin, who could scarcely prove a formidable rival to Stanhope and Sunderland. On the other hand, Craggs was not only an excellent speaker, but also a good-humoured tactful person, very well suited to manage men.³ Craggs therefore was chosen to lead the House of Commons. That Craggs held a position similar to that of a modern leader there is no doubt, as the following incident will show. In the year 1720, just before the opening of Parliament, there was a meeting at Craggs's office, which was attended by about a hundred Members. The King's speech was read to the gathering and then the terms of the Address, which was to be moved in reply, were discussed. Nor was the discussion purely formal, for certain changes were made at the request of those present.⁴ Doubtless similar meetings had been held in previous years, though when the practice started is uncertain. Such meetings continued to be held until the end of the period covered by this study.

The position with regard to the leadership of the Lords was much the same as that with regard to leadership of the Commons. The Leader of the Upper House was usually a Secretary, who summoned meetings of Peers favourable to the Government

¹ See the letters of Torcy to St. John, Sept. 27, 1712, and of St. John to Shrewsbury, Jan. 19, 1712-13, in the *Bolingbroke Corr.* For Dartmouth's correspondence during the period see P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Entry Books, 26.

² *Addisoniana*, ii. 11-12.

³ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Onslow MSS.* 459-60, 511; Graham, *Annals of Stair*, ii. 20-1; Walpole, *Reminiscences*, 40; Torrens, *History of Cabinets*, i. 185-6. There is an interesting account of Craggs's life in Boyer, *Political State of Great Britain*, 1721, pp. 443-4.

⁴ Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 201, Brodrick to Middleton, Dec. 10, 1720. Brodrick speaks of these meetings as customary, but I have not been able to find out when they started.

before Parliament met. The position of Leader was, however, relatively unimportant and few disputes arose in connexion with it.¹

After the death of Craggs no Member of the Commons became Secretary for a generation. Nor was this due to chance; for Walpole and Pelham took good care that none of the holders of great offices sat beside them in the Lower House. It is noteworthy that Walpole procured the offer of a secretaryship to Pulteney in 1730, on condition that the latter accepted a peerage together with the seals. Pulteney, however, was shrewd enough to refuse and so avoid relapsing into 'insignificance and an Earldom'.² Much in the same way, Pelham opposed a resolute negative to Newcastle's desire to have Sir Thomas Robinson for a colleague. While the First Lord of the Treasury, however, was master in the Commons, he showed no jealousy of the Secretaries' position in the Lords.³

When Newcastle succeeded his brother as head of the Treasury, he tried to find a leader of the Commons who would be subservient to him, but the task proved most difficult. Newcastle's plan was to give the leadership to a Secretary, while reserving the sole disposition of patronage and secret service money to himself. But the able Parliamentarian Henry Fox refused the seals upon these terms.⁴ Newcastle thereupon selected Sir Thomas Robinson, a veteran diplomatist, but completely incompetent to lead the Commons. Robinson's speedy and utter failure led Newcastle to take an even more foolish step. He decided that there was to be no Leader; each Minister who sat in the Commons was to speak when the affairs of his department were under discussion, but there was to be no one person appointed to manage Government business.⁵ Even Newcastle,

¹ Among the State Papers Domestic is a list of thirty-four Peers who 'are desired to meet as usual at the Earl of Stanhope's great room in the Cockpit tomorrow, being Monday the 10th of November, 1718, at six of the clock in the evening'. See P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., George I, 13.37. Townshend summoned a meeting of this kind in 1730, while meetings in 1731 and 1732 were called by Harrington. See *ibid.*, Various, Council Office. In 1772 a meeting was called by Suffolk. See *Col. of Home Office Papers*, iii. 1549. Was it always the Secretary for the Northern Department who called these meetings? Perhaps. But the evidence hardly justifies a more definite answer. ² T. Newton, *Works*, i. 38; Coxe, *Walpole*, i. 360.

³ Yorke, *Hardwicke*, i. 630; Lodge, *Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy*, 307-8.

⁴ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Report VIII*, App. I. 220, Fox to Digby, Mar. 12, 1754, and Fox to Newcastle, Mar. 14; Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, 21, 25; Yorke, *Hardwicke*, ii. 191-4; Ilchester, *Fox*, i. 199-211.

⁵ Yorke, *Hardwicke*, ii. 217-18, Newcastle to Hardwicke, Sept. 21, 1754.

however, was soon forced to admit the new arrangement would not work and was accordingly reduced to invoking the aid of Fox, who, in return for a seat in the Cabinet, promised his active assistance in the Commons, while agreeing to leave 'the priority' to Robinson.¹ Eventually Fox was made Secretary and Leader, though even then Newcastle had no intention of allowing him a free hand; for he triumphantly wrote to his sister-in-law: 'The King will not suffer Mr. Fox to do anything, even in the House of Commons, without consulting me.'² The Ministry, however, remained weak and soon broke up. Pitt's hour then came, and the terms which he demanded and secured on taking office are significant. He had long maintained that there should be a leader of the Commons with unfettered powers and frequent access to the King. Now he himself became Leader and Secretary of State, which last position he had long coveted.³ If Pitt was Prime Minister during the greater part of the Seven Years War, it was because he was a strong man in a strong position.

After the resignation of Pitt there was again difficulty in obtaining a leader for the Commons. Recourse was at first had to the services of George Grenville, who was soon afterwards made a Secretary. But Grenville, in alliance with his fellow Secretary Egremont, made himself so troublesome to Bute that he was removed to the Admiralty and the leadership given to the Paymaster, Henry Fox.⁴ No long time afterwards, however, Grenville again led the Commons as First Lord of the Treasury. In the Rockingham Ministry the leadership was, as it were, shared between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Secretary Conway. But after Grafton had succeeded Rockingham

¹ Walpole, *George II*, i. 417-20; Ilchester, *Fox*, i. 217-33; Riker, *Fox*, i. 219-22.

² Torrens, *History of Cabinets*, ii. 230. No long time before, it may be added, Hardwicke had told the King that 'the head of the Treasury was indeed an employment of great business, very extensive, which always went beyond the bare management of the revenue. That it extended through both Houses of Parliament, the Members of which were naturally to look thither. That there must be some principal person to receive applications, to hear the wants and wishes and requests of mankind with the reasons of them, in order to lay the same before His Majesty for his determination'. See Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32852, f. 64^v. Cf. a passage of Newcastle's letter to Hardwicke of Jan. 2, 1755 (*ibid.*, ff. 28-9).

³ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32997, f. 157; Dodington, *Diary*, 371; Yorke, *Hardwicke*, ii. 237-43. See also Namier, 'The Circular Letters' (*Eng. Hist. Rev.* xlv. 588 sqq.).

⁴ *Grenville Papers*, i. 411-12, 447, 449-50, 482-5; *Corr. of George III*, i. 139; Yorke, *Hardwicke*, iii. 292; Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 128-32; Winstanley, *Personal and Party Government*, 126 sqq.

Conway became sole leader and a curious state of affairs ensued. Though Conway performed his duties none too well, though Grafton did not trust him, yet Conway was found indispensable. Had Conway been a resolute man, it is plain that he might have become a power in the Ministry. As it was, he had little influence and was eventually succeeded as Leader by North, who held that position until the end of our period.¹

This brief outline may perhaps serve to indicate the more important features of general interest in the history of the secretaryship during the years 1681 to 1782. In the latter year the triumph of the opposition led to a drastic reorganization of the secretaryship. Under the new arrangement the recently created Colonial secretaryship was abolished, while the conduct of Colonial and domestic affairs was given to one Secretary and that of foreign affairs to the other. In the second Rockingham Ministry the Home and Colonial Department was given to the Earl of Shelburne, the Foreign Department to Charles James Fox. Their appointment marks the beginning of a new era in secretarial history and the proper ending point of this study.

¹ For Conway see Walpole, *George III*, ii. 139, 206-7, 219 sqq., 241, 266 sqq.; *ibid.*, iii. 107; *Corr. of George III*, i. 165, 216, 229, 243, 258, 262-4, 498, 548; *Chatham Corr.* iii. 281; *Grenville Papers*, iv. 247; Burton, *Hume*, ii. 396-7. It is noteworthy that there seems to have been no violent quarrel between North and Germain, when the latter was Colonial Secretary and, at the same time, a Member of the Commons. North, however, was anxious that Germain should receive a peerage. See *Corr. of George III*, iv. 2510, 2657.

CHAPTER I

SCOTLAND, IRELAND, AND THE COLONIES

BEFORE the Union Scotland had her own Ministers as well as her own Parliament. The English Secretaries of State therefore could have no authority in the Northern Kingdom. Their sole connexion with Scotch affairs was the writing of an occasional letter to or receipt of a letter from a Scotch Minister about some matter directly affecting both Kingdoms. Thus in 1702 Viscount Tarbat, one of the Scotch Secretaries of State, requested Nottingham to ask Queen Anne to stop the impressment of Scotch sailors in English ports. A year later Nottingham inquired of Tarbat whether it would be prudent to diminish the number of troops in Scotland, since the Queen desired to withdraw a regiment for service elsewhere.¹ After the Union, however, there soon occurred a change.

At the time of the Union Scotland had two Secretaries of her own, Lord Mar and Lord Loudon. Neither of them was immediately dismissed; but they received new patents, which appointed them Secretaries of State 'within Scotland and in matters which concern that part of Her Majesty's Kingdom, during Her Majesty's pleasure only'. Their duty was to 'write, docquett, and present to Her Majesty all gifts, warrants and signatures, passing Her Majesty's royal hand concerning Scotland only, or passing the seals there'. The two Secretaries, moreover, were to be equal and to share their fees.² Loudon continued to act as Secretary until May 1708, and Mar until February 1709, when a new arrangement was made.³ During their tenure of office, however, they managed Scotch business with but little interference from the English Secretaries. Though the latter occasionally wrote to persons in Scotland they were careful not to encroach to any considerable extent upon the authority of the Scotch Secretaries.⁴ But early in 1709 Mar was dismissed.

¹ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 29588, f. 14^r; *Cal. State Paps. Dom. 1703-4*, 2.

² P.R.O., Scotch, Scotch Warrant Books, 25, pp. 28 sqq.

³ See the warrants for the period in P.R.O., Scotch Warrant Books, 25.

⁴ e.g. P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Scotland, Series II. iii. 8, Sunderland to Lord Leven, Mar. 9, 1707-8: 'Your Lordship will receive by this express the warrants of the Councill of Great Britain for the seizing 31 persons. . . . You will be so fully

Henceforth there were to be three Principal Secretaries of State for Great Britain. The Duke of Queensberry was appointed the colleague of Sunderland and Boyle. The warrant declaring his appointment simply stated that 'the public business of this Her Majesty's Kingdom increasing, Her Majesty is graciously pleased to constitute James Duke of Queensberry and Dover one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries, besides those now in being, during Her Majesty's pleasure'.¹ The Queen, however, announced in Council that she did not propose to make any change in the management of foreign affairs, but that domestic affairs were to be managed indifferently by all three Secretaries. In reality, however, Queensberry practically monopolized Scotch business, while he had very little to do with English affairs.²

Queensberry was well versed in the intricacies of Scotch politics. In 1688 he had supported William of Orange, and from that time until his death he was a person of importance in Scotland. He had held the offices of Lord Privy Seal and Secretary of State in that kingdom and had exerted all his influence to bring about the Union, a service for which he was rewarded with the English dukedom of Dover. His reputation was not of the best, though it was no worse than that of most Scotch politicians of the period. By nature Queensberry was an intriguer and all the more successful in intrigue because of his abilities and winning manners. Such a man could not but have many enemies, among whom two deserve special mention here. There was then a group in Scotland known as the 'Squadron Volante'. As its name implies, the 'Squadron' was composed of men who now inclined to one side in politics, now to the other. Though the 'Squadron' had supported the Union it was bitterly opposed to Queensberry. Two of its leading members in particular, the Duke of Montrose and the Duke of Roxburgh, were Queensberry's great rivals. Both of them had held office

instructed by the Earl of Marr's letter to your Lordship by the Queen's order that I will not trouble you with anything of that, but beg leave to refer you to the orders and instructions you will receive from him.'

¹ Brit. Mus., Harleian MSS. 2263, f. 338r.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Mar and Kellie MSS.* 480, Mar to Grange, Feb. 3, 1708-9. Mar, who was present at the Council, represents the Queen as speaking thus. The 1710 edition of *Magnae Britanniae Notitia* says all three Secretaries did domestic business for the whole of Britain. But see *Wentworth Papers*, 72-3, and Appendix I. Everything goes to show that Queensberry and later Scotch Secretaries had very little to do with purely English affairs.

for brief periods, the one as Lord President of the Scotch Privy Council, the other as Secretary of State in Scotland. Both were destined in later years to be Secretaries of State for Great Britain, with Scotland as their province.¹

The abolition of the Scotch secretaryships was probably judicious. If the Union was to be a reality it was inadvisable that there should be a separate Scotch Ministry. Scotland, however, be it said, still kept her own Great Seal and her own signet.² But the choice of Queensberry as the third Secretary for Great Britain soon led to disputes. Queensberry was the friend of Marlborough and Godolphin and probably owed his appointment largely to their favour.³ Instead of attending quietly to the business of his office and seeking to conciliate his fellow Secretaries, Queensberry began a quarrel with Sunderland and Boyle about money. Before the Union it had been the practice that both the English and the Scotch Secretaries should divide their fees equally between them, which was a very sensible arrangement.⁴ Queensberry accordingly desired that his fees should be added to those of Sunderland and Boyle and the total shared between the three. He signified his willingness, moreover, to undertake part of the foreign business in order to equalize the labour of the three Secretaries. Sunderland and Boyle were far from ready to agree. Apparently they resented, not the offer to share in the management of foreign affairs, but the demand that fees should be divided. They pointed out that the profits arising from Scotch business were much less than the half of the total profits of the Northern and Southern Departments. The proposed arrangement therefore would benefit Queensberry at their expense. They made no attempt, however, to deny that he was as fully a Secretary of State as they were. Instead they asserted that the division of fees was purely a private matter between them, and so there was no obligation upon them to share with Queensberry. But these arguments made no impression upon the Scot.⁵ While Sunderland was in office he was unable to obtain his desire, but when Sunderland was driven out, Queensberry's plan for sharing the fees was

¹ Brown, *History of Scotland*, iii. 80 sqq. For Queensberry's character see Ker, *Memoirs*, i. See, too, *Dict. Nat. Biog.*, articles Queensberry, Montrose, and Roxburgh.

² Queensberry had of course the custody of the signet.

³ *Lockhart Papers*, i. 294; Tindal, iv. 1, 110.

⁴ See Chapter V for the question of fees in England.

⁵ See Appendix I.

adopted and at the same time he was given charge of relations with Russia, Poland, Denmark, and Sweden. Queensberry, it should be said, had friends among the Tories, notably Ormonde and Rochester. The gratification of his wishes at this time may therefore have been in the nature of a bribe. Perhaps Harley pressed the suggestion on the Queen, hoping to win over Queensberry, or it may have been a last effort on the part of Godolphin to retain Queensberry's support. In any case Queensberry remained Secretary after the dismissal of Godolphin and used his influence in Scotland during the ensuing elections to secure the return of Tories to both Houses of Parliament.¹

Queensberry died in July 1711, and his death led to a further change. Both the Duke of Hamilton and the Earl of Mar wished to succeed him. Oxford, with whom the decision chiefly lay, after some hesitation decided to abolish the third secretaryship for the time being, a decision by which Bolingbroke was the gainer. For not only did he take over the foreign business which had been Queensberry's but also the management of Scotch affairs.² If Oxford acted thus it was probably not out of love for Bolingbroke but from other and more statesmanlike motives. These motives may be conjectured from a letter written to Oxford by Defoe immediately after Queensberry's death. Defoe strongly urged that the third secretaryship be abolished for the following reasons. Its existence only served to accentuate the difference between Scotland and England, especially as it was inevitable that the Secretary be a Scot. A Scotch Secretary, moreover, would have a crowd of dependants and would naturally seek to make himself the head of a powerful faction in Scotland. Opposed to this there would be other factions and between them the country would be divided. The Scotch Secretary again would be the channel through which all Scotch business must pass before it could reach the sovereign; this would make the Secretary as it were the ruler of Scotland.

¹ See the note in P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Entry Books, 121: 'His Grace the Duke of Queensberry entered upon part of the Northern Province as one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, June 15, 1710.' See also *Hist. MSS. Comm., Report II*, App. IV. 318, Lewis to Dartmouth, Sept. 12, 1713. For Queensberry's conduct in 1710 see Tindal, iii. 110; *Lockhart Papers*, i. 319.

² P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Entry Books, 121. This shows that Bolingbroke took over Queensberry's foreign business. Bolingbroke also countersigned Scotch warrants. Cf. P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Scotch Warrant Books, 29, pp. 1-41.

Nor did Scotland need a special Secretary any more than, say, Yorkshire. Finally the office was a cause of needless expense. Considerations such as these, joined to the fear of displeasing more people than he gratified if a third Secretary were appointed, doubtless induced Oxford not to advise a new appointment.¹

In September 1713 Oxford changed his mind again. He now feared the power of Bolingbroke above all things and wished to diminish his influence. With this end in view he persuaded the Queen to revive the third secretaryship and to bestow it on the Earl of Mar. Even in that age, when Scotch politics were notoriously corrupt, Mar's reputation was distinctly bad. Until the year 1704 he had supported the Court, then he joined the 'Squadrone', only to desert them in 1705 in order to become Secretary of State. Dismissal of course made him discontented again and he got into touch with the Pretender. This was done in secret; but early in 1713 he like many of his compatriots clamoured for the repeal of the Union. Perhaps therefore his appointment to the secretaryship also indicated a desire on Oxford's part to conciliate the Scotch or at least to divide them. However this may be Bolingbroke bitterly resented a step which deprived him of all power in a country where Jacobitism was strong.² The change, it should be said, did not affect foreign affairs; Mar was concerned with domestic matters alone and in practice mainly with Scotch business.³

The accession of George I was speedily followed by the dismissal of Mar, who in spite of his vehement protestations was not trusted. George I and his advisers, moreover, desired to gain the 'Squadrone' and so replaced Mar by Montrose.⁴ The imminence of a Jacobite rising in Scotland, however, caused

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS.* v. 44 sqq.; *Swift Corr.* i. 266; Tindal, iii. 2, 219.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS.* v. 467-8. For Mar's early career see Brown, *History of Scotland*, iii. 100, 111; Lang, *History of Scotland*, iv. 163-4.

³ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 8, pp. 197-8, Bromley to Mar, Oct. 6, 1713: 'As the care of all affairs of that part [*sc.* Scotland] of the island is entirely committed to your Lordship.' *Ibid.*, 198-9, Bromley to the Lord Chief Baron of Scotland, Oct. 6, 1713: 'I have further in command . . . to let your Lordship know that Her Majesty having appointed the Earl of Mar to be a Secretary of State, committing to his care the affairs of Scotland, it is her pleasure the above mentioned notices should be duly sent to him.' See also *Hist. MSS. Comm., Report XI*, App. IV. 318, E. Lewis to Dartmouth, Sept. 12, 1713.

⁴ Lang, *History of Scotland*, iv. 173; Michael, i. 444. Montrose countersigned Scotch warrants from Oct. 7, 1714, to Aug. 4, 1715. See P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Scotch Warrant Books, 29.

Montrose to be turned out in less than a year. The Government decided to make the great Duke of Argyll Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Scotland. But since Argyll and the 'Squadron' were at enmity it was impossible for Montrose to remain in office. As it was the leaders of the 'Squadron' did little to support the Government against the rebels. No successor was appointed to Montrose, but Townshend and Stanhope were made 'principal conjunct keepers of His Majesty's signet, in that part of the said Kingdom (*sc.* Great Britain) called Scotland'. Until July 1716 Townshend and Stanhope indifferently countersigned Scotch warrants, and between July and December of that year the same was done by Townshend and Methuen.¹ At the end of 1716, however, a third Secretary was once more appointed. Argyll had not only adhered to Townshend, but also had paid assiduous court to the Prince of Wales. Since the King and Stanhope were then at feud with both Townshend and the Prince's faction they came to terms with the 'Squadron', who had been busily slandering Argyll. The result was that Argyll and his brother, Islay, were dismissed from their posts, while Roxburgh, still a leader of the 'Squadron', was made Secretary of State.²

The death of Stanhope in 1721 jeopardized Roxburgh's position. Instead of seeking to make his peace with Walpole and Townshend he supported Carteret and even after Carteret's dismissal endeavoured to make mischief. In 1725 Scotland was excited by the imposition of a malt tax. There were serious riots in Glasgow, which were only suppressed by the action of the military. The Government were hampered by the fact that Roxburgh exerted himself to foment the discontent and for that reason General Wade, the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, received orders from the King to correspond with Newcastle instead of with Roxburgh, who thereupon exhibited much annoyance. But Walpole was determined to get rid of Roxburgh and cared little for his feelings. 'I beg leave to observe', he wrote to Townshend, then in Hanover with the King, 'that

¹ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Scotch Warrant Books, 29, pp. 200 sqq. Scotch correspondence was similarly divided. Cf. *ibid.*, Scotch Letter Books, vol. iii, p. 219, Stanhope to Argyll, Oct. 27, 1715: 'By the flying packet which arrived last night, I received the honour of your Grace's of the 21st inst. by which I perceive neither my Lord Townshend's of the 4th nor mine of the 11th were then come to hands.' See too Brown, *History of Scotland*, iii. 171-2.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Stuart MSS.* ii. 228; Brown, iii. 190; Lang, iv. 232.

the present administration is the first that was ever yet known to be answerable for the whole government, with a Secretary of State for one part of the Kingdom, who, they are assured, acts counter to all their measures.' The King was moved by these arguments to dismiss Roxburgh, though he did it in the gentlest manner and gave him a pension of £3,000 at the same time.¹

The third secretaryship was again allowed to lapse after Roxburgh's dismissal. Some thought that it would be given to Argyll's brother, Islay, since the breach between Walpole and the 'Squadrone' was naturally followed by a close alliance between Walpole and the 'Argathelians', as Argyll's group was called. But Walpole decided it would be for the best not to have a Secretary for Scotland and his decision was popular in the Northern Kingdom. Duncan Forbes, the sagacious Lord Advocate, expressed his joy that Scotland was to be delivered from the rule of a Minister who could not be expected to be impartial in the distribution of patronage.² Once more the Scotch signet was committed to the care of the Secretaries for the Northern and Southern Departments. But though both Secretaries transacted some Scotch business the bulk of the work was done by Newcastle.³ Furthermore, Townshend and Harrington as a rule, though not always, only meddled with Scotch business when they were in Hanover in attendance upon the King. Yet though Newcastle almost monopolized the executive work both policy and patronage were largely con-

¹ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Regencies, 69, Newcastle to Townshend, July 7, 1725. For the riots in Scotland see also Brown, iii. 267 sqq. For Walpole's attitude see Coxe, ii. 234, and Omond, *The Lord Advocates of Scotland*, i. 337. For Roxburgh's dismissal see P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., George I, 57, 97, Delafaye to Newcastle, Aug. 21, 1725: 'An express is come in from Hanover. . . . The Duke of Roxburghe is to deliver up the seals to your Grace, for which there is a warrant under signet and sign manual and a letter to him, very civil, putting it upon the King's judging it for his service to have no Secretary of State for Scotland, and that as a mark of His Majesty's acceptance of his services he is to have a pension of £3,000 a year; this letter is written by my Lord Townshend.'

² Burton, *Lives of Lord Lovat and Duncan Forbes*, 333, Forbes to —, Sept. 7, 1725; Omond, *The Lord Advocates of Scotland*, i. 338-9; Brown, iii. 209-10.

³ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Scotch Warrant Books, 32 and 33. Most of the warrants are countersigned by Newcastle, but some by Townshend and, later, by Harrington. Some also were countersigned by both Secretaries. Such warrants are always for the appointment of Writers to the Signet, of Clerks to the Justices of the Peace of a shire, or of Sheriffs. Yet not all such warrants were countersigned by both Secretaries. See e.g. Warrant Books, 32, p. 172. I am unable to account for this procedure. After Tweeddale's resignation in 1746, however, though the old arrangement with regard to Scotland was resumed there seems to be no case of a warrant signed by two Secretaries.

trolled by Argyll and Islay. Nor was the influence of the Lord Advocate inconsiderable.¹ It should here be added that the oft-repeated statement that in 1731 the third secretaryship was revived and bestowed on Charles, Earl of Selkirk, is inaccurate. Selkirk was never Secretary of State, nor was there a third Secretary between the dismissal of Roxburgh and the fall of Walpole.²

During the last years of his administration Walpole quarrelled with Argyll, though not with Islay. Hence Argyll together with the leaders of the 'Squadron' exerted his influence against Walpole in the election of 1741, which proved highly favourable to the Opposition, especially in Scotland. Pulteney, however, in the hour of his triumph preferred the 'Squadron' to Argyll, and insisted that the Marquis of Tweeddale be appointed third Secretary, which was accordingly done.³ Tweeddale was at that time not even a representative peer, nor had he held any office before. But his opinions were those of Pulteney and Carteret, one of whose daughters he afterwards married. So he became Secretary of State and was shortly afterwards elected to a seat in the Upper House. Argyll forthwith began to show signs of displeasure and soon broke with the Ministry.⁴ Thus Tweeddale got the control of Scotch affairs and very ill he managed them. His incompetence was particularly dangerous when the rebellion of 1745 broke out. He at first affected to treat the rising as a trivial matter, much to the indignation of

¹ See the documents cited in the previous note. Also Mathieson, *Scotland and the Union*, 331; Brown, iii. 210. The correspondence printed in *More Culloden Papers*, vol. iii, shows that Newcastle was in charge of Scotch correspondence. For the power of the Lord Advocate see also the lives of Duncan Forbes by Burton and by Omond (*The Lord Advocates of Scotland*, vol. i).

² I do not know the origin of this error. The earliest work in which I have found it is Beaton's *Political Index*, i. 409 (edition of 1806). For proof that the statement is erroneous see *supra*, p. 35.

³ Coxe, *Pelham*, i. 30. Tweeddale's patent declared that: 'Whereas the public businesses of this Our United Kingdom of Great Britain are increasing it seemeth expedient to Us to appoint one other Principal Secretary of State besides our two Principal Secretaries of State already nominated and constituted. Know ye therefore that we . . . do nominate . . . John, Marquis of Tweeddale, to be one of our Principal Secretaries of State, to have, hold, exercise and enjoy the said office, with all commodities, pre-eminences, places, dignities, allowances, emoluments whatsoever belonging or appertaining to the same office, during Our pleasure.' See P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Scotch Warrant Books, 33, pp. 1 sqq. (second numbers). Tweeddale countersigned all Scotch warrants until his resignation, save for a few countersigned by Carteret when the latter was in Germany with George II.

⁴ Omond, *The Arncliffe Memoirs*, 97.

Newcastle and Hardwicke.¹ Moreover he quarrelled with Islay, who since his brother's death in 1743 had been Duke of Argyll, and a mighty man in Scotland. Their dissensions had the gravest results. Because Tweeddale and Argyll could not agree as to the nominees no Lord-Lieutenants were appointed for Scotland. Several of the Scotch Peers desired to arm their tenants against the rebels; but many of them swore they would not move while Tweeddale remained Secretary. Argyll of course encouraged their hatred of Tweeddale and was backed by Pelham.² Tweeddale, who since the fall of Carteret had been isolated in the Cabinet, was subjected to endless slights and insults by his colleagues. Their object was to drive him out of office, and in this they succeeded; for on January 11, 1746, Tweeddale resigned. His under-secretary Andrew Mitchell, the future diplomat, expressed surprise that he had not gone out long before, so bad had been his treatment.³

After Tweeddale's resignation Newcastle again took over the management of Scotch affairs. When Newcastle ceased to be Secretary Scotland remained in the Northern Department.⁴ It is a tribute to Newcastle's skill in extending his sphere of office that he managed to annex Scotch business when in charge of the Southern Department and to retain it when transferred to the Northern.⁵ No other Secretary was able to do the like.

The bulk of Scotch business does not seem to have been very great. A single entry book suffices to contain the warrants for the years 1736-53, while the entry book of out-letters for the period January 1747 to May 1753 has only 163 entries. This apparent inactivity was perhaps due to the fact that the Lord Advocate was doing work which otherwise would have fallen to the Secretaries, for he acted rather as a Minister than as a lawyer. Nor must the influence of the two Dukes of Argyll, and later of Murray, afterwards Lord Mansfield, and of Dundas be forgotten. When an English Secretary had charge of Scotch affairs he was

¹ Yorke, *Hardwicke*, i. 460, Birch to the Hon. P. Yorke, Sept. 28, 1745.

² Clerk, *Memoirs*, 181; *Marchmont Papers*, i. 106-7, 149-56.

³ Omond, *The Arncliffe Memoirs*, 136-8, Mitchell to Dundas, Dec. 31, 1745, and Jan. 4, 1746.

⁴ See the Scotch Warrant Books for the period; also the *Calendar of Home Office Papers, 1760-75*. On Jan. 4, 1746, Tweeddale ordered all his letters to be sent to Newcastle (State Paps. Dom., Scotland, 27. 5).

⁵ There are a few cases of interference in Scotch affairs by Newcastle's fellow Secretary, but usually when one or the other was in Hanover. No real attempt was made to restrict Newcastle's power.

usually guided by a Scot. Yet even the Scotch Secretaries do not seem to have been very busy. The Northern Kingdom afforded little work to the Secretaries. There were warrants to countersign, but not very many. There was correspondence to conduct, but not much; the Secretaries corresponded with the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, with the Lord Advocate, and with the Lord Justice Clerk. They sent orders to the Sheriffs, though not often. They notified the King's commands to the proper persons in Scotland. They received petitions and either laid them before the King or referred them, if relating to money matters, to the Treasury.¹

More important than these things, however, were patronage and electioneering. The Secretary in charge of Scotland could not but have a great influence over Scotch appointments. This was doubtless an inducement for Newcastle to undertake Scotch business. The Duke was certainly concerned with questions of patronage and was the recipient of numerous solicitations. Earlier and later Secretaries must have been in a similar position.² Moreover, the Secretary in charge of Scotch affairs usually exerted himself at the time of an election to secure the return of the sixteen Scotch Peers whose names appeared on a list issued by the Government. Not infrequently his activities aroused protests among the Scotch. There was an outcry in 1734 and again in 1774. But neither Newcastle nor Suffolk were greatly perturbed. On the contrary the Secretary in charge of Scotch affairs came to regard the selection of the representative Peers as controlled by him. Stormont in 1780 was indignant when North proposed to make Lord Glencairn one of the official candidates without receiving his previous consent.³

Irish affairs were in the charge of the Secretary for the

¹ See e.g. P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Scotland, 25-7. These contain letters from the Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Advocate, and the Generals in Scotland for the years 1745-6. *The Albemarle Papers* contain the correspondence of Albemarle's Commander-in-Chief in Scotland 1746-8. There are abstracts of the Scotch correspondence for the years 1760-75 in the *Calendar of Home Office Papers*. See also Chapter II for military affairs.

² Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32993, ff. 432^v, 480^r, Memoranda by Newcastle dealing with questions of patronage.

³ Omond, *The Lord Advocates of Scotland*, i. 347 sqq.; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32994, ff. 100-1; *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, iv, No. 777; *Hist. MSS. Comm., Report V*, App. 209, North to Gower, Sept. 30, 1774; *Corr. of George III*, v. 3144, 3148.

Southern Department. There is little doubt that even during the last years of the seventeenth century the intervention of the Secretary for the Northern Department was regarded as outside the ordinary course of business.¹ Thus in February 1681, Ormonde, then Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, was directed to correspond with the senior Secretary, that is the Secretary for the Southern Department.² Five years later Clarendon, the new Lord-Lieutenant, complained that business was delayed because Sunderland would not answer his letters, which implies that Sunderland and not Middleton was responsible for the conduct of Irish business in England.³ None the less it was not then unusual for the Lord-Lieutenant to carry on a subsidiary correspondence with the Secretary for the Northern Department, who was sometimes able and willing to expedite the dispatch of business by indirect means. Such a correspondence, however, was only semi-official, if that.⁴ During the reign of William III, however, both Secretaries were at one time actively and directly concerned with Irish affairs. Between December 1690 and March 1692 both Sidney and Nottingham conducted Irish correspondence and countersigned Irish warrants.⁵ But this was quite exceptional and was probably due to Sidney's special interest in Irish affairs.⁶

In subsequent years the old rule once more obtained. During his second term of office indeed Shrewsbury had some Irish correspondence before the death of Trenchard. But when that event occurred Capel, one of the Irish Lords Justices, wrote to Shrewsbury in terms which showed that the Secretary for the Southern Department had Irish business under his care, and expressed his joy that he had now to deal with a Minister so agreeable to him as Shrewsbury.⁷ Neither Trumbull nor Vernon, when holding the Northern Department, were wholly

¹ This appears from the entry books for the period. See P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Ireland), 1 and 2.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Ormonde MSS.* v. 568, F. Gwyn to Ormonde, Feb. 1, 1681.

³ *Clarendon Corr.* i. 552, Clarendon to Rochester, Aug. 22, 1686.

⁴ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Ormonde MSS.* v. 576, 588. Ormonde kept Conway informed of what was passing in Ireland. But Conway had interests of his own there.

⁵ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Ireland), 1, pp. 88-158, 185-373.

⁶ Sidney became Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland when he ceased to be Secretary of State.

⁷ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch MSS.* ii. i. 184, Capel to Shrewsbury, May 12, 1695. Much correspondence between Shrewsbury and Capel is calendared in the earlier part of this volume. The correspondence, however, does not seem to have caused any ill-feeling between Shrewsbury and Trenchard. See p. 103.

unconnected with Ireland. Their interference in Irish affairs was, however, no doubt partly due to the frequent indispositions and absence from London of Shrewsbury. After Shrewsbury's resignation things resumed their normal course and henceforth the Secretary for the Southern Department had practically a monopoly of Irish business.¹

It was the duty of the Secretary of State in charge of Irish affairs to correspond with the Lord-Lieutenant or the Lords Justices of Ireland, and with the Secretary of State of Ireland. When the Irish secretaryship of State became a sinecure in the course of the eighteenth century correspondence with him was largely replaced by correspondence with the Secretary of the Lord-Lieutenant. The correspondence with these persons dealt with the management of the Irish Parliament, with Irish politics, and with the Irish army. The Secretary for the Southern Department was the proper person to ascertain the King's pleasure and communicate it to his servants in Ireland. He procured the royal sign manual for warrants relating to Ireland. He was closely concerned with questions of patronage.² It should be added, however, that on all matters touching the revenue the Lord-Lieutenant was instructed to communicate with the Treasury and not with a Secretary of State. In this, as in most other respects, the Treasury was jealous of its autonomy.³

During the first twenty years of Charles II's reign the amount of colonial business done by the Secretaries of State largely

¹ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Ireland), 2. All letters from Oct. 20, 1696, to Feb. 26, 1696-7, are signed by Trumbull. But the first of these begins with the words 'In the absence of his Grace the Duke of Shrewsbury'. For Vernon see *Calendar of Treasury Papers, 1697-1702*, 163; *Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch MSS.* ii. 2. 610. For the period after Shrewsbury's resignation see the Irish Entry Books in the P.R.O. These show that the intervention of the Northern Secretary was exceptional. See Entry Books, 3, Boyle to the Lord-Lieutenant, July 28, 1709: 'In the absence of my Lord Sunderland, who is gone out of town.'

² For the Irish Secretary of State see 'The Office of Secretary of State for Ireland' by H. Wood in *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, vol. xxxviii, Section C, No. 4, 1928. The relations of the Secretary of State for the Southern Department to Ireland can be studied for the years 1689-97 and 1702-4 in the *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*, and for the years 1760-75 in the *Calendar of Home Office Papers*. The Irish Entry Books in the P.R.O. show that the business was of the same character during the years not covered by the above-mentioned *Calendars*. For the army see also Chapter II.

³ A clause to this effect was regularly inserted in the Lord-Lieutenant's 'Instructions'. See Brit. Mus., Lansdowne MSS. 1152 A, f. 319v; *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*, 1693, 195; *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, i, No. 1782. See, too, Evans; *Secretary of State*, 333.

depended upon their own pleasure. There was indeed a tendency to regard the Colonies as forming part of the Southern Department; but both Secretaries could deal with Colonial affairs and both did so.¹ The functions of the Secretaries remained undefined partly because they were not very important. Royal supervision over the Colonies was largely exercised by a special committee of the Privy Council which had been set up in 1675.² In the seventeenth century the Privy Council and its committees played a great part in the work of government and while this system was in force the activities of the Secretaries were necessarily circumscribed. Thus while the Committee of Trade and Plantations existed there could be no real Colonial Ministry. This Committee consisted nominally of twenty-one persons, among whom were the Secretaries of State. Nine of the twenty-one were given 'the immediate care and intendency of those affairs, in regard they had been formerly conversant and acquainted therewith'. But neither of the Secretaries were included among the nine. Such was the Committee in its original form.³ In practice, however, the meetings of the Committee were often attended by Privy Councillors who were not among the nine nor among the twenty-one. Even so the average attendance was not more than seven and few troubled to come regularly.⁴ Evidently interest in Colonial questions was not widespread.

It was the business of the Committee to prepare 'Instructions' for Governors of Colonies and to correspond with them.⁵ When a Colony was under the control of Proprietors the latter were under an obligation to keep the Committee informed of what was passing in the territories assigned to them. The Committee, moreover, endeavoured to secure the enforcement of the Navigation Acts. They inquired into complaints of misgovernment. They examined all laws passed by Colonial legislatures and reported on them to the King in Council. They likewise presented reports to the Privy Council on questions of a political

¹ Evans, *Secretary of State*, 315 sqq.

² My account of Colonial affairs during the years 1681-96 is based upon the *Calendars of State Papers Colonial* and also upon the following modern works: Root, *The Lords of Trade and Plantations 1675-96*; Bieber, *The Lords of Trade and Plantations 1675-96*; Beer, *The Old Colonial System*, 1. 256 sqq.

³ *Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series*, i, No. 1021.

⁴ Bieber, 47-8, 89. After 1678, moreover, the Committee was less active. See Root, 24.

⁵ Every Governor received 'Instructions' upon his appointment. See also *infra*, p. 45.

or economic nature which affected the Colonies, and their advice was generally taken.¹ These comprehensive duties the Committee had at first discharged with some diligence and efficiency, though at the time when this study commences they had begun to show signs of slackness.

The Secretaries of State were concerned with Colonial affairs both as Ministers and as members of the Committee. This membership was not merely formal. The attendance of the Secretaries compares not unfavourably with that of other members. Though the Committee had been ordered to meet once a week the number of annual sessions varied between thirty-five and forty-five in the years 1681-5, while during the years 1686-8 the average number of meetings was sixteen. Now Jenkins attended seventy-eight meetings in the years 1680-4; Sunderland attended sixty-two meetings in the years 1683-8; Middleton attended sixty-six meetings in the years 1685-8.² These facts help to explain the comparative paucity of the correspondence between the Colonial Governors and the Secretaries, since the latter as members of the Committee were in a position to acquaint themselves with dispatches addressed to it. Nor is it possible to establish any clear distinction between the correspondence of the Governors with the Committee and that of the Governors with the Secretaries, for both dealt with the same matters or very nearly so. Moreover, apart from coming to the Committee, the Secretaries during the years 1681-8, with one exception, showed little interest in Colonial affairs. Jenkins was here as elsewhere zealous in the discharge of his duties. But the other Secretaries, especially Sunderland, proved dilatory and negligent.³ Such conduct was easily possible because no one person was responsible for Colonial administration. A keen and energetic Secretary might do much; an idle Secretary need do very little.⁴ Since the Secretaries became negligent the Committee gained in importance. Though far from being all that it should have been its deficiencies were largely supplied by William Blathwayt, who acted as its Secretary. This duty should have been performed by the four Clerks of the Privy Council in turn; but the work of Secretary

¹ Bieber, 24; Beer, 258.

² Bieber, 25-6, 91-2; Root, 24.

³ See the correspondence of the Secretaries in the *Calendar of State Papers Colonial*. Also Bieber, 50; Root, 33.

⁴ Arlington, Coventry, and Williamson had all shown interest in the Colonies (Root, 27).

soon came to be done by Blathwayt alone, whose original task it had been to assist the Clerks of the Council.¹ Blathwayt often corresponded with Colonial Governors and was probably better informed than any member of the Committee.²

The Secretaries of State were supposed to execute the wishes of the Committee and also in some cases to convey to it the royal commands. They directed the Committee to prepare 'Instructions' for newly appointed Governors. They procured the royal sign manual to warrants and countersigned such warrants as needed a countersign. Frequently they conveyed the King's commands to Colonial Governors. With these last too they sometimes carried on a correspondence. But the Governors often contented themselves with sending to the Secretary duplicates of their dispatches to the Committee. On occasion also they merely referred him to dispatches addressed to the Committee.³ Until the resignation of Jenkins both Secretaries executed Colonial business, though the Secretary for the Southern Department did more than his colleague. But after that event Sunderland practically excluded Middleton from executive work in relation to the Colonies. This may seem to conflict with the previous statement that Sunderland was not much interested in Colonial affairs. But Sunderland left most of the correspondence to the Committee. Even when he did receive dispatches from the Colonies they were often laid before the Committee, who reported on them.⁴

The Revolution was not followed by any immediate change of great moment. William nominated a new Committee of twelve for Trade and Plantations, instead of the old Committee.⁵ The members showed some diligence and the average number of sessions rose to forty. The Secretaries, however, were far from

¹ According to the *Dict. Nat. Biog.* Blathwayt did not become a Clerk of the Council until 1686. But he acted as Secretary to the Committee long before that date. See Root, 33, and Bieber, 45.

² e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Col. 1689-92*, No. 2552, Sir W. Phips to Nottingham: 'I have written at length to Mr. Blathwayt, so shall spare you a long letter.'

³ My account of the Secretaries' duties is based on the *Calendars of State Papers Colonial*. As to the correspondence see e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Col. 1681-5*, No. 187, Stapleton to Jenkins, July 26, 1681; *ibid.*, No. 669, Sir T. Lynch to Jenkins, Aug. 29, 1682; *Cal. State Paps. Col. 1685-8*, No. 576, Lord Howard to Sunderland, Feb. 20, 1686.

⁴ Bieber, 50; Root, 33.

⁵ *Cal. State Paps. Col. 1689-92*, No. 17. The members were the Lord President, the Lord Privy Seal, Devonshire (Lord Steward), Bath, Fauconberg, Mordaunt (First Lord of the Treasury), Sir H. Capel, Powell, Russell, the Secretaries, and the Bishop of London.

regular attendants. Nottingham came to forty-two meetings; Trenchard to forty-four; Shrewsbury during both his terms of office to fifty-two.¹ As regards executive work the Secretaries continued to act much as before. But though Colonial business did not by any means fall exclusively to the Secretary for the Southern Department, it is plain that he was looked upon as the proper Minister to transact such business.² Nottingham in particular had a great share of Colonial work. Trenchard, on the other hand, did remarkably little, perhaps because Shrewsbury had a special interest in the Colonies at that time.³ A great deal still depended on the inclinations of each individual Secretary.

The chief business of the Committee at this time was to consider schemes of Colonial defence. Their deliberations on this subject, however, were not productive of much good. Yet it was not for this but for another reason that they became involved in general discredit. Parliament took it very ill that the trade of the nation suffered so heavily during the war. The Committee was thought to be at fault and there was talk of abolishing it and setting up a Council of Trade in its place by Act of Parliament. William III, who wished to safeguard his prerogative, replied by dissolving the Committee and replaced it by a new body which was to enjoy a long existence. William nominated certain persons as Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. In common parlance, however, they were called the Board of Trade and by this name they will hereafter be mentioned.⁴ All the great Ministers had seats on the Board *ex officio*. Besides these there were also eight other members, who received a salary and one of whom was nominated President. The real work of the Board was in practice done by the paid members, for the attendance of the others was but intermittent. That work was not executive but advisory. The Board was to consider schemes for the encouragement of trade and the employment of the poor and to make representations thereupon to the King or the Privy Council. With regard to Colonial affairs their functions were more numerous. It was incumbent

¹ Bieber, 27, 91-2. It should be remembered that the Committee was abolished in the spring of 1696.

² e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Col.* 1689-92, No. 1584.

³ *Cal. State Paps. Col.* 1693-6, No. 1195.

⁴ The history of the Board has been written by Dr. Dickerson (*American Colonial Government 1696-1765*) and by Dr. Basye (*The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations 1748-82*).

upon the Board to inform themselves of the condition of the plantations as well in respect to the 'administration of justice as in relation to commerce', to 'look into the Instructions to be given to Governors there to see what may be proper to be added or omitted', 'as often as occasion shall require to consider of proper persons to be Governors, or Deputy Governors, or to be of the Council, or Council at law, or Secretaries, in order to present their names to His Majesty in Council', 'to examine such acts of the Assemblies as shall be transmitted for His Majesty's approbation and to represent their usefulness or mischief and to consider what matters may be recommended as fit to be passed in the Assemblies there', and 'to hear complaints of oppressions and maladministration in order to represent as aforesaid' (*sc.* to the King in Council), and also 'to require an account of monies given for public uses by the assemblies and how the same has been applied'. In order to discharge these duties the Board was empowered to examine witnesses on oath. For this purpose the quorum was fixed at three; but all representations to the King had to be signed by five members.¹

The Secretaries of State might therefore be connected with the Board in two ways. They regularly asked the Board to consider questions relating to commerce and to present reports thereupon to the King in Council. They further instructed British envoys and consuls to inform the Board from time to time of the state of trade in places where they were resident. They sometimes also ordered envoys at the suggestion of the Board to make representation to the Courts, where they were accredited, on commercial matters.² Far more important, however, were the relations of the Secretaries to the Board in respect of Colonial affairs.

The Secretaries of State performed with regard to Colonial administration all the executive duties which did not fall to the Admiralty or Treasury.³ The purpose of the Board of Trade was to supply information and advice. The Secretaries could

¹ I have used the transcript of the Board's Commission in Shelburne MSS. 134, pp. 1 sqq.

² e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1697, Nos. 295, 358; *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1702-3, No. 639; *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 10453, ff. 67 sqq.; *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, i, Nos. 281, 1594, 1608.

³ As to the duties of the Admiralty and Treasury see Beer, *The Old Colonial System*, i. 258 sqq. See also *infra*, p. 52, n. 4. In practice there was a good deal of confusion owing to the lack of inter-departmental co-ordination.

hardly give very close attention to the Colonies and the Board might do what they could not. No doubt a Secretary of State at the present day has to transact more business than had his predecessors in 1696, but his duties are more specialized. Then a Secretary might be concerned with foreign, domestic, military, naval, Irish, and Colonial affairs alike. No man, however, could master all these subjects. An efficient Board of Trade could act as an expert adviser to the Secretary in charge of Colonial affairs, while the terms of the Board's commission would prevent it from becoming the Secretary's rival. The eight paid members had for the most part no other official duties and so were in a position to devote themselves to their task. Thus there was much to be said for the new arrangement. It is not, however, by any means certain that appointments to the Board were always wisely made. But the Board certainly devoted great care to the Colonies. Though not explicitly instructed to do so, they carried on a frequent and regular correspondence with Colonial Governors. Since the latter also sometimes corresponded with a Secretary of State confusion was only averted because the Board usually sent abstracts of letters from Governors to the Secretaries and the latter transmitted to the Board copies of their dispatches to Governors. Nor must it be forgotten that the Secretaries could attend meetings of the Board and did so when they saw fit.¹

After the appointment of the Board of Trade the Secretary for the Northern Department tended more and more to leave Colonial business to his colleague. Trumbull, it is true, and Vernon—while he held the Northern Province—had a certain amount of correspondence with Colonial Governors; but the sickness of Shrewsbury will account for this.² In the years following Shrewsbury's resignation Jersey, Hedges, Manchester, and Vernon all corresponded with the Board about Colonial matters, but Vernon had much more correspondence with Colonial Governors than the other Secretaries.³ During Anne's reign the Secretary for the Northern Department had little to

¹ Dickerson, 110.

² See the *Calendars of State Papers Colonial* for the period. Most of Trumbull's work was done between November 1696 and March 1697. Vernon did much more Colonial business than Shrewsbury. It cannot be a mere chance that so little of Shrewsbury's Colonial correspondence is extant. He can scarcely have done a great deal during this period.

³ I have formed this opinion from an examination of the Secretarial correspondence in the *Calendars of State Papers Colonial*.

do with the Colonies.¹ These were now regarded as being within the Southern Province.²

As before the amount of Colonial business done by the Secretaries largely depended upon their own wishes. Sometimes the Board did most of the work, while the Secretaries confined themselves to the executive business which was unavoidable. But when he so chose the Secretary for the Southern Department could influence policy. Thus Sunderland, after the dismissal of Hedges, showed himself a real Minister for Colonial affairs. He sent a circular to Governors of Colonies desiring them to send him an account of all important events which occurred in their governments.³ He directed the Board of Trade to send him any representations which they intended to lay before the Queen, since he claimed a right to be acquainted with the contents of any document relating to his Department before it was transmitted to the Queen. His wishes were followed and a precedent was created.⁴ The Board on their part complained that Sunderland treated them with neglect and asked him to inform them of such of the Queen's orders as related to the business of the Board of Trade and also to let them know the date of the Queen's signature to documents which they had prepared, in order that an entry to this effect might be made in their records.⁵ The Board's request is of special interest as showing that neither the Board as a whole nor its President had then regular access to the sovereign. Though it could make representation to the sovereign in Council, it could only communicate with him or her through a Secretary. This rule had probably obtained from the first and certainly obtained

¹ Colonial defence is here left out of account. St. John was closely concerned with the Canada expedition of 1710. See Chapter II.

² e.g. *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 29589, f. 165^r, Hedges (then at Bath with the Queen) to Nottingham (then in London), Sept. 10, 1703: 'Here have been some gentleman today with a petition against the Act for removing the place of trade from Port Royal in Jamaica. . . . Her Majesty was pleased to command me to make a reference upon it to the Committee for Trade to examine the matter and make report to Her Majesty in Council which I have done accordingly, of which I thought necessary to give your Lordship notice, since it should have been done by you, if you had been here.'

³ *Cal. State Paps. Col.* 1706-8, No. 658.

⁴ *Cal. State Paps. Col.* 1706-8, No. 703. The document is also found in one of the Secretarial precedent books. See *P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various*, 8, p. 59. See too Dickerson, 108.

⁵ *Cal. State Paps. Col.* 1706-8, No. 1067. The Board prepared draughts of 'Instructions' to Governors which, after he has approved of them, were laid by the Secretary before the sovereign for signature.

for the future.¹ But on the whole the Board and the Secretaries seem to have worked together in tolerable harmony. The Board resigned itself to the supremacy of the Secretaries of State, while the latter were ready enough to make use of the Board. On certain questions indeed, such as frontier disputes with the French, Colonial defences, relations with the Indians, and breaches of the commercial laws, the Board rarely offered an opinion after the first years of its existence. These matters they simply referred to the Secretary for the Southern Department. But on other matters the Board freely exercised its right to make representations. Further, the Board was always asked by the Secretary to prepare the 'Instructions' which every Governor received upon his appointment.²

The relations of the Board of Trade with the Secretaries remained unchanged for many years after the death of Anne. Even Newcastle, greedy of power as he was, did not seriously encroach upon the Board's sphere of duties.³ He certainly controlled most of the Colonial patronage. But this was nothing new; for the right of the Board to submit names to the King had never been much exercised.⁴ Even when Shrewsbury had been Secretary Colonial offices had been regarded as his gift.⁵ Nottingham during his second term of office virtually appointed Governors.⁶ Craggs was in receipt of solicitation from the friends of aspirants to Colonial posts.⁷ Newcastle of course took a keen interest in matters of patronage, and the Board was so far from raising objections that their President once asked for the bestowal upon one of his relatives of an office, for which the Board had a nominal right to recommend.⁸ One branch of

¹ *Cal. State Paps. Col.* 1706-8, No. 1067. Cf. Dickerson, 108-9. Sometimes a copy of the representation was sent to the Secretary instead of the original. See too *infra*, pp. 50-1.

² Dickerson, 109.

³ Dr. Dickerson (p. 34) holds that after the accession of George I the Board became inefficient and that the power of the Secretaries increased. It is not germane to the purpose of this study to inquire into the wisdom of the Board's proceedings; but they do not seem to have been less diligent after Anne's death than before. The 'Journals of the Board of Trade' have been calendared for the period 1696-1734; from the Calendars it would appear that the Board continued to act much as before. See too *infra*, p. 50, n. 2.

⁴ For the offices to which the Board had a nominal right to recommend see *supra*, p. 45.

⁵ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Buccleuch MSS.* ii. 2. 448, H. Guy to Shrewsbury, Feb. 16, 1696-7.

⁶ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 29589, f. 384, J. Evans to Nottingham, Mar. 10, 1703-4.

⁷ Brit. Mus., Stowe MSS. 246, f. 216, Wager to Craggs, Jan. 28, 1718-19.

⁸ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32699, f. 481, Monson to Newcastle, Oct. 25, 1742.

patronage alone the Board was resolved to keep. When Newcastle named a Colonial Councillor they protested vigorously and Newcastle so far acknowledged the justice of the rebuke as to abstain from similar acts for the future.¹ Patronage then was largely in the Secretary's control, but the Board continued to influence policy in a marked degree. During the years 1723-34 they made some two hundred representations.² After 1737 indeed the importance of the Board declined for some time. The reason was not so much that Newcastle desired to limit its activities as that for many years Britain was on the brink of war or actually engaged in war. While war was raging it was only natural that Colonial business should chiefly be of a military character; then civil business was of minor importance. Monson, who was President of the Board of Trade during the years 1737-48, has been taxed with indolence and inefficiency. But even under his able and energetic successor the Board had little to do in the years 1757-61. While Monson was President, moreover, the business of the Board, though it decreased in quantity, did not vary in kind. Their journals do not lead one to suppose that Newcastle was interfering unduly with their activities.³ It was only natural that at such a time the correspondence of the Governors with the Secretary of State should be more copious and more important than that of the Governors with the Board of Trade. Newcastle indeed did not always send to the Board copies of the dispatches he had addressed to the Governors, as had been the practice. But these dispatches dealt largely with military questions.⁴ The Board too continued to meet frequently and the paid members attended fairly well.⁵ On one occasion

¹ 'Journals of the Board (Calendar) 1723-8', 287. For proof that the Board henceforth named Councillors see e.g. P.R.O., Colonial Office, 391. 50, p. 81. Journal of the Board, July 21, 1743.

² Walpole says (*Memoirs of George III*, ii. 50) that Newcastle was not interested in the Colonies. If military and diplomatic affairs are left out of consideration, the remark is at least partly true.

³ The 'Journals' of the Board, which had formerly been folios, shrank to quartos in 1737. The volume for 1737 contains 200 pages, that for 1742 116 pages, that for 1743 121 pages, and that for 1746 111 pages. Thus business decreased after the outbreak of war. But there seems to be no hint that Newcastle was trying to depress the Board. See P.R.O., Colonial Office, 391. 46, 50, 53.

⁴ Dickerson, 36 sqq.; Basye, 25-6.

⁵ In 1722 there were 107 meetings, in 1736 there were 126, in 1742 there were 138, in 1743 there were 119, in 1746 there were 108. The 'Journals' for the year 1722 have been calendared, but not for the others. Cf. P.R.O., Colonial Office, 391. 45, 50, 53, for the years 1736, 1742, 1743, and 1746.

they informed Newcastle they had received no letter from a Governor for nearly four years. They did not blame Newcastle for this but requested him to bring pressure to bear on the Governor.¹ Thus there is probably not sufficient reason to believe that Newcastle sought to reduce the Board to insignificance.²

In 1748 the Earl of Halifax was appointed President of the Board of Trade. Halifax was an able and vigorous young man and therefore desired to increase the scope of his office. The return of peace would in any case have given the Board more to do; but this alone did not content Halifax, who wished for power to execute as well as power to advise. This wish, however, could not be gratified unless the activities of the Secretary for the Southern Department were restricted. Halifax's ambitions accordingly gave rise to a series of discussions and conflicts which are of much interest.

Though his appointment had been due to Bedford, Halifax soon came to hate the Duke when he found that the latter was opposed to his plans for increasing the powers of the Board.³ As was natural, Bedford cordially reciprocated the feeling and told the King at the time of his resignation that a scheme was on foot to give Halifax the control of Colonial administration, a scheme concerted by Newcastle and Halifax behind the King's back.⁴ There was some truth in this, for Halifax was pouring his grievances into the ear of Newcastle, who, now that he no longer held the Southern Department, had no objection to an augmentation of Halifax's powers, if it could be obtained without undue trouble for himself. Halifax complained that the Board had of late been given to understand that it should not make representations, unless moved thereto by the Secretary of State or the Privy Council, and that they had lost most of their patronage.⁵ In August 1751 Halifax asked that he might have

¹ P.R.O., Colonial Office, 391. 53, p. 71, Journal of the Board, July 25, 1746.

² I am inclined to think that Dr. Dickerson and Dr. Basye both somewhat exaggerate the depression of the Board during the years 1737-48. Dr. Basye admits that the Board had little to do during the Seven Years War, though he also says 'from 1752 to 1761 the Secretary of State had little to do with the civil administration in America' (pp. 102, 166). Surely conditions must have been much the same during the war of 1739-48. But to determine exactly what happened in those years would involve a detailed examination of all the very copious Colonial records, a task which I have not been able to undertake.

³ Dickerson, 39; Basye, 65.

⁴ Yorke, *Hardwicke*, ii. 116.

⁵ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32725, f. 91; Basye, 54. See also Appendix II and Appendix IV.

access to the King in order to discuss Colonial affairs with His Majesty. If this were not granted he desired that the Board, according to its commission, be allowed to present names for the higher Colonial appointments and to exercise a general supervision over Colonial affairs. In either case he wished to be called to the Cabinet. These requests were refused by the King.¹ But in December Halifax made further demands, which were granted in substance. While waiving his claim to a seat in the Cabinet, he asked that the Board should have control over all such patronage as did not fall to the Admiralty or Treasury. In this matter, however, he professed his willingness to consult the other Ministers. He asked, moreover, 'that it be fully understood that the Secretary of State for the Southern Department have no other authority in the Plantations or right of interfering in the appointment of officers there than the Secretary of State for the Northern Department and to evince this more clearly the Earl of Halifax proposes that the Board of Trade may be permitted to send such papers as shall be thought proper to be laid before His Majesty to either Secretary of State, but if any objection he is not aware of arises to this he desires to submit it for further consideration'. Lastly Halifax requested to be called to Cabinet meetings when Colonial affairs were under discussion.² In March 1752 an Order in Council made certain changes conformable to Halifax's wishes. The claim to control patronage was conceded, and Colonial Governors were ordered to send their dispatches to the Board, save when there was urgent need to obtain the King's directions or when they had to inform a Secretary of State of the steps they had taken to execute his orders.³ In practice the Governors corresponded with the Secretary only upon military and diplomatic matters. Henceforth too Halifax was called to the Cabinet when there was a debate on Colonial affairs.⁴

The effect of these changes was to make the Board of Trade stronger than it had been even before the recent war. The Southern Department of course suffered by this, though its holder remained the only Secretary to transact Colonial business. Halifax's demand that the Secretary for the Northern

¹ Basye, 67.

² Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32994, ff. 286-7. See too Basye, 69.

³ *Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series*, iv, pp. 154-5.

⁴ e.g. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 33029, f. 124.

Department should have as much authority in the Colonial sphere as his colleague was plainly unreasonable and was perhaps not seriously pressed.¹ Holdernessee, however, showed much annoyance at the concessions made to Halifax. There exists in the British Museum a volume of MSS. which once belonged to Horace Walpole. Among the documents therein contained is one which purports to be a copy of a letter from Holdernessee to Newcastle, written in December 1751. In this the Secretary protests against the proposed alterations and even threatens resignation.² The language of the letter is so exquisitely absurd that its authenticity becomes suspect. Horace Walpole was by no means incapable of composing such an epistle by way of a skit on the pompous and servile Holdernessee. But there would have been no point in doing so had not Holdernessee really held the opinions therein ascribed to him. Moreover, there is evidence in the Newcastle MSS. that Holdernessee strove to keep the new powers of the Board within as narrow limits as possible.³

If Holdernessee was angry because his sphere of duties had been diminished, Halifax was dissatisfied because he had not obtained all that he really wished. Halifax wanted or soon came to want to be made a third Secretary of State with the Colonies as his Province. Ambitious though he was Halifax was probably inspired by a love of efficiency as much as by ambition. The then system of Colonial administration was unduly cumbersome. A few years later Thomas Pownall, who spoke as an expert, poured scorn upon it and with good reason. The Secretary of State for the Southern Department, the Board of Trade, the Board of Ordnance, the Treasury, and the Admiralty were all concerned with Colonial affairs in one or more of their aspects.⁴

¹ e.g. P.R.O., Colonial Office, 391. 59 and 61. 'Journals' of the Board of Trade for 1752 and 1754. These show no trace of interference by the Secretary for the Northern Department. When the Board communicated with a Secretary about the Colonies they always wrote to the Secretary for the Southern Department. Cf. e.g. *Ibid.* 61, p. 124.

² For this letter, which is too long to reproduce in the text, see Appendix III.

³ See Dr. Basye's quotations, pp. 71-2.

⁴ Pownall, *Administration of the Colonies*, i. 15 (ed. of 1774): 'While the military correspond with the Secretary of State, the civil in one part of their office with the Secretary of State, in another with the Board of Trade; while the Navy correspond in matters not merely naval with the Admiralty; while the Engineers correspond with the Board of Ordnance; officers of the revenue with the several boards of that branch; and have no communication with the department which has or ought to have the general direction and administration of this great . . . commercial

It was not the business of any one Minister to deal with Colonial problems as a whole. None the less a Colonial secretaryship was not created for several years. Halifax made repeated efforts to become Secretary, but in vain. Newcastle indeed was not unfavourable to the project and seriously considered the establishment of a third secretaryship.¹ In particular, during the prolonged and complicated negotiations which preceded his coalition with Pitt in 1757 Newcastle wished Halifax to be made Secretary for the Colonies. Yet he did not venture to impart the plan to Pitt, though Halifax was given to understand that his ambitions were about to be realized. The result was most painful for Halifax. When he told Pitt he was to be Secretary of State, the 'great commoner' replied that this was news to him and that in any case he would not tolerate Halifax's appointment. Halifax thereupon talked of resignation, but was finally pacified with a seat in the Cabinet, which, however, was granted him not as President of the Board of Trade but as Earl of Halifax.²

During the Seven Years War the Board had little business, though Pitt did not interfere much with civil affairs.³ None the less Pitt showed himself eager to restrict the Board's powers when the chance came. Early in 1761 Halifax resigned and Pitt seized the opportunity to secure a revocation of the Order in Council made in 1752. Since then the Board had made recommendations to Colonial offices. The new Order robbed them of this privilege, though it left untouched the direction to Colonial Governors to correspond with the Board.⁴ The change was not happy, for it proved impossible to secure capable interest, who will be the person that can collect; who does or ever did collect into one view all these matters of information and knowledge?' Yet this was written after the creation of the Colonial secretaryship, when things should have been better than before.

¹ Dodington, *Diary*, 349, 396; Basye, 95-6.

² Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32997, f. 286r.

³ 'Kensington, Sept. 3, 1757.

⁴ 'This read and approved by Mr. Pitt. Lord Halifax to be called to the Cabinet Council not as head of the Board of Trade, but as Earl of Halifax.

'All the present arrangements to stand as they are and the Secretary of State to carry the recommendations from the Board of Trade as practised at present.

'The case of Lord Mansfield being called as Lord Mansfield and not as Chief Justice is what that of Lord Halifax would be.'

See also *Bedford Corr.* ii. 249-50, Rigby to Bedford, June 18, 1757; Basye, 97.

³ Basye, 102, 166.

⁴ Walpole, *Memoirs of George III*, i. 33-4; *Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series*, iv, p. 157.

Presidents while their functions were thus restricted. Yet in the earlier part of the century the Board had done good work and had had competent Presidents. Perhaps the fault was in the men rather than in the system. However this may be, though the conclusion of peace brought with it an increase of business, the Presidents were either inefficient or discontented. Shelburne, who held the office for a few months in 1763, found it so disagreeable that he soon resigned, and the general opinion was that the Presidency was a post of extreme discomfort.¹ The Secretaries on their part did not show much interest in or capacity for Colonial business. Egremont never even read the Board's commission. Halifax, who was appointed to the Southern Department largely because of his experience in Colonial affairs, scarcely proved fit for his task.²

This state of things gave rise to much criticism. Many held that a Colonial secretaryship should be created, as the only means of securing efficiency. Bute is reported to have offered such a position to Townshend in 1762.³ Two years later Chesterfield told Dartmouth, the President of the Board of Trade, that unless a Colonial Secretary was appointed America would be lost. Hillsborough, an ex-President, warned Dartmouth that unless the powers of the Board were increased his position would be one of humiliation.⁴ Dartmouth himself expressed a wish to be Secretary in the spring of 1766 and both Rockingham and Newcastle desired his appointment.⁵ The Rockingham Ministry, however, was on the brink of collapse and nothing was done. When Pitt came back to power he firmly refused to make Dartmouth Secretary of State, whereupon the latter resigned.⁶

When Pitt formed his Ministry he gave the Southern Department to his adherent Shelburne, desiring that one who was

¹ *Grenville Papers*, ii. 203; Grafton, *Autobiography*, 44.

² Basye, 124 sqq.

³ *Chatham Corr.* ii. 182, T. Nuthall to Lady Chatham, Oct. 14, 1762.

⁴ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Dartmouth MSS.*, iii. 179, 182.

⁵ *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 33001, f. 227^r: 'Plan proposed this day by Lord Rockingham to the King and agreed to by His Majesty. . . . Third Secretary of State for America, Earl of Dartmouth.' The document is dated May 14, 1766. Cf. *ibid.* 32975, ff. 104-5, Newcastle to Conway, May 7, 1766: 'No one man can have the time to do the duty of Secretary of State and attend the King every day and give that attention to the settlement and government of our Colonies, which in their present situation they will require.'

⁶ *Corr. of George III*, i. 363, George III to Pitt, July 25, 1766; Newcastle, *Narrative of Changes in the Ministry*, 96-7.

closely connected with him should have charge of Colonial affairs. There was no room therefore for a semi-independent Board of Trade. The Board indeed was now almost reduced to insignificance by a new arrangement. Hillsborough, who returned to the Presidency, insisted that henceforth the Board should merely report upon matters referred to it. Moreover an order in Council revoked that clause of the Order of 1752 which still remained in force as to the duty of Governors to correspond with the Board.¹ Hillsborough's attitude seems curious but was really very sensible. In the old days the Board had largely controlled Colonial policy. Now Colonial questions were of greater concern to English Ministers and consequently the Secretary for the Southern Department wished to subject the Board to himself. As long as the Board of Trade was merely a body which gave advice when asked it might still be useful. If it was to be anything more there would certainly be confusion. Seeing that the Board could not develop into a real Ministry for Colonial affairs Hillsborough determined not to accept the Presidency unless it was reduced to 'Board of report upon reference only'. The Board in fact, since it could not be more than it had been under Dartmouth, must become less. Curiously enough Hillsborough was much more eager to diminish the powers of the Board than was Shelburne. The Board was officially notified of the changes in its status by a letter from Shelburne. As to the terms of this letter there was a correspondence between Hillsborough and Shelburne which shows that the latter was reluctant to see the Board's functions curtailed and also that he was lamentably ignorant of its history.² Eventually the letter was drawn up in the sense desired by Hillsborough.

The new arrangement did not last long. Shelburne's views on Colonial policy were not those of most of his colleagues, with whom, after Chatham's collapse, he was bitterly at variance. Grafton, who disliked Shelburne, then decided there must be a separate Minister for the Colonies, nor were his motives entirely personal. Grafton realized very well that the business of the Southern Department was too heterogeneous for any one man to transact properly. Shelburne, however, resented a proposal which, if carried into effect, would materially reduce his power and asserted that he was perfectly capable of managing his

¹ *Grenville Papers*, iii. 295-6, Hillsborough to George Grenville, Aug. 6, 1766.

² Shelburne MSS. 134, pp. 67 sqq.

Department. His treatment of Colonial questions, he boasted, had been particularly successful. He even pretended that the amount of Colonial business was so small that it entailed but little additional work. But Grafton remained unmoved and, strong in the King's support, insisted that a Colonial secretaryship must be created. Shelburne finally acquiesced, though with the greatest reluctance.¹

The Earl of Hillsborough was appointed the first Secretary of State for the Colonies. At first Hillsborough simply took over the bulk of those duties with respect to Colonial affairs which had previously been performed by the Secretary for the Southern Department. Towards the Board of Trade also he stood in the same relation as that Minister had stood. But in July 1768 a change occurred. Clare, the President of the Board, resigned and a new commission was issued which nominated seven instead of eight paid members. Henceforth Hillsborough and his successors acted as Presidents of the Board until 1779. Colonial Governors, who since the Order in Council of 1766 had sent the Board duplicates of their dispatches to the Secretary of State, were now informed this was no longer necessary, since Hillsborough was a regular attendant at meetings of the Board.² Thus the possibility of conflict between the Board and the Secretary for the Colonies was prevented. But it would have been simpler to abolish the Board altogether. For what good purpose could it now serve?

The exact status of the Colonial Secretary was long uncertain. When, some years previously, Halifax had sought to become Secretary for the Colonies, there had been some doubt as to the manner in which such an appointment should be made. It was then suggested that an Order in Council should be issued reciting the reasons for the appointment and directing a warrant to be prepared for passing a patent under the Great Seal in the same terms as those of the other Secretaries.³ When Hillsborough was appointed, however, there was no Order in Council, but his patent was drawn up in the usual form for a Secretary of State, save for the following words in the preamble: 'Whereas the business of our Colonies and Plantations increasing, it seemeth expedient to Us to appoint one other Principal Secre-

¹ *Chatham Corr.* iii. 292-302; Fitzmaurice, *Shelburne*, i. 327-31.

² *Basye*, 169 sqq.

³ See Appendix IV.

tary of State besides our two ancient Secretaries.'¹ These words gave rise to disputes as to the precise functions of the Colonial Secretary. Did his patent limit his activities in any way? There were even some who doubted whether the appointment of a third Secretary was legal at all. At the end of the Session following Hillsborough's appointment the matter was debated in Parliament. Of this debate a report is extant, though one which is perhaps not very reliable, for its author desired to see the powers of the Colonial Secretary restricted within the narrowest limits. According to the report both the legality and the expediency of Hillsborough's appointment were questioned. It was argued that there was only one office of Secretary of State, an office which could be held by two persons but not by more than two. In support of this contention reference was made to the Regency Act of 1751, which provided for the appointment of a Council of Regency, which was to include the Secretaries of State. Now there were then only two Secretaries. Had it been possible for more to have been appointed the purpose of the Act would have been defeated. Again the Regency Act of 1765 declared that 'the two principal Secretaries of State' were to be members of the Council provided for in that Act. If there were three Secretaries and only two could sit on the Council, how were those two to be chosen? Moreover, a statute of Anne's reign made it illegal to add to the existing number of commissions for the execution of any office. In reply to the argument that at various times there had been an additional Secretary who was in charge of Scotch affairs it was alleged there had been two Scotch Secretaries before the Union, whose office had never been formally abolished. The creation of the Colonial secretaryship was further denounced as unwise since it would tend still more to emphasize the difference between Britain and America.²

Such were the arguments against the new secretaryship. As to the arguments on the other side there seems to be next to no evidence. But all the advocates of the change cannot have been so ignorant of recent history as to be unaware of the precedents furnished by the appointments of Methuen and Walpole.

¹ Basye, 'The Secretary of State for the Colonies' (*American Historical Review*, xxviii. 13-23). The patent is quoted on page 14. Cf. the patents of the Scotch Secretaries. See Appendix V.

² See Appendix V.

Shelburne at least, whatever his opinions, was properly informed. For among his papers is a copy of the warrant for the passing of Walpole's patent.¹

Hillsborough's real enemies were not among the Opposition but among his own colleagues. Weymouth disliked him.² Suffolk and Rochford contended he was not a proper Secretary of State and made attempts to limit his control over the Army and Navy.³ They affected to regard him as merely 'the First Lord of Trade with the seals and the Cabinet'.⁴ Hillsborough had to endure this treatment, but he asserted himself on general questions of Colonial policy.⁵ He was, however, substantially in agreement both with the King and the majority of his colleagues. In 1772 he resigned, nominally because the Privy Council refused to accept the advice on a Colonial question embodied in a report of the Board of Trade which he presented to them. But in truth he was the victim of a plot. Rochford, Suffolk, and Gower were all determined to drive him out of office, as part of their design to overthrow North whom Hillsborough supported. Rochford, moreover, hoped that if Hillsborough resigned it would be impossible to fill his place and so the Colonies would once more be attached to the Southern Department. The scheme was only a partial success. When the time came for the Privy Council to consider the Board's report, North seeing the King was on the side of Hillsborough's opponents came round to their view. Hillsborough thereupon resigned, but North remained. The vacant secretaryship was offered to Weymouth, who declined on the ground that it was not a true secretaryship. Much to men's surprise, however, Lord Dartmouth consented to take the office.⁶

The Earl of Dartmouth was a well-meaning and amiable nobleman, whose unfeigned piety made him generally respected. If good intentions could have made a good Minister Dartmouth would have gained a great reputation. But Dartmouth was quite unfit to hold an important office at a critical time. Being a weak man he had little control over policy. At the Board of

¹ Shelburne MSS. 134, p. 201.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Knox MSS., Various Collections*, vi. 264.

³ See Chapter II, pp. 84-5.

⁴ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Knox MSS., Various Collections*, vi. 256.

⁵ e.g. *Corr. of George III*, ii. 701.

⁶ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Knox MSS., Various Collections*, vi. 253sq.; *Corr. of George III*, ii. 1100; Basye, 186-7.

Trade, where the President usually ruled, one of the junior Lords was the master, while in the Ministry Suffolk had the chief influence with regard to Colonial affairs.¹ When therefore a rebellion broke out in America it became plain that a new Secretary must be found. Dartmouth himself wished to exchange his office for one of which the duties were purely nominal. Since Dartmouth wished to go and the King wished to replace him by Germain the matter should have been easily arranged. But trouble was caused by the intrigues of Suffolk and the susceptibility of Dartmouth. Only with much difficulty did the King achieve his purpose.

Lord George Germain had originally borne the name of Sackville; for he was a younger son of the first Duke of Dorset. This name he had exchanged for that of Germain upon the receipt of a legacy.² As a young man he was both a soldier and a politician. He acquired some reputation in the Commons as a speaker, while in the military line he rose rapidly. In 1759 he was the commander of the British cavalry in Germany. There, however, he covered himself with disgrace. At the battle of Minden he thrice disobeyed an order to charge. Since Germain in later years fought duels without showing the white feather it is reasonable to suppose that the cause of his disobedience was not cowardice. He was on bad terms with Prince Ferdinand, the Commander-in-Chief, and seems to have disobeyed his orders out of sheer ill-temper. But such an explanation, if true, is even more discreditable than that of cowardice. Germain had to suffer for his conduct, though not so severely as some would have wished. Byng had been shot because a court martial held he had not done his utmost to relieve Minorca. Germain's fate was much milder. The sentence of the Court which tried him was that he was unfit to serve His Majesty in any capacity. George II took care to emphasize the ignominy by directing that this sentence be read out to every regiment within the British Empire. Yet Germain was not crushed by his condemnation. He continued to take part in politics and found powerful friends to support him. George III looked upon him as a useful servant and after giving him a minor office made him

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Knox MSS., Various Collections*, vi. 110, Pownall to Knox, July 23, 1773; *ibid.* 122, same to same, Oct. 10, 1775; Basye, 189-90.

² There is no separate biography of Germain, but some account of him is given in Phillips, *History of the Sackville Family*, vol. ii, chap. xiii. The author believes that Germain was Junius. But this is more than doubtful.

Secretary of State. Germain had one great merit in the King's eyes; he was determined that the American Colonies must be reduced to subjection. Because of this conviction Germain was given an office which virtually gave him the conduct of the war. The man who had refused to charge at Minden was now to give orders to the commanders of British armies and British fleets.

Germain's appointment made it necessary that the status of the Colonial Secretary should be more precisely defined. Since he was a Member of the House of Commons he could not hold a new office. But the preamble to the patents of Hillsborough and Dartmouth had seemed to give that character to the Colonial secretaryship. Germain's patent therefore did not contain the debatable clause but ran in the ordinary form. Suffolk, however, though he had welcomed Germain's appointment as that of a political ally, was unwilling to acknowledge him as an equal. There still exists a draught of a document defining the position of the three Secretaries, which is in the hand of William Eden, one of Suffolk's under-secretaries. This document was submitted to the King, in the hope that he would approve of its terms. It was proposed that Germain should deal with Colonial business alone, while the other Secretaries were to be known as 'the two Principal Secretaries of State' and were exclusively to transact all Secretarial business other than Colonial.¹ Neither the King nor Germain would accept this. George was resolved that Germain should be a Secretary of State in the fullest sense. When, at a meeting of the Privy Council, the President asked that Weymouth, the new Secretary for the Southern Department, be sworn, the King replied 'there are two Secretaries of State [*sc.* Weymouth and Germain] to be sworn, let them both be sworn together'. Resistance was impossible and Weymouth much against his will acquiesced in the King's decision, nor did Suffolk refuse to prepare Germain's commission.²

Germain always ranked as 'One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State'. His colleagues made no attempt to dispute his equality with them. Once indeed his position was debated in the Commons. In 1779 Sir Joseph Mawbey raised the question of Germain's right to sit in the Lower House. His argument was

¹ See Appendix VI.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Knox MSS., Various Collections*, vi. 256-7.

in substance that Germain held a new office and so could not legally hold a seat in the Commons. The supporters of the Government, however, replied that Germain's office was not new. Since, moreover, the secretaryship was not in commission no objection could be made to Germain on the ground that he was an additional commissioner. Further, they pointed out that there had several times been three Secretaries, and once even four, since the act of Anne's reign which forbade holders of new offices to sit in the House of Commons. This reply was conclusive. When the division took place Mawbey had only one supporter.¹ Moreover in the following year Burke introduced his Establishment Bill which contained a clause abolishing 'the office commonly called . . . by the name third Secretary of State, or Secretary of State for the Colonies'. When this clause was under discussion Germain insisted that he was simply 'One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State'.²

Germain's successful struggle to obtain parity with the other Secretaries established an important principle. Though in 1782 the number of Secretaries was reduced to two, a third was again appointed in 1794, while there are at the present time eight. But they are all equally Secretaries of State. Their number may be increased or diminished. Their status remains unchanged.

As a Minister Germain was a patent failure. His mismanagement of the war was gross and culpable. There is, however, evidence that he possessed some talents for civil business. Cumberland, the then secretary to the Board of Trade, assures us that Germain abolished a lot of red tape and generally did much to promote efficiency there.³ But Cumberland, who was often the recipient of Germain's lavish hospitality, is not the most unbiased of witnesses. Even if his statements be correct, civil business was then a minor matter. Germain's services at the Board of Trade could not compensate for his failure as a War Minister.⁴ The King was none too pleased with Germain, and early in 1778 expressed a hope that he would resign, though His Majesty thought it better not to turn him out. In the following year North urged George III to give Germain a peerage, since it would damage the Government if Germain appeared to

¹ Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, xx. 250 sqq.

² *Ibid.*, xxi. 193-4.

³ For the relations of Cumberland and Germain see Cumberland's *Memoirs*, i. 394 sqq.

⁴ The Board of Trade had of course little to do during the war.

be in disgrace at Court. But the King replied that Germain had 'not been of use in his department' and did not deserve a title. Even in the House of Commons Germain though a frequent and vigorous speaker sometimes did harm by his indiscretion.¹ Thus the King showed no desire to spare Germain when a question of restricting his powers arose. At the end of 1779 Germain was deprived of the Presidency of the Board of Trade for the following reason. Lord Carlisle, the son-in-law of Lord Gower, was in need of money. His friends and relatives therefore exerted themselves to procure him a Ministerial appointment, in order that he might replenish his depleted purse. Since the King desired to conciliate Gower he made Carlisle President of the Board of Trade, much to Germain's disgust. North wished to soften the blow by the promise of a peerage, but the King refused to authorize it and observed that Germain had no cause for complaint since the change only placed him 'in every respect on the same line as the two antient Secretaries'. In this way Carlisle was provided with a salary of £2,000 per annum. The conduct of Colonial affairs, however, was not altered for the better, though perhaps not very much for the worse. Colonial Governors were once more instructed to send the Board duplicates of their dispatches to the Secretaries of State and Germain ceased to be a regular attendant at meetings of the Board. Carlisle was soon transferred to another post, but the Presidency was then given to Lord Grantham instead of being restored to Germain.²

The failure of the war eventually brought about a drastic change in Colonial administration. After the disaster at Yorktown the King inclined to the view that Germain must go if the war was to be carried on, but referred the matter to North. For a time North hesitated, but in the end he decided that Germain's removal was indispensable if the Ministry was to obtain the requisite support in the Commons. Seeing that he was doomed Germain resigned and was at length given a peerage. After some difficulty a successor was found in the person of Welbore Ellis, a veteran placeman who had held minor offices for the best part of a generation. A hint that he might soon be given a peerage induced Ellis to accept and the King was so pleased that he declared 'so very proper conduct as that of Mr. Ellis I

¹ *Corr. of George III*, iv. 2202, 2510, 2626, 2657.

² *Ibid.* 2770-1, 2788; *Basye*, 204, 211.

fear is only to be found in men of the last age'.¹ A few weeks later, however, the Ministry collapsed and the King had to submit to the Opposition. When Rockingham and Shelburne came into office they demanded and secured the abolition of the Colonial Department. Henceforth domestic and Colonial affairs were to be in the charge of a single Secretary. At the same time the Board of Trade was abolished.

The case for these changes has been argued by Burke, in a speech delivered in 1780. The Colonial Department, he said, was created merely in order to increase the means of corruption at the disposal of the Court. Colonial affairs were indeed of the highest importance but the amount of work they entailed was small, nor had the Secretaries too much to do. It had recently been possible for Weymouth to administer both the Southern and the Northern Departments for several months. Surely then, if one Secretary could do the work of two, two could do the work of three. His suggestion was that the Secretary for the Northern Department take over American affairs and the Secretary for the Southern Department West Indian affairs. For the Board of Trade Burke had nothing but contempt. 'The Board has both its original formation and its regeneration in a job.' It was expensive and yet had not even the negative merit of abstaining from mischief. It could not do good and would do harm.²

On the whole Burke's arguments seem weak. As soon as Colonial problems became serious it was obviously desirable there should be a Colonial Minister. To prove that Colonial affairs had been mismanaged was easy. The remedy, however, was not to abolish the separate Colonial Ministry, but to give it to a better man. George III chose badly, though, granted his policy, it was not easy to choose better. Had he appointed competent Secretaries things would have been very different. As to the Board of Trade and Plantations it might at least have been useful with regard to trade. The younger Pitt found it expedient to set up a Board of Trade in 1784. But once there was a Secretary for Colonial affairs the Board should have abstained from Colonial business, save in so far as it concerned trade. Burke and his friends, however, were bent on economy,

¹ *Corr. of George III*, v. 3497, 3501, 3502, 3508, 3511, 3513, 3516; *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Knox MSS.*, *Various Collections*, vi. 272 sqq.

² Burke, *Speech on Economic Reform*.

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not only for its own sake but also in order to reduce the patronage, by means of which, they held, the Court could corrupt Parliament. The Colonial Department, moreover, was very unpopular, perhaps because Germain was unpopular.¹ George himself entertained the idea of abolishing it at the end of 1781 and very sensibly suggested that, if this were done, Stormont should take over the whole conduct of foreign affairs, while Hillsborough should take the Colonies.² When the changes of 1782 were made his views fortunately prevailed and not those of Burke.

¹ *Corr. of George III.* v. 2964.

² *Ibid.* 3485.

CHAPTER II

ARMY AND NAVY

‘EVERY one who is at all acquainted with the constitution of this government must know that all warlike preparations, every military operation, and every naval equipment must be directed by a Secretary of State before they can be undertaken. Neither the Admiralty, Treasury, Ordnance, nor victualling boards can move a step without the King’s command so signified.’¹ Thus wrote William Knox, an under-secretary in the Colonial Department during the American war. This chapter is an attempt to ascertain how far his words hold good for the whole period 1681–1782.

The connexion of the Secretaries of State with military and naval affairs arose from the fact that they were the agents for communicating the King’s pleasure. A warrant with a Secretary’s countersign or a simple letter signed by a Secretary of State was in many cases the regular means of conveying the royal commands to the servants of the Crown.

The relations of the Secretaries with the Army during the first portion of this period are somewhat obscure. An unhappy gap in the records makes an intricate subject even more difficult. In dealing with the problem it is necessary to consider the relations of the Secretaries of State with the Secretary at War, the Board of Ordnance, and the Treasury. As regards military matters the Secretaries came into contact with the Treasury over the question of supplying troops abroad with victuals and, sometimes, with other stores. Their relations with the Board of Ordnance were connected with the supply of arms, ammunition, and such other stores—e.g. tents—as the Board provided. Further, since the Board was in immediate control of the artillery and engineers, the Secretaries often sent it orders relative to the disposition of these forces. With the Secretary at War the connexion of the Secretaries of State was far more close, and with this topic it is therefore best to begin.

The position and duties of the Secretary at War are not easy to define. He is first found in the middle of the seventeenth century as the personal secretary of the Commander-in-Chief. By the end of Charles II’s reign his position was firmly estab-

¹ W. Knox, *Extra Official Papers*, i. 14.

lished. In 1676 it was stated in a royal warrant that amongst other things the Secretary at War dealt with the quartering and relief of troops and the sending of convoys; moreover all such warrants and orders as 'Our late general' had issued were now to be signed by the King and countersigned by the Secretary at War.¹ It is surprising that the Secretary at War did not develop into a great Minister. An able man, holding this office, must have had many opportunities of influencing the sovereign, who was frequently in immediate command of the Army. The Secretary at War again was a Member of the House of Commons where in virtue of his office he played a certain part. During the eighteenth century it was his duty to present the Army estimates to the House. The post of Secretary at War was at times held by rising young politicians such as Craggs and Henry Fox, while Pitt in his earlier days would have been glad to obtain it. Yet the Secretary at War continued to occupy an anomalous position. He was neither a soldier nor a civil servant, nor, in the full sense of the word, a Minister. In 1747 the Earl of Bath, who as William Pulteney had held the office thirty years previously, declared in Parliament that 'The Secretary at War is but a Ministerial, not a constitutional, officer and is obliged to give orders according to the King's pleasure, when properly authenticated to him'.² A generation later the then Secretary at War stated in the House of Commons 'that he was no Minister and could not be supposed to have a competent knowledge of the Army and how the war was to be carried on'.³ The reason for this curious condition of affairs was probably that the Secretaries of State acquired and retained Ministerial powers and responsibility with regard to the Army.

It was not strange that the King should employ his Secretaries of State to communicate his pleasure to the commanders of his forces. During the last years of Charles II they often issued military orders. But both Charles and his two immediate successors sent orders to their troops through the Secretary at

¹ Clode, *Military Forces of the Crown*, i. 72. In 1811 Palmerston drew up a long memorandum on the duties of the Secretary at War, which sheds much light on the early history of the office. The memorandum is printed in Bulwer's *Palmerston*, i. 384 sqq. For a detailed account of the Secretary at War during the American Revolution see Curtis, *Organization of the British Army*. But this account is to a certain extent misleading, since Mr. Curtis scarcely refers to the Secretaries of State.

² Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, xiv. 479.

³ *Ibid.*, xx. 1253.

War. This was quite natural. For it was not probable that Army officers would dispute the authority of that official. Since, moreover, the Secretary at War was then neither a man of rank nor of political importance the King could treat him as his servant in the strictest sense of the term. The more use he could make of the Secretary at War the closer would be his control of the Army. Thus the authority of the Secretary at War and of the Secretaries of State was to some extent concurrent. The contemporary War Office records show that during the reigns of Charles II and James II the Secretary at War sent out orders, sometimes in the form of sign manual warrants countersigned by himself, sometimes in the form of a simple letter with only his own signature.¹ But during these same years the Secretaries of State transacted much military business. Sunderland, for instance, sent orders to the Lord-Lieutenant of Suffolk in connexion with the disbanding of certain companies of Infantry; he directed the Commissary-General of Musters to include in his list as present an officer absent in France for his health; he ordered the Governor of Jersey to demolish a useless fort; he ordered Colonel Monk to raise men for the purpose of recruiting the English forces serving with the States General. All these orders were in the form of warrants, though not of warrants under the royal sign manual. Sometimes, however, sign manual warrants were employed. Thus on June 26, 1685, Sunderland issued such a warrant, containing orders to the Commissary-General of Provisions.² Again during Monmouth's rebellion Sunderland sent many orders to the royal forces. But some also came from Blathwayt, who had been made Secretary at War in 1683 and who so commended himself to successive sovereigns that he remained Secretary at War till 1704.

Since William III was a soldier and, except in 1689, always commanded the main English army in person, the military business of the Secretaries of State diminished during his reign. When on the Continent William was attended by Blathwayt. In Blathwayt's absence George Clarke acted as his deputy in England.³ Presumably Blathwayt and Clarke between them were mainly responsible for military administration. The extant

¹ See the documents in P.R.O., War Office, 5.1 and 4.1. Certain warrants the Secretary at War continued to countersign in the nineteenth century (Clode, i. 73).

² P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 164, pp. 2-3, 5-6, 89, 233. There are many other military documents in this and also in Entry Book 69.

³ Clode, ii. 691-2.

records of the Secretaries of State, if we assume they are tolerably complete, indicate that these Ministers had little to do with the Army at this time. Unfortunately, however, the War Office records are deficient. Since no entry book of out-letters general for William's reign appears to have survived, it is difficult to discover precisely what was done by the Secretary at War.¹ But though the Secretaries of State had apparently little military business, the nature of that business did not change much. They still on occasion sent orders to officers. In 1694 Cutts, who held a command in the Isle of Wight, was in correspondence with Shrewsbury. His letters show, however, that he also received orders from Blathwayt.²

In the next reign things were different. Anne could not command her troops in person, so Marlborough was appointed Captain-General and sent to command the main army in the Netherlands. The question therefore arises whether the Secretaries of State or the Secretary at War transmitted the Queen's commands to Marlborough and to other generals with independent commands. Now when appointed to an independent command an officer always received 'Instructions'. These 'Instructions' were documents under the royal sign manual and were not, as a rule, countersigned by any Minister. It would appear, however, that the practice in Charles II's reign and later was for them to be sent to the officer in question by a Secretary of State. But it is not certain they were never sent by a Secretary at War.³ In the 'Instructions' a clause was sometimes inserted directing the addressee to correspond with a Secretary of State and sometimes also to obey his orders. In 1679 the newly-appointed Governor of Jersey was instructed to write to a Secretary at frequent intervals, if possible once a week.⁴ Marlborough's relations with the Secretaries of State, however, remain obscure. The five published volumes of his dispatches show that he was in constant correspondence with both the Secretaries, especially with the Secretary for the

¹ P.R.O., War Office, 4.1, covers the period Mar. 1684 to Dec. 1690. War Office, 4.2 begins in Jan. 1703. Not much can be gathered from the last part of Entry Book 1.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Frankland-Russell-Astley MSS.* 80-5.

³ Many 'Instructions' are found in the Secretarial entry books from 1679 onwards. For some early examples see 164, p. 233 (1685); 165, pp. 185-6 (1689); 177, pp. 165-7 (1716).

⁴ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Military), 164, pp. 9 sqq.

Northern Department. But Marlborough was an Ambassador as well as a General, and the correspondence concerns diplomacy more than war. Yet Marlborough kept the Secretaries informed about his conduct in the field and sometimes received orders from them.¹ The unpublished letters from Marlborough to the Secretaries now in the Public Record Office appear to be of a similar nature.² On the whole it would appear that Marlborough was given a fairly free hand in the conduct of the war. His genius and influence doubtless secured for him a measure of independence which was not granted either to other contemporary commanders or to those who led British armies in later days. Every commander must have had much liberty in the field, but the general plan of campaign was usually settled in Cabinet. Marlborough who spent the winter of each year in England and had a seat in the Cabinet in all probability largely determined military plans.

Ormonde, who succeeded Marlborough, looked to the Secretaries of State for orders.³ Bolingbroke's letter commanding him to abstain for the future from the active prosecution of the war is notorious. But the Secretary's action in issuing the celebrated restraining orders may well have been *ultra vires*. For the committee of inquiry into the conduct of Bolingbroke, Oxford, and Ormonde, appointed by the Commons in 1715, reported that since Ormonde's 'Instructions' ordered him to carry on the war with vigour 'your committee conceive these Instructions signed by Her Majesty must be the rule of His Grace's actions, till countermanded or revoked by equal

¹ The reference is to Murray's edition of Marlborough's dispatches. Many, however, are not printed there. See Marlborough's letter to Hedges of Oct. 30, 1703, for proof that he received orders from the Secretaries. Marlborough also corresponded with Godolphin. But the Treasurer does not appear to have sent him orders. There are also a number of Marlborough's letters in *Hist. MSS. Comm., Bath MSS.* These are of a similar character to those printed by Murray.

² For examples see the documents in P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Military Expeditions, 2. The letters deal mainly with diplomacy.

³ e.g. P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Military Expeditions, 7, Ormonde to St. John, May 25, 1712: 'I am very glad to hear Her Majesty approves of my continuing the Army upon the present footing.' Ormonde to Dartmouth, Aug. 27, 1712: 'It is to Lord Bolingbroke's absence that I owe the honour of your Lordship's letter. . . . I shall expect the Queen's commands relative to the disposition of the troops. . . . Enclosed I send your Lordship an estimate of the forage which it may be reasonable to allow the battalions which marched to Dunkirk.'

It would seem from the above that Ormonde regarded Bolingbroke as the proper person to send him orders. Already the provincial division was beginning to obtain in military affairs.

authority, there being no general direction in them to follow such further orders as he should receive from a Secretary of State'. Now the 'restraining orders' had been conveyed in the form of a simple letter.¹

The Secretaries of State were closely concerned both with the operations in Spain and with those in the Colonies during the war of the Spanish succession. British Generals in Spain were in correspondence with a Secretary, usually the Secretary for the Southern Department, and received orders from him. In 1711 there was a debate in the Upper House on the causes of the recent British reverses in the Peninsula, during which it came out that Sunderland had commanded Stanhope to conduct a vigorous offensive. The debate developed into an interesting discussion of the Cabinet, but none disputed that the Secretaries of State were proper persons to communicate the Queen's pleasure to Generals.² With regard to the Colonies the Board of Trade devoted much attention to schemes of defence while their execution was supervised by a Secretary. The Secretary for the Southern Department was as a rule employed for this. But St. John had far more to do than Dartmouth with the Canada expedition of 1711.³

The Secretaries during Anne's reign were much concerned with military administration. Portions of that work indeed they alone could perform. All military commissions had to pass through a Secretary's office. This rule obtained during the latter years of Charles II and never altered. After the passing of the first Mutiny Act no court martial could be held without an order from a Secretary of State. But that was not all. The Secretary at War to a great and, apparently, an increasing extent acted in obedience to the sovereign's commands as signified by a Secretary of State. In his commission, it is true, the Secretary at War was only instructed to obey orders coming from the sovereign or the General of the forces.⁴ Marlborough

¹ Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, vii, Appendix XXX sqq.

² For the debate see A. Boyer, *Political State of Great Britain*, i. 141 sqq. See too the correspondence in Mahon, *War of Succession in Spain*, Appendix.

³ This is based on the *Calendars of State Papers Colonial* for the period. See the volume for 1710-11, No. 724, General Nicholson to Dartmouth, Mar. 14, 1711: 'Your Lordship was pleased to tell me Mr. Secretary St. John had undertaken the management of the expedition and that I should apply to him.' St. John had a special interest in the expedition. See *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Portland MSS.* v. 655.

⁴ For commissions see Evans, *Secretary of State*, 324. The military entry books of the Secretaries contain copies of these commissions. For courts martial see

as Captain-General sent orders to St. John, when the latter was Secretary at War, and presumably to others who held that position during his tenure of the command.¹ Yet the Secretary at War is often found acting as the agent of a Secretary of State. It is noticeable that with the appointment of St. John in 1704 the office of Secretary at War assumes a somewhat different character. Blathwayt had had very little connexion with politics. But after his retirement the Secretary at War was always a professional politician.² This fact is perhaps connected with the increase of the civilian control over the Secretary at War and the decrease of the military control. While, however, the letters from the Secretary at War to the Secretaries of State during the eighteenth century are, in great part at least, extant, most of the letters from the Secretaries of State to the Secretary at War written before 1756 have disappeared. All that can be done then is to infer, as far as possible, the functions of the Secretaries of State from the letters of the Secretary at War and a few other documents.

In the years 1702-14, the Secretaries of State transacted military business of the most diverse kinds. St. John, when Secretary at War, was consulted by Hedges as to a proposal from a certain person to raise a regiment of foot at his own cost. In reply he gave information concerning financial details but said it was not for him to advise for or against acceptance; such matters were determined by others. The Secretary at War, to give a few further examples, received orders from a Secretary of State as to the dispatch of clothing to British troops in Portugal, as to the raising of recruits for a regiment in Jamaica, as to the relief of an Independent Company in Newfoundland, and as to the breaking of a regiment of dragoons.³ Moreover, the concern of the Secretaries of State with military affairs is attested by the presence among their records of many miscel-

Fortescue, *British Army*, ii. 21, n. 3. For a specimen of a sign manual warrant to the Judge Advocate General authorizing the holding of a court martial see P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Military), 170, pp. 197-9. For the Secretary at War see P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Military), 165, pp. 365-7; *ibid.*, State Paps. Dom., Anne, i. 39.

¹ P.R.O., War Office, 4:4, pp. 201-2.

² Sir John Fortescue comments on the increasingly political character of the office (*British Army*, i. 582).

³ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Military, 3, St. John to Hedges, Sept. 8, 1704, Jan. 8, 1704-5, Feb. 23, 1704-5, May 24, 1705; *ibid.*, Various, 8, 150, Dartmouth to Granville, Dec. 8, 1710. These are only a few examples.

laneous documents. We find there papers dealing with army finance, with the number of men in the forces, with remounts for the cavalry, and many other matters.¹ Thus the control of the Secretaries of State over the Secretary at War appears to have been considerable. The latter busied himself with the details of military administration; but in all important matters he was merely the agent of the Captain-General or of a Secretary of State. It is worth adding that the Secretary at War was not a member of the Cabinet or the Committee of Council. But only those who knew the plans there formed were in a position to direct.²

After the accession of George I the authority of the Secretaries of State over the Army was if anything increased. Yet George I being a man and not unversed in the management of an army might have been expected to act directly through the Secretary at War as far as possible. There is, however, no reason to believe the King attempted to limit the powers of the Secretaries of State. Perhaps the then Secretaries at War did not know sufficient French or Latin to converse with their sovereign. However this may be the Secretaries of State continued to act much as before in relation to the Army. They continued to give orders to the Secretary at War. Thus the latter was commanded to cashier a lieutenant-colonel; to strike off the half-pay list a captain who had published 'scandalous libels'; to order the officers of regiments stationed in Ireland to return to their posts.³ Sometimes too the Secretaries of State sent orders to officers directly. During the rebellion of 1715 Townshend and Stanhope communicated the royal commands to Argyll. In the following year a clause was inserted in the 'Instructions' of General Carpenter, appointed to a command in Scotland, directing him to correspond with and obey such orders as he received from a Secretary of State.⁴ Townshend, in 1722,

¹ These documents may be found in State Paps. Dom., Military, 3. This is a bundle of documents and precise reference to each is impossible, since they are not letters.

² The Secretary at War does not appear on any list of the Cabinet. Fox, however, had a seat in the Cabinet for a few months while Secretary at War. But this was a reward for service in the Commons (Ilchester, *Fox*, i. 238). Of course the Secretary at War was occasionally called to a Cabinet meeting, but that is another matter. Even Barrington, however, was not a member of the Cabinet.

³ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 8, pp. 212, 215, 220. Many similar documents may be found in State Paps. Dom., Military, 5.

⁴ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Townshend MSS.* 173 sqq.; P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Military), 177, pp. 165-7.

dispatched a circular to all generals in command of camps forbidding them to allow their men to work at day labour.¹

During the next reign the great wars in which Britain was engaged naturally gave the Secretaries of State much business. With regard to military operations outside England the custom was that each Secretary directed the forces in his own Province. Thus the Secretary for the Southern Department was concerned with operations in America; the Secretary for the Northern Department with operations in the Netherlands. The Secretary at War remained in a subordinate position, though he still occasionally acted as the immediate agent of the King. The following facts may serve to shed light on the state of affairs. In 1742 it was the Secretary at War who countersigned the warrant ordering Stair to take over the command of the royal forces in the Netherlands. But it was Carteret who transmitted the warrant to Stair, who, on his part, evidently regarded Carteret as the Minister to whom he was subject. From Carteret he received 'Instructions'; to Carteret he sent information, which was communicated to the King alone; when he wished to know what price the King expected him to pay for forage it was Carteret whom he consulted.² Cumberland again, appointed Captain-General in 1745, was instructed to correspond with a Secretary of State and to obey all orders which he received under the royal sign manual or from one of the Secretaries.³ Newcastle directed operations in the Southern Province during the years 1739-48. He was partly to blame for the failure of the attack on Carthage in 1740; he encouraged Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, to attack Canada, though eventually the troops promised by Newcastle were diverted to a raid on the coast of France and the Americans were left to shift for themselves.⁴

The Seven Years' War apparently brought with it very little change with respect to the control of the Army. At this period, however, begin the extant entry books of letters from the Secretaries of State to the Secretary at War, and military affairs at once become easier to understand. The Secretary at War is

¹ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 8, pp. 240-1.

² P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Military Expeditions, 8 and 12, Carteret to Stair, Apr. 22, 1742; Stair to Carteret, June 5, 1742, and Apr. 15 and May 19, 1743. These last are in Military Expeditions, 12.

³ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Military, 16. 6.

⁴ Fortescue, *British Army*, ii. 59 sqq., 259.

shown to have had very little power then, and since there is no hint of a recent change in his position it is reasonable to infer that he had not for some time been in different circumstances. The Secretaries of State are now found directing the Secretary at War to issue orders for the movement of troops from one place to another. Thus Holdernessee commands Barrington to order certain companies of Foot to march to Leith, whence they are to embark for Germany, and Pitt commands him to order the embarkation of two regiments for Gibraltar.¹ Yet the Secretary at War issued many 'marching orders' for which he received no commands from a Secretary of State. But all important movements of troops must have been directed by the Secretaries of State. Otherwise there would have been the most horrible confusion.² Moreover, the authority of the Secretaries of State over the Secretary at War still covered much else besides the movements of troops. A few of the orders given by Pitt to Barrington will serve to illustrate this. When the innkeepers of Winchester began to give up their licences owing to the bad behaviour of the soldiers quartered upon them, Pitt forthwith told Barrington to concert measures with the Treasury whereby this might be prevented. It was in obedience to Pitt that Barrington drafted men from four regiments to reinforce the garrison of Fort Louis in Senegal or made arrangements for the exchange of prisoners with the French. When Barrington wished to ascertain the King's pleasure as to the discharge of a sergeant it was to Pitt that he applied.³

That the Secretaries of State were largely responsible for the strategy of the war there is no doubt; for they issued the important orders. In practice Pitt virtually controlled Holdernessee's Province. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who commanded the British troops in Germany, wrote directly to Pitt on all points which he considered especially important.⁴ In his

¹ P.R.O., War Office, i. 678 (letters from the Secretaries of State and the Treasury to the Secretary at War), pp. 213, 73-4.

² This can be ascertained by a comparison of War Office, i. 678, with the contemporary War Office entry books of out-letters general, e.g. War Office, 4. 58.

³ P.R.O., War Office, i. 678, pp. 77-8, 105-6, 197; *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, i, No. 74.

⁴ P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 90. Many letters from Ferdinand to Pitt are found here. See especially that dated Aug. 11, 1760: 'Votre excellence sera déjà informé de tout ce qui c'est passé jusqu'icy par les lettres que j'ay successivement écrites a My Lord Holdernessee afin de rendre compte a Sa Majesté de la situation des affaires dans ces contrées-ci. Mais je me crois obligé de rétoucher en gros certains

own Province Pitt was of course indisputably the master. He prepared the 'Instructions' for generals; he corresponded with them; he took the greatest trouble to see they were properly supplied with all they required. Pitt, however, only did well what other Secretaries during the previous generation had done indifferently.¹

In the years 1763-82 the Secretaries of State for the Northern and Southern Departments continued to act much as before, save that the newly-created Colonial Secretary gradually took over military business in so far as it concerned the Colonies. As a result the importance of Germain during the American war far exceeds that of his colleagues. The other Secretaries had then but little to do. The details of military administration in England were indeed largely supervised by them. Operations, however, were chiefly controlled by Germain.²

The Secretaries of State besides sending orders to the Secretary at War and officers with independent commands did the like to the Board of Ordnance. The Board usually acted in response to warrants under the royal sign manual and countersigned by a Secretary of State. Sometimes, however, though not often, the Board was moved by Orders in Council.³ The relations of the Secretaries with the Board did not vary greatly during the whole period 1681-1782. In 1679 Sunderland countersigned a warrant which ordered the Board to issue ammunition to a regiment of Foot bound for Virginia. In 1681 a warrant with Conway's countersign bade them strengthen the fortifications of Kingston-upon-Hull. A hundred years later the Secretaries of State were countersigning similar orders.⁴ It should be added

points qui me paroissent meriter trop d'attention pour ne les exposer.' Ferdinand then proceeded to ask that Granby be reinforced.

¹ Pitt's activities are amply illustrated in *The Correspondence of Pitt with the Colonial Governors, &c.* (ed. Kimball).

² The letters of the Secretaries for the Northern and Southern Departments from Dec. 1777 to Dec. 1781 are to be found in P.R.O., War Office, i. 682. For typical specimens see pp. 29, 81, 101, 145, 157, 177, 185-6, 197, 511. The Secretary for the Southern Department of course was still partly responsible for military affairs as far as they regarded the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca.

³ For an instance of such an Order in Council see *Cal. State Paps. Col.* 1693-6, No. 779. The Admiralty, it should be added, could obtain stores from the Board without the aid of a Secretary. See Curtis, *Organization of the British Army*, 41 sqq.

⁴ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Military), 164, pp. 29, 69-70 for Sunderland and Conway. The military entry books contain warrants of this nature throughout. For a specimen of a warrant dealing with the Artillery see State Paps. Dom., Military, 34, Ordnance to Dartmouth, May 26, 1713.

that early in the eighteenth century the Secretary at War made an attempt to assert his authority over the Board, though without much success. Blathwayt met with a rebuff when he tried to get stores issued without the usual warrant. In 1706, however, St. John sent a letter to the Board, which contained a request for a number of tents. Whatever the fate of this request it is plain that after Anne's death the Secretary at War had no authority over the Board.¹

The regular procedure was for the Secretary at War to acquaint the Secretary of State with the needs of the Army. The latter would then obtain and countersign a sign manual warrant which gave the appropriate directions to the Master-General of the Ordnance. This system did not always work well. The Board was notoriously dilatory.² Nor were the Secretaries of State always efficient. In 1723 the War Office complained that while they had some time previously informed Newcastle that a number of gun carriages were needed at Gibraltar, they had heard from the Governor of the Rock that none had been sent. All that the War Office could do was once more to request Newcastle to take the necessary steps.³ Sometimes, however, delays occurred for which it is more difficult to assign the blame. During the Seven Years' War Barrington wrote to Holdernessee that a regiment of Dragoons, then in Germany, was in want of twelve light carbines and twelve firelocks. Holdernessee then duly sent a warrant to the Master-General of the Ordnance requiring the delivery of these weapons. The Board, instead of obeying, represented that such a demand was unprecedented and improper. Holdernessee thereupon proposed to talk the matter over with Barrington. The Board on their part asked Holdernessee to alter the warrant in the sense they desired.⁴ At this distance of time it would be difficult to decide who was in the wrong. But the incident illustrates the great defect of the then military organization, the lack of a real Ministry of War. It was with a view to preventing delays of the above kind that the Ordnance, a few years later, made a sensible arrangement with the Secretaries of State which

¹ Clode, ii. 260; P.R.O., War Office, 4. 4. 248. Even in Anne's reign, however, the Board was fairly dependent on the Secretaries of State. See e.g. P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Military, 34, letters from the Board to Dartmouth of Apr. 17, May 19, and May 26, 1713.

² P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Military, 5, Arnold to Delafaye, Feb. 19, 1722-3.

⁴ P.R.O., War Office, i. 678, pp. 177 sqq.

provided that no warrant for stores should be issued until the Board had been consulted.¹

With the Treasury the Secretaries of State had some dealings in respect of the Army. When the Treasury made contracts for the victualling of troops abroad, they often consulted the Secretaries.²

With the Paymaster of the Forces the Secretaries of State had no connexion.³

Royal control over the Militia was exercised through the Secretaries of State. They sent orders to the Lord-Lieutenants of the counties, who put them into execution. In 1679 Sunderland directed the Duke of Newcastle to send five hundred men of the Militia to Berwick, in view of the rebellion in Scotland.⁴ Conway in 1681 ordered the Earl of Pembroke to remove Thomas Thynne from the command of a regiment in the Wilts Militia and to confer the same on Thomas Penruddock.⁵ Sunderland in 1685 dispatched warrants to the Lord-Lieutenants of several counties ordering them to raise the Militia against Monmouth.⁶ During the Seven Years' War the Secretaries saw to the execution of the Militia Act of 1757. They ordered the embodiment of the Militia in several counties, submitted to the King the names of those recommended for commissions by the Lord-Lieutenants, and exercised a general control over the force. It is worth noting that either Secretary might deal with the Militia of the same county. No attempt was made to separate their spheres of action.⁷

The Secretaries of State had relations both with the Admiralty and with Admirals at sea.

¹ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 9, p. 51; *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, iii, Nos. 136, 870.

² e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Col.* 1696-7, No. 686; *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, Knox MSS., *Various Collections*, vi. 167; P.R.O., Treasury Minute Books, 44, pp. 283, 355-6; *ibid.*, State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 238, pp. 86-7; *ibid.*, War Office, i. 682, p. 559.

³ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Military, 5, Arnold to Delafaye, Sept. 2, 1723.

⁴ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 164, pp. 16-17.

⁵ *Cal. State Paps. Dom.*, 1680-1, 570.

⁶ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 164, p. 186. Sunderland issued many orders to the Militia during the rebellion. Cf. pp. 186 sqq.

⁷ See P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Military, 30, letters written by the Lord-Lieutenants to Pitt in 1759, e.g. Portsmouth to Pitt, June 17; Dorset and Manchester to Pitt, June 20. See also Pitt's circular to the Lord-Lieutenants of June 5, directing them to put the Militia Act into execution. Compare Home Office, 51. 1, Holderness's Militia entry book 1758-60. From a comparison of these two it is evident that both Secretaries might be concerned with the same county, e.g. Bucks.

Before the Revolution the Secretaries appear to have had but little connexion with the Admiralty. On the other hand they sometimes sent orders to Admirals in command of a fleet. Thus Dartmouth received orders from Jenkins, from Sunderland, and from Middleton.¹ But in the reign of William III the Secretaries began to have dealings with the Admiralty in a regular way.² Now all naval officers who held independent commands received 'Instructions' upon their appointment. These 'Instructions' were supplemented by 'Additional Instructions' or by directions conveyed in other form. The Admiralty sometimes but by no means always issued the 'Instructions', 'Additional Instructions', and other supplementary orders. They then acted either without receiving any written commands from the King or in accordance with an Order in Council or in pursuance of the King's pleasure as signified by a Secretary of State.³ After the Revolution the Secretaries are found giving the Admiralty information and directing them to issue orders and 'Instructions' and likewise to perform various other duties. For this purpose two methods were employed. Commands could be sent to the Admiralty either in the form of a sign manual warrant, countersigned by a Secretary of State, or in the form of a simple Secretarial letter.⁴ After the first few years of William's reign, however, the letter was by far the more frequent. Both the warrants and the letters deal with much the same topics. Besides commanding the issue of orders and 'Instructions' they gave directions to the Admiralty with regard to convoys, allowances to particular persons, levy money for the Marine regiments, and the fitting out of fireships. Henceforth the Secretaries continued to act much in the same way with regard to the Admiralty until 1782.⁵

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Report XI*, App. V, Dartmouth MSS., 87, 93, 97-101, 115, 196, 198. These orders are in the form of letters. See too Evans, *Secretary of State*, 326-7.

² It cannot be a mere chance that both the extant Secretarial entry books (naval) and the extant Admiralty entry books of in-letters (Secretary of State) begin in 1689.

³ Such Orders in Council were never common; but some were made in the years 1689-1702.

⁴ For specimens see P.R.O., Admiralty, In-Letters, 4080 (1689-94). Many orders issued by the Admiralty begin with some such words: 'As a result of Her (or His) Majesty's pleasure as signified to us under Her (or His) signet and sign manual'. Or: 'Whereas Her (or His) Majesty has been pleased to signify Her (or His) pleasure unto this Board'. See Admiralty, Order Books, 10, for examples. Sometimes a sign manual warrant and a Secretarial letter contain the same orders. Cf. In-Letters, 4080, p. 191. ⁵ See P.R.O., Admiralty, In-Letters, 4080 sqq.

The Secretaries after the Revolution, as before it, conveyed the royal commands to Admirals 'at sea'. This they might now do in any of three ways. They sent out 'Instructions' and also orders in the form both of sign manual warrants and of letters. In August, 1690, for instance, a sign manual warrant bade the Admiralty direct the 'Admirals of the Fleet' to obey such 'Instructions' as they should receive from Mary for 'this immediate expedition'.¹ 'Instructions' that came directly from the sovereign were always transmitted by a Secretary.² It is worth mentioning too that these were sometimes countersigned and sometimes not. In the next century, however, 'Instructions' to Admirals were rarely countersigned.³ Orders were now also conveyed in the form of sign manual warrants and of letters. The former, however, soon became infrequent. Sometimes, moreover, but not always, Admirals were instructed to maintain a correspondence with a Secretary and obey such orders as they received from him. Pepys records a report that this was done for all Admirals in 1693; Rooke was certainly so directed in 1700. A clause to this effect was inserted in Byng's 'Instructions' when, in 1718, he was given the command of a fleet in the Mediterranean. In virtue of this clause Byng received orders from Craggs to attack the Spanish fleet.⁴ Instances might easily be multiplied. The Secretaries indeed seem often to have corresponded with Admirals who had not received 'Instructions' of this kind.

Thus the connexion of the Secretaries with the Navy was close. They were at least as much responsible for operations as was the Admiralty. It was William III who first caused them to interfere regularly in naval affairs, since he apparently trusted

¹ P.R.O., Admiralty, In-Letters, 4080, p. 49.

² 'Instructions' which came from the Admiralty were not under the sign manual but were signed by three Commissioners of the Board, or, occasionally, by more. 'Instructions' transmitted by a Secretary were always under the sign manual. Hence the sovereign had a more direct control over the latter.

³ e.g. P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Naval), 205. This deals with the activities of Trenchard (Mar. 1693–Nov. 1694) and Shrewsbury (Dec. 1694–Mar. 1695–6). Some of the 'Instructions' therein contained are countersigned and some not. None of those in Entry Books (Naval), 208 (Hedges 1702–4), are countersigned. But though countersigns on 'Instructions' became rare they did not cease. See Entry Books (Naval), 225, pp. 41 sqq. Much the same thing happened with regard to military and diplomatic 'Instructions'. For the latter see Chapter III.

⁴ Pepys, *Naval Minutes*, 307–8; Rooke, *Journal*, 9; P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Naval), 218, Craggs to the Admiralty, Apr. 28, 1718. Michael, *Englische Geschichte*, i. 866, for the orders from Craggs to Byng.

the Secretaries more than he did the Admiralty. The change, however, was by no means universally approved. Pepys, whose opinion is not lightly to be contemned, grumbled because the direction of naval operations was committed to the Secretaries, who were not competent for that task.¹ Nor, it would appear, were the sailors very pleased. Sidney, in 1691, thought it expedient to apologize to Admiral Delaval for giving him an order, on the ground that he was scarcely the proper authority to do so.² In 1693 Trenchard ordered Rooke by letter to take over the command of the Blue Squadron. The 'Admirals of the Fleet' none the less refused to hand over the command and contended that Trenchard's letter to Rooke did not concern them. Rooke thereupon wrote an account of what had passed to Trenchard in which he observed he had never before known a Secretary's letter to be disobeyed.³ Soon, however, it was regarded as fit and natural that the Secretaries should issue naval orders.

During the early years of William III both Secretaries could do naval business and both did so. But a far greater part fell to one than to the other. Nottingham had much more concern with the Navy than either Shrewsbury or Sidney. When sole Secretary his part in naval affairs was still greater. As a result many held him responsible when there was mismanagement. The failure to follow up the victory of La Hogue caused much indignation. Russell threw the blame on Nottingham and Nottingham on Russell. The Commons praised Russell and censured the Admiralty. Nottingham though not censured by name was obviously attacked in two general resolutions. The Commons resolved that the King be asked only to employ persons of undoubted loyalty for the future and also to send all orders to the Fleet through the Admiralty.⁴ Next year, after the loss of the Smyrna fleet, the outcry was louder still. Trenchard had this time to share in the responsibility; for he had

¹ Pepys, *Naval Minutes*, 309-10.

² P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Naval), 204, p. 51: 'I am sensible that orders of this nature should more properly be addressed to you by the Lords of the Admiralty immediately, but the time not allowing of that method now I doubt not but that this signification of Her Majesty's pleasure will be altogether as effectual.'

³ *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1693, 283, Rooke to Trenchard, Aug. 23, 1693.

⁴ *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *House of Lords MSS.* 1692-3, 179 sqq.; *Commons Journals*, x. 714 sqq., 749 sqq., 775; Klopp, vi. 145, 149-51; Bonnet's dispatch of Jan. 13-23, 1693, as cited in Ranke, vi. 203.

issued many naval orders since his appointment and as yet there was no clear division between the spheres of the Secretaries in naval affairs. Nottingham, however, was regarded by Parliament as the more culpable and William thought it best to dismiss him before the Session began. In spite of this there was an inquiry into the disaster. Nottingham is reported to have tried to fix the responsibility on Trenchard. Pepys, however, writing just before Nottingham's dismissal condemned his conduct of naval affairs in the strongest terms and evidently hoped he would be punished. But Parliament, while ready enough to declare there had been mismanagement, did not censure any person.¹

After Nottingham's dismissal, Trenchard, for some time, transacted the greater part of the naval business that fell to the Secretaries. At the beginning of 1694 a foreign observer described him as being in charge of the Navy.² Even before turning out Nottingham, William had by preference employed Trenchard in naval affairs and he continued to do so after Shrewsbury's appointment.³ Early in 1694 the King apologized to Shrewsbury for directing him to hasten the departure of a fleet from the English ports, though such business did not properly fall to him. It is plain from Shrewsbury's letters at this time that he thought Trenchard should correspond with the King about naval matters.⁴ But gradually things changed. Russell, who commanded the Mediterranean fleet in 1694-5, corresponded with both Secretaries.⁵ Trumbull used language

¹ *Calendar of House of Lords MSS.* 1693-5 contains many documents as to this. See too Pepys's *Naval Minutes*, 313; Ralph, ii. 471.

² Bonnet's dispatch of Jan. 19-29, 1694, as cited in Ranke, vi. 233: Trenchard 'qui avoit le departement de la flotte'.

³ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 37992, f. 13^r, Blathwayt to Nottingham, June 12-22, 1693: 'Having writ to Mr. Secretary Trenchard every thing that I have in command from His Majesty relating to the main fleet and the Mediterranean squadron, I have very little in answer to your Lordship's letter.' Cf. Pepys's *Naval Minutes*, 313. Pepys implies that after the disaster to the Smyrna fleet Nottingham voluntarily surrendered the bulk of naval business to Trenchard.

⁴ *Shrewsbury Corr.* 32-3.

⁵ Shrewsbury's correspondence with Russell may be found in *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Buccleuch MSS.* ii, and in *Shrewsbury Corr.* 192-254. See *Buccleuch MSS.* ii. 1. 70 for proof that Russell also corresponded with Trenchard. The correspondence with Shrewsbury, however, was the more important. *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1694-5 shows that Shrewsbury began to do a certain amount of general naval business in July 1694. It may be added that P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Naval), 205, contains documents sent out by Trenchard from Mar. 29, 1693, to Nov. 12, 1694; these are followed by documents sent out by Shrewsbury from Dec. 12, 1694, to Mar. 2, 1695-6.

which implied that naval affairs were divided between the Secretaries according to Provinces.¹ The division, however, was as yet far from absolute. Early in the next reign we find both Nottingham and Hedges in correspondence with the same Admiral at the same time.² The tendency none the less for each Secretary to direct the fleets in his own Province grew stronger and stronger. Thus the Mediterranean was regarded as being in the Southern and the Baltic in the Northern Department. By 1709 there was a fairly well-established rule. Norris, who was then cruising in the Baltic, thought it necessary to tender his excuses to Boyle, because he had at first inadvertently addressed his dispatches to Sunderland.³

As a result of this division of labour the Southern Department became more important in naval affairs than the Northern. Newcastle during the greater part of the war of 1739-48 and Pitt during the decisive years of the Seven Years' War controlled the fleets. Newcastle discharged his duties with some fair amount of care and diligence.⁴ But he was in terror lest he be held responsible if things went wrong. Accordingly he adopted a rather ridiculous precaution in the hope of safeguarding himself. In the course of a conversation with Admiral Norris the Duke divulged the fact that he never countersigned 'Instructions' or enclosed them in a covering letter over his own signature. Norris protested at this proceeding and stated that Townshend had always countersigned 'Instructions'. Even if this was not done, the Secretary should at least send a covering letter stating the 'Instructions' were from the King and were sent by His Majesty's command; otherwise the Admiral to whom they were sent had no guarantee the 'Instructions' were authentic. Moreover, said Norris, Newcastle's precautions were futile as well as dishonourable; for it would be possible to discover who

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS.* i.2. 603-4.

² e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1702-3, 189-90, 195; P.R.O., *State Paps. Dom.*, Entry Books, 208, p. 103.

³ e.g. P.R.O., *State Paps. Dom.*, Naval, 67, Norris to Boyle, July 7, 1709: 'I humbly ask your pardon that I did not sooner write to you upon my coming in to these parts, but till I understood by Mr. Pulteney he had the favour of corresponding with you, I did not know my error and gave my Lord Sunderland that trouble, having formerly corresponded with his Lordship.'

⁴ e.g. P.R.O., *State Paps. Dom.*, Naval, 98, f. 6^r, Newcastle to Byng, Sept. 15, 1747: 'I shall hope to hear frequently from you as it is His Majesty's pleasure you should take every opportunity of sending full and exact accounts of what passes.' There is a great quantity of Newcastle's naval correspondence in the P.R.O.

was the responsible Secretary from the date of the 'Instructions'. Such is the story recorded by Norris. Though strange, it can scarcely be dismissed. Norris was an honest man and, in any case, had nothing to gain by writing down lies in a diary which he did not publish. Nor is there anything in the extant records which contradicts Norris.¹

Pitt's conduct was very different. He set a high importance upon naval operation and his colossal energy soon made itself felt. Pitt's activity is reflected not only in the number of his letters to the Admiralty and to Admirals in command of fleets but in their tone. He wrote far more frequently than Newcastle had written and in language far more peremptory. No previous Secretary had ever laid such stress on the need for activity and haste. He treated the Admiralty as entirely subordinate to him.² It was perhaps this unusual vigour on the part of Pitt which gave rise to a curious story about his relations with the Admiralty. Pitt, it is said, compelled the Commissioners to sign orders which he had drawn up and which they were not allowed to read. This tale is nothing but absurd. If Pitt wished to give directions to the fleets without the knowledge of the Admiralty he could communicate directly with the Admirals. As a matter of fact there was very little difference between Pitt's methods and those of earlier Secretaries. Sometimes Pitt sent orders to Admirals; sometimes he bade the Admiralty do so; sometimes the Admiralty acted without any direction from him. Nor, be it said, do all the 'Instructions' issued by the Admiralty at this time contain a clause enjoining the recipient to correspond with a Secretary of State.³

During the next great war in which Britain was engaged, that

¹ See Appendix VII.

² Many of Pitt's letters to the Admiralty are to be found in P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 230. See also e.g. P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 78, The Admiralty to Pitt, Oct. 3, 1758. Some drafts of 'Instructions' may also be found in this bundle.

³ P.R.O., Admiralty, Out-Letters, 2. 1331, is an entry book of 'Secret Orders and Instructions'. These must obviously have been read by the Commissioners. The 'Instructions' were sometimes issued by Pitt's orders and sometimes not. But several 'Instructions', neither more nor less important are not found here, e.g. the 'Additional Instructions' to Boscawen of Jan. 27, 1758. These are in Chatham Papers, 78. Saunders again must have received 'Instructions' in 1759, for the Quebec expedition; but these are not in the Admiralty records nor in the Secretarial records, it would seem. But the latter are defective. See also Corbett, *Seven Years' War*, i. 180-2. The statements in Ruville, *Chatham*, ii. 129-30 are confused and inaccurate. The story refuted in the text comes from Almon, *Anecdotes of Chatham*, i. 228.

arising out of the rebellion in America, the third or Colonial Secretary played a great part. Ever since the creation of the Colonial secretaryship the third Secretary had to some extent been connected with naval affairs in so far as they regarded the Colonies, though the precise extent of his powers had long been a matter of dispute. In time of peace the chief dealings of the Secretaries with the Navy were in connexion with the transport of troops. Since it was on this subject that differences arose between the Colonial Secretary and his colleagues something should here be said about the question of transport.

In William's reign the Secretaries gave orders for the transport of troops to the Admiralty and the Commissioners for Transport, and they continued to issue similar orders until the end of the period covered by this study.¹ The appointment of a Colonial Secretary, however, created a problem. Were orders for the transport of troops to and from the Colonies to be issued by the Colonial Secretary or, as before, by the Secretary for the Southern Department? Bound up with this was the general question of the control of fleets in Colonial waters and of troops in the Colonies. Hillsborough at first gave all the orders for the transport of troops to and from the Colonies.² He seems also to have conducted most of the correspondence with generals in the Colonies.³ But when there was a prospect of war with France and Spain over the Falkland Islands the Secretary for the Southern Department asserted his right to intervene.⁴ The inevitable result was a certain amount of confusion and delay. After the danger of war had passed the Secretaries quarrelled about their functions. Rochford occasionally sent orders about transport to the Admiralty, though most of these came from Hillsborough.⁵ Such a state of affairs was plainly intolerable, and efforts were made to reach an agreement.

¹ e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Col. 1689-92*, No. 1722; P.R.O., Admiralty, In-Letters, 4090, f. 14^r, Hedges to Lord High Admiral, Nov. 30, 1704; *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, i, No. 212, Admiralty to Bute, June 20, 1761. Many orders about transport may be found in P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Naval).

² P.R.O., Admiralty, In-Letters, 4127, covers the period Jan. 1766-Nov. 1769. All orders for transport in this volume, which are posterior to his appointment, were issued by Hillsborough.

³ P.R.O., Colonial Office, 5. 87 (Correspondence of Hillsborough and Gage, 1769). I have found no allusion here to a correspondence between Gage and any other Secretary.

⁴ *Corr. of George III*, ii, No. 1115.

⁵ P.R.O., Admiralty, In-Letters, 4129. Letter 45 is from Rochford, most of the others are from Hillsborough.

At the time of Hillsborough's resignation Suffolk suggested that the 'Admiral or Commander-in-Chief of the fleet on the American or West Indian station should transfer his correspondence from the Secretary of State for the American Department to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the Southern Department, also that the Commander-in-Chief in America as well as the different Governors there shall correspond with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the Southern Department on all matters of a political nature which may arise between them and any Governor or other officer of foreign powers. And that, as to all military arrangements or operations in time of war the Commander-in-Chief in America should only correspond with and receive orders from the Secretary . . . for the Southern Department'. George III approved of this plan, and North was given the task of commending its acceptance to Dartmouth, who appears to have agreed.¹ This arrangement, however, did not affect the question of transport. Just after Dartmouth's appointment the other Secretaries took it upon them to issue orders for the relief of troops in the West Indies without consulting him. The claims of the Colonial office were thereupon championed by Mr. under-secretary Pownall, who fought the matter out first with Rochford and then with Suffolk and carried his point for the moment.² But Rochford continued to give orders for transport, as well as Dartmouth.³ Finally—in February 1773—a compromise was reached. The terms, which favoured the Southern Department, were, briefly, as follows: In the case of troops sent from Great Britain or Ireland, when relief was not the object, orders for transport were to be given by one of the Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, while directions for the reception and employment of these troops in the Colonies were to be sent by the Colonial Secretary; when relief was the object, the same rules were to obtain, save that the Colonial Secretary was to give orders both to the proper persons in the Colonies and to the Admiralty for the embarkation and transport of the troops which were to return home; in all cases of troops ordered to return to the British Isles, when no relief was sent out, the Colonial Secretary was to give orders for embarkation and transport, while one of the Foreign Secretaries

¹ *Corr. of George III*, ii. 1112, 1113, 1115.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Knox MSS., Various Collections*, vi. 109.

³ P.R.O., Admiralty, In-Letters, 4129, e.g. Letters 80 and 81.

was to make arrangements for their reception and disposition on this side of the ocean.¹

This agreement was tolerably well observed until Germain succeeded Dartmouth.² By then Britain was engaged in a great struggle with the American rebels and the plain need for unified control brought to an end the complicated system described above. No long time after Germain's appointment the other Secretaries ceased to issue orders for the transport of troops.³ Moreover, the Colonial Office now took over the direction of naval operations, in so far as it did not lie with the Admiralty, though the Board, as in previous wars, did much without directions from a Secretary.⁴ Germain directed all military and many naval operations and his position was very like that of Pitt during the Seven Years' War. But in energy and capacity there can be no comparison between the two.

Thus throughout the period 1689-1782 the Secretaries or one of them exercised much authority over the Navy.⁵ Admirals were often subject to a dual control, that of a Secretary and that of the Admiralty. The inconveniences that might have arisen thereby were, in great part at least, obviated by the power of the Secretaries to give orders to the Admiralty and by the existence of the Cabinet. It is, however, natural to ask whether there was any great difference in kind between the orders given to Admirals by the Secretaries or by the Admiralty upon their direction and those issued by the Admiralty without such direction. To make sweeping statements without a thorough and detailed examination of all the pertinent documents would be rash. But it seems that as a general rule the Admiralty was responsible for the issue of all orders of minor importance and

¹ P.R.O., Admiralty, i. 4129, Letter 83.

² So I infer from the Admiralty, In-Letters (Secretary of State), for the period. In practice all orders not given by Dartmouth came from Rochford.

³ The other Secretaries at first gave a few orders for transport even after Germain's appointment. See P.R.O., Admiralty, In-Letters, 4130, Letters 164 and 168. But Germain issued all the orders of this kind in 1776 (In-Letters, 4131) and later. Cf. the next note.

⁴ Germain's letters to the Admiralty may be found in P.R.O., Colonial Office, 5. 254-5. But Admiralty, Out-Letters, 1332-40 (Secret Orders and Instructions) contain many orders the issue of which was not directed by a Secretary. The naval entry book of the Southern Department for the period (State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 232) shows that the holders of that office had little to do with the conduct of the war. Captain James treats Germain as largely responsible for naval operations, especially in 1777 and 1778. See *The British Navy in Adversity*, 54 sqq., 94.

⁵ I have left out of account here those Secretaries whose Province was Scotland.

for those of a specially technical nature. The other orders came both from the Secretaries and from the Admiralty, who acted sometimes in response to a letter from a Secretary, and sometimes not. Both Nottingham and—later—Trenchard apparently controlled naval operations with peculiar closeness. During the years 1702–8 the incompetence of the Lord High Admiral, Prince George of Denmark, increased the work of the Secretaries. In the war of 1739–48 Newcastle was responsible for the issue of most important orders, other than those that were especially technical.¹ According to the late Sir Julian Corbett Pitt's orders usually related to combined military and naval expeditions.² During the American war Germain was largely responsible for general plans of campaign, but did not always direct their execution.³

Reasons for the employment of the Secretaries to control the Navy are not far to seek. If orders were communicated directly to an Admiral by a Secretary of State a greater degree of secrecy was obtained than if they had to pass through the Admiralty and be seen by the Board. There is still extant a document in Godolphin's hand, which refers to orders sent to Admiral Rooke in 1703. Godolphin wrote that those orders which were of a particularly secret character must be sent by a Secretary; the others by the Lord High Admiral's Council, a body which really did the work nominally performed by the Lord High Admiral.⁴ Moreover, time as well as secrecy was gained by the employment of a Secretary. The Admiralty was usually in commission, in which case all orders issued thence must bear the signatures of at least three Commissioners. Since the Board did not meet every day delay must often have occurred thus. Neither of these reasons, it is true, will explain why the Secretaries so often directed the Admiralty to act. Since the head of the Admiralty usually had a seat in the Cabinet he could always inform the Board of what was necessary.⁵ Perhaps the

¹ I am indebted for this information to Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond.

² Corbett, *Seven Years' War*, i. 182.

³ See *supra*, p. 86, n. 4.

⁴ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 29591, f. 252^r, a document endorsed: 'Sir Geo. Rooke. Orders at Cabinet. Feb. 20, 1702–3.' Cf. 'It ought first to be considered what uses the Queen would apply this squadron to, and what part of those services might be communicated to the Prince's Council, and the orders given to Sir Geo. Rooke by them, and what part of the orders ought to be secret and sent to him by a Secretary of State.'

⁵ It is not certain this was always so in the years 1689–1702. George of Denmark,

explanation is that the Secretaries of State gained this power in the reign of William III, during the first part of which the Admiralty seems to have been weak.¹ Once gained the power was not relinquished. Furthermore in the case of a combined naval and military expedition it was expedient that the Secretary who controlled the troops should also control the Admiralty.

The great part played by the Secretaries in time of war is evident. Both military and naval operations could be controlled by them. Since too the greater portion of the work often fell to one Secretary, that Minister could not but have had great influence in Cabinet. Even Pitt might not have found it easy to make his views prevail during the Seven Years' War had he held a different office. Complicated though the system of Ministerial control over the Army and Navy was, the results were on the whole good, when the Secretaries were competent. A combined military and naval expedition required the co-operation of the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Ordnance. This could only be obtained when all obeyed a Secretary of State. On him everything ultimately depended. Pitt knew how to direct. Others sometimes did not, as the following instance will show.

In 1756 a fleet under Admiral Byng was sent from England to protect Minorca. Byng's 'Instructions' were drawn up by the Admiralty in pursuance of Fox's 'directions'. Fowke, the Governor of Gibraltar, was ordered by Barrington, the Secretary at War, who was himself acting on orders from Fox, to put a battalion on board Byng's fleet in exchange for Bertie's regiment, which Byng was to land at the Rock. Hearing of this the Admiralty protested that Bertie's regiment was needed to serve on board the fleet as Marines. Fox thereupon ordered Barrington to inform Governor Fowke that Bertie's regiment would not land but that he must none the less give Byng a battalion to take to Minorca, if the island was threatened with a French attack. Barrington, however, so worded his letter to Fowke that it was not made plain whether or no Bertie's regiment was to land at Gibraltar. Nor was Fowke definitely ordered to put a battalion on Byng's fleet if he was aware the French had

moreover, was probably not a member of the Cabinet in 1702-8. See Note A at the end of this chapter.

¹ Perhaps this was in part due to Nottingham, who liked naval business, and was trusted by William.

actually commenced an attack on Minorca. The results were lamentable. Fowke clutched at the excuse for retaining the men when he heard there was a French army in Minorca and so Byng was deprived of the battalion which he might otherwise have landed in Minorca to reinforce the besieged British garrison there.¹

During the period covered by this chapter Britain won many victories on land and sea and suffered many reverses. Clumsy though the military and naval administrative organization was it did not prevent the former nor was it the chief cause of the latter. Men are always more important than systems.

NOTE A

The Relations of the Lord High Admiral to the Cabinet and the Committee of Council 1702-8

P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Naval), 208, p. 71, Hedges to the Lord High Admiral's Council, April 28, 1703: 'You are desired to attend my Lords of the Committee of Council at my Lord Nottingham's office to-morrow morning . . . and bring with you Instructions for Sir George Rooke concerning such services as may be thought practicable on the French coast.' Ibid., 210, p. 11, Sunderland to the same, March 8, 1706-7: 'I am commanded by the Queen to signify her pleasure to you that whatever orders shall hereafter be thought fitt to be directed to Sir Cloudesley Shovell or any other Admiral or Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's fleet, either for continuing abroad or returning home, before the same shall be issued by his Royal Highness, that you do from time to time lay copies of them before the Queen in Cabinet or a Committee of the Lords.'

These letters would seem to imply that Prince George was not a regular member of the Cabinet.

¹ Tunstall, *Byng and the Loss of Minorca*, 63 sqq.

CHAPTER III

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

IN 1681 it was the business of the Secretaries to conduct a correspondence with the English envoys and Consuls in foreign countries and to send them 'Instructions' and orders. They also gave interviews to the envoys of foreign states in London and negotiated with them on any matters that might arise. These duties had gradually been imposed on the Secretaries, probably because the other Ministers were too occupied with the specific work of their various offices to take over the conduct of foreign affairs as well. The Secretaries indeed were not the only Ministers to correspond with envoys even in the eighteenth century, but the greater and the more important part of the work was regularly done by them.¹ It should be added, however, that the Northern and Southern Departments were—with one exception—alone concerned with foreign business. Neither those Secretaries whose province was Scotland—except for Queensberry during a brief period—nor the Secretaries for the Colonial Department dealt directly with foreign affairs.

The Provincial division was already tolerably well established in 1681.² There was of course no technical reason why either Secretary should not interfere in his colleague's Province. Both held the same office and had identical powers. Practically, however, it was expedient that each Secretary should have his own sphere of duties. It therefore happened that the Secretaries usually confined themselves to their respective Provinces and when interference took place there was generally a special reason for it. If one Secretary was ill or out of town his colleague would naturally act in his stead. Then as now men liked to go out of London from time to time and spend a few days in the country.³ Moreover, the sovereign was regularly attended by a Secretary of State when he left London. Charles was a frequent

¹ See *infra*, pp. 99-100.

² P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Entry Books (France), 19, Sunderland to Long and Westcomb (Consuls respectively at Marseilles and Bayonne), May 18, 1680: 'Mr. Coventry has lately resigned his place of Secretary of State and I succeeding him in his Province, I desire you will let me know from time to time what occurs in those parts.'

³ e.g. Trumbull and Bedford were both fond of doing this.

visitor at Newmarket. Anne often spent part of the summer at Windsor.¹ On such occasions the Secretary in attendance often communicated the sovereign's pleasure to envoys in his colleague's Province. But far more significant are those cases of interference which arose not from any of the above-mentioned causes, but from the desire of one Secretary to control entirely the execution of foreign policy. Without special investigation it is not always possible to determine the cause of any particular act of interference; but it seems true to say that while prior to 1710 interference was rarely of great importance, after that date interference, provided it is tolerably frequent, indicates more often than not that one Secretary dominated the other or at least was trying to dominate him. Mention should also be made of a practice which, though fairly common in the seventeenth century, seems to have died out early in the eighteenth. Envoys, besides their regular correspondence with the Secretary in charge of their own Province, also carried on a subsidiary correspondence with the other Secretary.² This was convenient to both, to the Secretary because he was thereby informed of what was passing in his colleague's Province; to the envoy because he expected the Secretary to do him small favours by way of return. One may infer from this practice that the Secretaries were not then very communicative to each other. Ministerial unity was a plant of slow growth.³

The existence of this subsidiary correspondence sometimes caused a little confusion, though not apparently of a very serious kind. In 1681 the Prince of Orange wrote to Jenkins, then in charge of the Southern Department, asking that Henry Sidney, the British envoy at The Hague, be allowed to accompany him to Memmeling. Charles II readily consented, whereupon Jenkins informed Sidney that Conway would let him know the King's decision. But Conway did not realize it was

¹ St. John and Dartmouth took in turn the duty to attend the Queen for a week at a time (Macknight, *Bolingbroke*, 215).

² e.g. *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Bucleuch MSS.* ii. 2. 497, Williamson to Shrewsbury, July 16-26, 1697. For early examples see *Brit. Mus.*, Add. MSS. 35104, Conway to Bulstrode, Feb. 28, 1680-1; Sidney, *Diary*, ii. 173.

³ I do not think that this subsidiary correspondence was as a rule of much importance. Its existence then scarcely implied that Secretaries gave positive orders to envoys in each other's Provinces. The position of Sunderland during the reign of James II was due to a special order from the King. His correspondence with envoys in Middleton's Province was hardly of the kind discussed above. Cf. p. 6.

his business to do so and Sidney was left in ignorance. After a time Sidney anxiously inquired of Conway whether or no permission had been given him. Conway replied that since he had not been specifically ordered to tell Sidney of the King's decision he had done nothing. The original application had been made to Jenkins and Jenkins should have given the answer in due course.¹

The Revolution was followed by a change in the conduct of foreign affairs, which endured until the death of William III. None of William's Secretaries enjoyed the pre-eminence which Sunderland had had under James II. But the Provincial division was still recognized and on the whole respected. Indeed there was little occasion for conflict when no Secretary counted for much.² When Trumbull received letters from the Consul at Teneriffe he promptly declared this was the result of an error and transmitted them to Shrewsbury.³ On one occasion Trenchard retired to the country for a time owing to sickness and entrusted Shrewsbury with the task of opening and answering his letters in his absence. This reason Shrewsbury carefully stated in the replies which he wrote.⁴ The rule was if anything strengthened during the reign of Anne. Though both Secretaries still sometimes corresponded with the same envoy, one correspondence being of a subsidiary kind, the practice became less frequent.⁵ As a rule a Secretary only corresponded with an

¹ The story is told in Conway's letter to Sydney of Apr. 23, 1681. Conway excused himself thus: 'I did really think he [*sc.* Jenkins] would have answered his own letters himself.' Conway's letter is in Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 35104, f. 12.

² P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Entry Books (Holland), 69, Shrewsbury to Kick, Apr. 2, 1689: 'My Lord Nottingham having been now for some time Secretary of State for the Northern Province I have not been as exact in answering your several letters as otherwise I should; you are too well versed in business to need to be acquainted that the applications must be now made to him for such matters as are more immediately committed to his care. But however if anything occurs of moment I should be glad you would continue to send me the advices thereof.' Ibid., 198, Shrewsbury to Stanhope (Ambassador at Madrid), May 7, 1695: 'Mr. Secretary Trenchard being lately dead I must now renew a correspondence with you which has been long interrupted.' Ibid., 194, p. 85 (second numbers), Trenchard to envoys in the Northern Province, Mar. 6, 1693-4.

³ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28895, f. 29^r, Trumbull to Ellis (one of his under-secretaries), June 7, 1696: 'The enclosed letters and papers from the Consul at Teneriffe were sent to me by mistake, being to be given to the Duke of Shrewsbury, which I desire you to do.'

⁴ Hist. MSS. Comm., *Buccleuch MSS.* ii. 1. 126-7, Shrewsbury to Blathwayt, Sept. 4, 1694.

⁵ Marlborough, however, corresponded with both Secretaries, *qua* Ambassador, rather than *qua* Captain-General. Most of his letters were to the Secretary for

envoy not in his Province for one of the special reasons mentioned above. Hedges, when attending the Queen at Bath, dealt with Nottingham's foreign correspondence, which was forwarded to him. Harley once sent orders to the British envoy at Turin, but excused himself on the ground of Hedges's absence from town at the moment.¹ Not until St. John virtually took over the conduct of the peace negotiations with France, in 1711, does there appear to have been an important breach of the rule.

After the accession of George I cases of interference usually imply either that one Secretary was markedly stronger than the other or that there was a pronounced difference between the two on questions of policy. Instances of a subsidiary correspondence of the old type are very few. Methuen, however, insisted that Polwarth, envoy to the Danish Court, should correspond with him, and Polwarth, after some expression of surprise, complied with the demand.² Henceforth Polwarth treated it as a matter of course that he should correspond with both Secretaries. When Addison succeeded Methuen, Polwarth informed him that while he would not write regularly he would let him know of anything important or entertaining.³ But subsequently it seems to have been regarded as definitely irregular for an envoy to correspond with a Secretary other than the one in charge of his Province. When such a correspondence occurred an attempt was generally made to keep it secret. Stanhope indeed was so far above Craggs that he could probably intervene in his Department without the risk of provoking a quarrel. But the mission of Horatio Walpole to Paris in 1723 and his correspondence with Townshend were regarded as an insult to Carteret.⁴ Townshend was chary about meddling with Newcastle's business. When, in 1728, he wished certain orders to be sent to the British envoy in Paris he found it a matter of some difficulty. To approach Newcastle directly was useless, for the Duke was averse to consulting Townshend about the tenor of the Northern Department. See the five volumes of his dispatches edited by Murray.

¹ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 29588, f. 150, Hedges (at Bath) to Nottingham, Aug. 24, 1702: 'I have received . . . your foreign letters.' *Hill Corr.* i. 157, Harley to Hill, Sept. 5-16, 1704. Harley concludes his letter thus: 'Secretary Hedges' absence in the country gives me this opportunity without being impertinent to answer you with how much respect I am . . .'

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Polwarth MSS.* i. 73, 105.

³ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Polwarth MSS.* i. 253, Polwarth to Addison, June 5, 1717.

⁴ See Ballantyne, *Carteret*, 95 sqq.

his dispatches. Accordingly recourse was had to underhand methods. Delafaye, one of Newcastle's under-secretaries, was induced to convey Townshend's orders to the envoy, who was directed to obey them without informing Newcastle.¹

In later years Newcastle himself became an offender. In 1734 he wrote to the Ambassador at The Hague, in the hope of influencing the critical negotiations then in progress there.² Ten years later he began to interfere systematically in the Northern Province and continued that interference until its care was transferred to him.³ When he held the Northern Department Newcastle could not keep himself from interfering in the Southern, and at times corresponded with the envoys at Paris and Madrid.⁴ The desire to meddle was peculiarly strong in Newcastle, but later Secretaries were not always exempt from it. Even Fox, who knew little about foreign affairs, tried to direct the envoy at The Hague, much to the disgust of Holder-nesse, who would not submit to Fox as he had submitted to Newcastle.⁵ Pitt too refused to confine himself to his own Province and sometimes sent orders to envoys at Warsaw, St. Petersburg, and Berlin and received dispatches from them.⁶ After the accession of George III, however, the Secretaries seem generally to have minded their own business. On one occasion Conway while in charge of the Southern Department thought a communication should immediately be sent to the envoy at Stockholm. Since Grafton was out of town he acted himself; but first secured the King's leave. Similarly, a few years later Rochford was instructed by George III to act on Suffolk's behalf during the latter's absence.⁷

Every envoy to a foreign Court received 'Instructions' upon his appointment. These 'Instructions', however, are very different from the French 'Instructions Diplomatiques'. The French documents usually contain broad surveys of foreign policy in relation to the particular Court to which the recipient was accredited. The British may be divided into three classes,

¹ Coxe, *Walpole*, ii. 623, Delafaye to H. Walpole, May 14, 1728.

² Vaucher, *Walpole et Fleury*, 114, n. 2.

³ See Lodge, *Studies in European Diplomacy*, for Newcastle's intrigues.

⁴ Yorke, *Hardwicke*, ii. 84; Coxe, *Pelham*, ii. 405, 483; *Chatham Corr.* i. 39-40.

⁵ Ilchester, *Fox*, i. 345.

⁶ e.g. Bissett, *Sir A. Mitchell*, i. 168-70; Mahon, *History of England*, iv, Appendix XXVI-XXXVII; *Chatham Corr.* i. 407.

⁷ *Corr. of George III*, i. 145; *ibid.*, ii. 1087-9.

'public Instructions', 'private Instructions', and 'additional Instructions'. The first mainly consist of common form clauses. The envoy was directed to promote British trade, to maintain good relations with the envoys of states in alliance with Britain, to correspond with British envoys at other Courts and with a Secretary of State, and on his return to England to present to the sovereign a detailed account of the policy and condition of the country to which he had been sent. These directions were regularly repeated in all documents of this kind.¹ The other 'Instructions' are more valuable but still lack the breadth of view displayed in the French 'Instructions'. A study of the British 'Instructions' alone would not tell one very much about British foreign policy. The dispatches written by the Secretaries of State to the envoys are at least of equal importance in this respect. But it would be difficult to lay down any absolute rule as to the length or frequency of the letters from the Secretaries to the envoys or from the envoys to the Secretaries. Nor can one easily tell how much of the work of his office was done by the Secretary and how much by his subordinates. If a dispatch is in the hand of a subordinate it may have been dictated or, on the other hand, the Secretary may only have been responsible for its substance and not its actual wording. *Mutatis mutandis* the same will apply to the dispatches sent by the envoys. The following facts, however, shed a little light on the subject.

Sunderland was said to be careless of forms and negligent in transmitting information, while he objected to receiving frequent and lengthy dispatches.² Jenkins often sent letters to the envoy at Brussels all written in his own hand. But his letters to the envoy in Paris were frequently written on his behalf by his subordinate, Wynne.³ Conway at least professed a desire for efficiency and on his appointment ordered the Resident at Hamburg to write frequent and detailed dispatches.⁴ Notting-

¹ *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. v-vii. For 'private Instructions' see *infra*. For specimens of the French 'Instructions' see the two volumes dealing with England edited by M. Jusserand. The British 'Instructions', it may be added, are not as a rule countersigned. They bear the sovereign's sign manual at the top and his initial at the bottom, e.g. P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Entry Books, 19, Instructions to Ambassador Trumbull, Sept. 21, 1685: at the top, 'James R.'; at the bottom, 'J. R.'

² *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Finch MSS.* ii. 77-8, D. Finch to J. Finch, May 10, 1680; *Savile Corr.* 126, Halifax to H. Savile, Nov. 9, 1679.

³ Bulstrode, *Memoirs*, 351, 359; *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Report VII*, Appendix, 366-7.

⁴ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 35104, f. 5^r, Conway to Wyche, Feb. 22, 1680-1:

ham appears to have been diligent and Shrewsbury the reverse.¹ But many of Shrewsbury's deficiencies were supplied by Vernon.² Trumbull, though once complimented on the style of his dispatches by a courteous envoy, was very idle.³ It did not, however, matter very much whether the Secretaries were efficient or not while William III reigned and controlled foreign policy. But subsequently their importance and, as a result, their work was greater. Nor is it easy to see how a Secretary could have carried out properly all his manifold duties. Carteret complained that he had not time to attend to the correspondence of his Department when Parliament was sitting.⁴ Carteret, moreover, delegated as much of the work as he could to his subordinates. During his second term of office, at least, he is reported to have left the actual work of composing dispatches to his under-secretary Weston, merely telling him in general what to say.⁵ If we may believe another report Newcastle reversed this process and allowed Mr. under-secretary Stone to do his work for him, while he did Stone's. But this is probably a jest, if in part a true one. According to the same authority Newcastle had an itch for writing even about matters on which nothing should be said, which is very probable.⁶ Chesterfield, Bolingbroke assures us, did not know how to draw up a State paper. Pitt was not only most industrious, but never allowed any subordinate to take the smallest step without his express order.⁷

It would appear from the evidence adduced above that the Secretaries could do much or little, as they pleased. In this as in other respects almost everything depended on the man.

Envoys, as has been said, were expected to write to a Secretary frequently. In practice this meant as a rule at least once or twice a week, usually the latter.⁸ Arlington had directed them

'I desire you to continue your advices . . . in as large and frequent a manner as you can.' Also *Hist. MSS. Comm., Report VII*, 358, Blathwayt to Preston, Oct. 4, 1682.

¹ See p. 8.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Bath MSS.* iii. 24, Vernon to Prior, June 11-22, 1694.

³ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS.* i. 602, Kingston to Trumbull. See also p. 8.

⁴ *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 22515, f. 7^r, Carteret to Schaub, Mar. 13, 1720-1: 'Les journées deviennent si longues dans le Parliement que je n'ay gueres le temps de reste, comme vous pouver vous l'imaginer, pour entretenir la correspondance de mon Departement.'

⁵ Fitzmaurice, *Shelburne*, i. 43.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Marchmont Papers*, ii. 289, n. 1; Williams, *Chatham*, i. 327 sqq.

⁸ Lane, 'The Diplomatic Service under William III' (*Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, fourth series, x. 91). The conclusions there seem to hold good for later years.

to write regularly when they had nothing to say and such seems henceforth to have been the practice.¹ Less important letters, however, were often addressed to an under-secretary.² The frequency with which a Secretary wrote to an envoy might, however, vary greatly. Envoys in the small Italian states and—at some periods—in Russia might be greatly neglected.

It would appear that dispatches from envoys were frequently though not always read to the Cabinet or its equivalent. That these dispatches were always read out from beginning to end is difficult to believe, for the time so occupied would have been great. Possibly therefore only extracts were read.³ In the Cabinet also, during the eighteenth century, was usually determined the substance of the more important dispatches which the Secretaries wrote to envoys.⁴

It is impossible to discuss the Secretaries' correspondence without making some mention of those letters which bear the mark 'private' or 'most secret' or some such words. Letters of this kind were written and received by the Secretaries throughout the eighteenth century.⁵ Between these 'private' letters and the ordinary letters there seems, however, to be very little difference; for both deal with diplomatic business. Naturally the former were regarded as of special importance. But apart from this it is difficult to draw any distinction. Bolingbroke indeed declared that very secret matters should be reserved for 'private'

¹ *Bolingbroke Corr.* ii. 665.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS.* ix. 176; *Chesterfield, Letters*, ii. 701.

³ e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1680-1, 126, Jenkins to Warwick, Jan. 4, 1681; *Vernon Corr.* iii. 202, Vernon to Stepney, Mar. 24, 1701-2; P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Entry Books, 121, Queensberry to Stair, July 1, 1710; *ibid.*, State Paps. Dom., Various, 1, Minute of a Cabinet held on June 11, 1739.

⁴ *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 34518, Godolphin to Marlborough, Mar. 5, 1710: 'I come from the Cabinet Council. Mr. Secretary Boyle has orders to write no more at present than . . . ' *Bedford Corr.* iii. 137, Bute to Bedford, Oct. 24, 1762: 'Your Grace knows that the heads of the Secretary of State's letters are composed of the united opinions of the King's servants approved by His Majesty.' See also P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 1, Minute of a Cabinet held on Oct. 5, 1736; King, *Diary*, 470, 473-4; *Corr. of George III*, v. 3171, 3197-8, 3202. See also the document in Evans, *Secretary of State*, 367.

⁵ *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 29588, f. 277^r, Hedges to Nottingham, Sept. 28, 1702: 'I have decyphered Mr. Stepney's . . . letter; your Lordship will find by that letter and another private one to me which is enclosed . . . ' This is the earliest reference to a 'private' letter of which I know. The thing, however, was old, though the name was not. See Evans, *Secretary of State*, 299. I give a few references for later years: *Hist. MSS. Comm., Report II*, Appendix, 190; King, *Diary*, 459; *Chesterfield, Letters*, ii. 778 sqq.; there are many 'private' letters in Bissett's *Mitchell* and the *Buckinghamshire Corr.*

letters, since the Secretary was under no obligation to read these out in Cabinet or to leave them behind in the office when he retired.¹ Neither of these rules, however, was observed in later years. Many 'private' letters are still in the Public Record Office and many were read in Cabinet, just as though they had been ordinary dispatches.² 'Private' letters in fact seem merely to have been especially confidential communications and also—sometimes—less formal and official documents than the regular dispatches. Envoys were expected to send such letters to the Secretary in charge of their Province at frequent intervals.³ Presumably, 'private' letters would only be opened by the addressee or an entirely trusted subordinate and thus some additional measure of secrecy would be ensured. The addressee would also exercise his own discretion to whom he showed the letter; for unlike an ordinary dispatch, it was not necessarily supposed to be read in Cabinet.⁴ But 'private' letters, besides being sometimes read in Cabinet, were often shown to a few of the chief Ministers, and often too laid before the King.⁵ When, however, an envoy received a 'private' letter from a Secretary he was expected to keep its existence secret, which was only reasonable.⁶ Envoys, moreover, were often provided with both

¹ *Bolingbroke Corr.* i. 119–20.

² e.g. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 35870, f. 37^v, Minute of a Cabinet Council held on Aug. 8, 1738: 'Waldegrave's most secret, private, and confidential letters . . . were read.'

³ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32766, f. 228, Harrington to Newcastle, Mar. 25, 1730: 'I am ashamed that having been a fortnight in Paris this should be the first private letter that your Grace will have received from me.'

⁴ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32766, f. 365, Harrington to Newcastle, Apr. 12, 1730: 'I received the honour of your Grace's private letter . . . and was extremely pleased to find by it that His Majesty did not disapprove of my notions relating to Mons. Fonseca's proposals. For altho' what I wrote to you, the 25th past N.S., upon that subject was designed purely to convey to you in confidence such private thoughts of mine, as I feared might not deserve a place in our dispatches, yet I never doubted but that your Grace would lay them before the King in case you thought they deserved any attention, I having no other view in writing in that manner than that of suggesting freely every idea of mine, however ill founded, that I could hope might possibly be of any service to His Majesty's affairs.'

⁵ For instances of 'private letters' shown to fellow Ministers by the Secretary to whom they were addressed see King, *Diary*, 464; *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Weston Underwood MSS.* 255. For instances of their being shown to the King see, besides the previous note, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32766, f. 292; *Bedford Corr.* ii. 64.

⁶ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32994 (Newcastle MSS.), f. 223^r, a document headed 'Letters for tomorrow'. The year appears to be 1750. 'Lord Holderness—Answer to his private letter about the barrier and the succession. Private—only for himself.'

'public' and 'private Instructions'. The former apparently were intended to be shown to foreign statesmen, with whom they had to negotiate; the latter not.

It was by no means uncommon during the eighteenth century for a British envoy to carry on a correspondence with the head of the Treasury as well as with a Secretary of State. Thus Godolphin and Marlborough wrote frequently to each other, nor did the Lord Treasurer make any attempt to conceal from the Secretaries the existence of this correspondence.¹ Stanhope, while first Commissioner of the Treasury, had some correspondence with envoys.² Walpole, after Townshend's dismissal, had a good deal, especially with the Ambassador in Paris. The latter, moreover, was expected not to tell Newcastle of the correspondence, though Newcastle of course discovered it.³ Pelham followed the precedent and corresponded with the envoy at The Hague without informing Carteret.⁴ Newcastle, when at the Treasury, likewise corresponded with envoys and endeavoured to conceal from Holdernessee the fact that he was interfering in the Northern Department.⁵ Nor were his precautions without reason. For when, in 1759, Holdernessee discovered that Yorke, then envoy at The Hague, was transmitting to Newcastle information which was not also sent to him, he protested violently. At first he received the support of Pitt and there seemed to be every probability of a Cabinet crisis. Pitt's wrath, however, was appeased by the bestowal of the Garter upon Lord Temple. Holdernessee was then left to face alone the combined fury of Newcastle and Hardwicke, who were supported by the King. George II declared that he knew and approved of the correspondence and desired it to continue. Since Pitt acquiesced, the wretched Holdernessee was forced to submit and to eat humble pie. Even so he was within a measur-

¹ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 29589, f. 95, Godolphin to Nottingham, Aug. 29, 1703: 'My letters from the Duke of Marlborough coming always in Mr. Secretary Hedges packet.' Much of this correspondence is printed in Marlborough's *Despatches* (ed. Murray).

² Torrens, *History of Cabinets*, i. 182; Wiesener, *Le Régent, l'Abbé Dubois et les Anglais*, ii. 37, 136.

³ Coxe, *Walpole*, iii. 300, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Nov. 25, 1735; *ibid.* 309, Sir R. Walpole to Waldegrave, Dec. 5-15, 1735: 'What I mention of this correspondence being seen of the King alone is by his special order that you will be pleased to make no mention of your correspondence with me in any of your other letters.'

⁴ *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Trevor MSS.* 95 sqq.

⁵ Bisset, *Mitchell*, i. 190, Newcastle to Mitchell, July 9, 1756.

able distance of dismissal.¹ But after the accession of George III such conduct on the part of the First Lord of the Treasury seems to have been infrequent. Grenville indeed corresponded with the Ambassador in Paris and North occasionally did the same.² On the whole, however, the conduct of foreign affairs was left to the Secretaries. It may be added in this connexion that Chatham, while Privy Seal and Prime Minister, corresponded with Sir Andrew Mitchell.³

If the head of the Treasury troubled to write to envoys it must have been in order to influence their conduct and not merely to obtain information. But a mere letter from that Minister was not reckoned a sufficient authorization for a formal act, such as the making of a treaty. When Godolphin, in 1707, thus directed Manchester to conclude a treaty with Venice, which would bring the Republic into the Grand Alliance, the Ambassador was cautioned by his secretary, Cole, to do nothing until he had received 'Instructions' under the royal sign manual transmitted by a Secretary of State. Manchester took this prudent advice and returned a non-committal reply to Godolphin, in which he gave reasons for delaying overtures to the Republic. In this way time was gained for a Secretary of State to act. Godolphin himself had evidently not felt very sure of his ground; for in his letter to Manchester he had stated that both the Secretaries were absent from the Court, which was then at Windsor. Cole's comment on the incident was that it was no wonder British diplomacy was often unsuccessful when things were so mismanaged.⁴ However this may be, Cole was right in his views as to the correct method of procedure. But even without acting as had Godolphin the head of the Treasury could influence foreign policy by his correspondence with envoys. Newcastle, in 1756, excused his correspondence with Mitchell on the ground that he did not send the envoy orders but only informed him of his thoughts.⁵ The distinction is as nice as the sincerity of its maker is doubtful.

The following facts relative to the practice of a later age with regard to 'private' correspondence and the diplomatic activities of the head of the Treasury are of some interest and may be

¹ Yorke, *Hardwicke*, iii. 22-7, 65-107. A full account with illustrative correspondence.

² *Grenville Papers*, ii. 410; *Corr. of George III*, iii. 2066.

³ *Chatham Corr.* iii. 29 sqq., 50.

⁴ Cole, *Memoirs*, 473 sqq.

⁵ Bisset, *Mitchell*, i. 190, Newcastle to Mitchell, July 9, 1756.

quoted here. From Professor Webster's published selection of British diplomatic documents for the years 1813-15 it would seem that when Castlereagh, the then Foreign Secretary, was in England, none of the British envoys corresponded with Liverpool, the First Lord of the Treasury. When, however, Castlereagh was on the Continent he corresponded chiefly with Liverpool, though also with Bathurst, Secretary for War and Colonies. Liverpool on occasion communicated the views of the Cabinet to Castlereagh. But formal intimations of the Prince Regent's pleasure appear to have come from Bathurst. At this period too letters marked 'private' or 'secret and confidential' were not uncommon. Such letters might, then as before, be read in Cabinet.¹

All envoys were of course appointed by the King. But the Secretaries soon came to have a voice in their selection. Even William III consulted Shrewsbury as to the choice of plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Ryswick.² During the next reign the Secretaries were largely responsible for filling diplomatic posts. The second Earl of Chesterfield solicited Nottingham on behalf of his relative, Colonel Stanhope, who wished to be made envoy to the Archduke Charles.³ Addison, in 1710, used language which implied that each Secretary chose the envoys in his own Province.⁴ Henceforth such seems to have been the rule, though it was not always observed. In 1737 Walpole wished his friend Hanbury Williams to be sent on a special mission to Naples. He did not, however, apply to the King directly but requested Newcastle to recommend the appointment to George II. The Duke, so far from doing this, obtained the nomination of another.⁵ Resolute as he was to keep the patronage of his Province in his own hands, Newcastle had no scruples in poaching upon a colleague's preserve. Chesterfield was mortified to discover that Newcastle filled posts in the Northern as well as the Southern Department.⁶ Even when First Lord of the Treasury, Newcastle still interested himself in diplomatic patronage.⁷ After the accession of George III things continued much in the same course. It was still the accepted

¹ C. K. Webster, *British Diplomacy 1813-15*. See also Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, 35.

² *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Bentinck*, i. 185, William to Portland, Aug. 13, 1696.

³ *Letters of the second Earl of Chesterfield*, 382-3.

⁴ Aikin, *Addison*, ii. 15.

⁵ Lord Ilchester and Mrs. Langford Brooke, *Hanbury Williams*, 38-9.

⁶ *An Apology for a Late Resignation*, 25.

⁷ Ernst, *Chesterfield*, 478, 510.

theory that the Secretaries should select the envoys, but practice did not always accord with theory. Grenville told the Commons in 1767 that the public service was suffering because the Secretaries were not allowed to choose the men with whom they had to work.¹ Nor was Grenville wholly wrong as to his facts, whatever may be thought of his inference. For we hear that in the ensuing year Shelburne was aggrieved because the King rejected his nominee for a post at Turin.²

There was often much difficulty in finding suitable men for diplomatic positions, especially during the earlier part of the period. William III once said no Englishman could keep a secret.³ William, however, was in a specially difficult position because he was forced to dismiss most of the diplomats who had served James. Yet while he was on the throne several very competent men, such as Stepney, came to the front. Sometimes, moreover, William employed foreigners. This, however, was always unpopular. Lonsdale when he held the Privy Seal scrupled to sanction the appointment of a Saxon as envoy to Berlin; yet Lonsdale himself complained that none of his fellow countrymen were trained for diplomatic work.⁴ For this reason foreigners were still sometimes employed. Schaub and St. Saphorin, for many years the British representative at Vienna, were both natives of Switzerland.⁵ The envoys of British birth varied much both in rank and capacity. Some were great nobles. Manchester, Shrewsbury, and Chesterfield all held Embassies. It was in fact considered proper to send a man of high rank to an Ambassadorial post, when the Court to which he was accredited had sent an equally illustrious representative to London. Moreover, it seems to have been customary to send a peer to Paris after the conclusion of a war with France. The majority of posts, however, were filled with men of lower status. Scotch peers and the eldest sons of Scotch peers held a good many diplomatic appointments. The greatest of our envoys, however, were not usually of noble birth. Stepney, Robinson, Mitchell, and Keene were the sons of commoners. These names suffice to show that some good men were available. But the Secretaries cannot always be congratulated on their choice.

¹ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 217-18.

² Fitzmaurice, *Shelburne*, i. 368; *Corr. of George III*, ii. 628.

³ Klopp, ix. 110.

⁴ *Vernon Corr.* ii. 352; Chance, *Diplomatic Relations of England and Germany 1689-1727*, 33; Lonsdale, *Memoirs*, viii-ix.

⁵ Ward, *Great Britain and Hanover*, 49.

Lord Glenorchy absented himself from Copenhagen for a whole year, on a frivolous plea of ill-health.¹ Hanbury Williams only succeeded in irritating Frederick the Great and Tyrawley, when at Lisbon, disobeyed his orders.²

During the reign of George I an interesting attempt was made to secure a supply of competent men for the public service. Edmund Gibson, the then Bishop of London, pointed out to the Government the mischief arising from the prevalent ignorance of modern languages and modern history. Such ignorance, he said, led to the frequent employment of foreigners. Yet there was no provision at either of the English Universities for the teaching of these subjects. Acting on Gibson's suggestion the King founded chairs of Modern History at Oxford and Cambridge. The Professors were given a salary of £400, out of which each was expected to pay two teachers of languages. Since, however, the teachers were only to receive £25 apiece per annum, the diminution of the Professors' stipends was not great. Yet the arrangement was curious in view of the fact that languages were regarded as more important than history. No doubt the teacher's income was to be supplemented by fees. Inducement as well as opportunity to learn was offered to undergraduates; for twenty scholarships were founded at each University. The scholarships were to be for three years each, and were to be awarded only to men who had completed two years' residence. Every scholar was to study two languages, in which he was to be examined from time to time. At first all went well. We hear that most of the scholars at Oxford applied themselves to their studies with diligence and a fair measure of success. French and Italian were the most popular languages. But some devoted themselves to German and Dutch. Nor were history and international law neglected. Eventually some of the first scholars were given posts. One was taken into Townshend's office and one became secretary to the envoy at Berlin. But neither Townshend nor Newcastle was prepared to find employment for all deserving scholars. They used their powers of patronage rather to extend their political influence than to benefit their country. They had indeed the strongest reasons for desiring efficiency in their own offices. But the number of

¹ Chance, *Alliance of Hanover*, 338.

² Williams, 'The Foreign Office under the First two Georges' (*Blackwood's Magazine*, 1907, pp. 100-1).

clerks was small and vacancies cannot have been frequent. In the filling of diplomatic appointments favouritism continued to rule. The consequence was that men at the Universities ceased to study subjects, the knowledge of which led to no material advantage. The Professorships became sinecures and long remained so in spite of George III's wish to encourage the studies they had been founded to promote. The teachers of languages apparently were always ready to give tuition. None the less Gibbon, who certainly had no aversion to French, did not improve his knowledge of that tongue while he was an undergraduate, nor, it would seem, was he urged to study it.¹

Envoys and sometimes Consuls received a regular salary. Besides this they were paid certain sums for extraordinary expenses. The procedure with regard to the payment of 'extraordinaries' was as follows. The bills were sent by the envoy or Consul to a Secretary, who inspected the various items and either allowed or disallowed them. Then the bills were transmitted to the Treasury, where they were paid to the envoy or Consul in so far as the Secretary had allowed them.² Moreover, the Secretary's certificate that the person in question was actually discharging his duties was necessary before even the ordinary salary could be paid.³ In 1690, moreover, an Order in Council provided for a fixed annual sum to envoys by way of 'extraordinaries'.⁴ 'Extra extraordinaries', however, were still paid when allowed by a Secretary. The chief items of expenditure under this head were for postage and secret service.⁵ The Treasury, however, was most dilatory in its payments and complaints were frequent.⁶

¹ Sir C. H. Firth, *Modern Languages at Oxford*, 115 sqq.

² e.g. *Calendar of Treasury Books 1681-5*, i. 34, 95; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 35104, f. 34, Conway to Warwick, Dec. 2, 1681; *Calendar of Treasury Papers 1702-7*, 148; *ibid.* 1714-19, 91; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 34412, f. 45.

³ *Calendar of Treasury Books 1681-5*, i. 155, 282.

⁴ Lane, 'The Diplomatic Service under William III', 95-6 (*Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, fourth series, x. 91).

⁵ For a specimen of a bill of extraordinaries see M. Graham, *Annals of Stair*, i. 391. See also Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32788, ff. 299^v-300^r, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Aug. 16, 1735 (N.S.): 'I have this day drawn on Sir Robert Walpole a note at two months' date . . . and referred him to your Grace for the use it is put to. I was forced to do so; for as I could not charge it in my bills of extraordinaries till Michaelmas next, I might perhaps be six or eight months out of my money.' This money Waldegrave spent on bribes to secure information.

⁶ Lane, 'The Diplomatic Service under William III', 99-100; *Bolingbroke Corr.* ii. 466, Bolingbroke to Strafford, Aug. 7, 1713.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

BOTH the Secretary for the Northern and the Secretary for the Southern Department attended to domestic affairs.¹ No attempt was made to establish a division of functions. Both indifferently transacted domestic business, which was of a very miscellaneous character. Of the principal branches of this business some account is here given.

The Secretaries were the proper persons to receive most petitions to the sovereign, which, when necessary, they referred to other Departments. Thus petitions which concerned financial matters might be referred to the Treasury; petitions which concerned the law to the Attorney- or Solicitor-General.² Moreover, no letters patent could be issued without a sign manual warrant, which was prepared by a Secretary, who was also concerned in other ways with several later steps preparatory to their issue.³ But work of this kind was largely formal and most of it could be done by clerks. It was not a great labour for a Secretary to obtain the royal sign manual or to countersign a document, nor could he derive much influence from so doing. Sometimes, of course, it was within his power to promote or expedite the passage of a grant, pardon, or charter through the seals, and on occasion the parties interested thought it expedient to solicit his support. Thus Trumbull was requested, and not in vain, to favour the grant of a new charter to the town of Plymouth.⁴

With local government the Secretaries had some concern. They were connected with the appointment of Deputy-Lieu-

¹ Only English affairs are discussed in this chapter. For Scotch affairs see Chapter I. Neither those Secretaries whose Province was Scotland nor those whose Province was the Colonies dealt with the domestic affairs of England.

² e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1693, 215; *ibid.* 1697, 73.

³ See Evans, *Secretary of State*, 196-7; Sir H. C. Maxwell-Lyte, *Notes on the Great Seal*, 94-6 (a detailed description of the procedure in granting a charter); H. Hall, *Studies in English Official Documents*, 332-4 (for a list of warrants).

⁴ *Brit Mus., Add. MSS.* 28895, f. 46¹, Trumbull to Ellis, endorsed, 'Sept. 3, 1696': 'There was a report from the Attorney and Solicitor agreed to this morning at Council for a new charter for Plimouth and a warrant ordered to be prepared for that purpose. If you would speak to Mr. Bridgeman about it, I believe it would easily come to my office and there is good reason for it since several of the members writt to me to favour the passing of it, which I have done.'

tenants, Sheriffs, and Justices of the Peace in a manner that was not merely formal. The Lord-Lieutenants drew up lists of the persons they considered suitable to be Deputy-Lieutenants. These lists they transmitted to a Secretary, whose duty it then was to ascertain whether or no the King assented to the appointment of the persons named therein.¹ The Secretaries picked out fit persons to fill the office of Sheriff.² They corresponded, moreover, with the Lord Chancellor about the appointment of Justices of the Peace and directed him to insert names in the Commission or strike them out. Nor did they neglect the opportunity thereby afforded to serve their friends. Thus we find Nottingham assuring Hatton that his name would be inserted.³ Sandwich, when he was on a diplomatic mission in the Netherlands, on hearing that a new commission for Huntingdonshire was to be issued, coolly asked Newcastle that its issue might be deferred until he returned home, as he understood it contained the names of several local political opponents. But since he was a supporter of the Government Sandwich argued that it was expedient his 'interest' should be maintained.⁴ Apart from questions of patronage, however, the Secretaries showed little interest in local government. Jenkins was once ordered to bring pressure to bear on the King's friends in the Common Council of London in order that they might oppose any proposition disagreeable to His Majesty.⁵ But the motive for this was political. Jenkins too on another occasion directed the Justices of Middlesex to make proposals for the execution of the Poor

¹ e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Dom. 1680-1*, 350, Worcester to Jenkins, July 10, 1681.

² e.g. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32994, f. 119 (Newcastle Papers), 'List of persons to be excused serving the office of Sheriff'. Ibid., Stowe MSS. 246, f. 175^r, W. Morgan to Craggs [1718]. The writer in obedience to Craggs's commands names a person suitable to be Sheriff of Brecon.

³ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 29594, f. 147^r, Nottingham to Hatton, Apr. 4, 1689: 'I sent to the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal to insert your Lordship's name into the Commission of the Peace.' See too *Cal. State Paps. Dom. 1680-1*, 349, Jenkins to the Lord Chancellor, July 9, 1681.

⁴ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32805, f. 244, Sandwich to Newcastle, Sept. 16, 1746: 'I have had some more letters out of Huntingdonshire informing me of the intended new Commission of the Peace for that county, and as my friends represent it to be proposed merely with a design to prejudice my interest, which I believe your Grace is well convinced is the only interest that can in that county be serviceable to the Government, I hope you will not think me unreasonably solicitous in begging you would not forgett in time to entreat of my Lord Chancellor to defer passing the commission as I can assure his Lordship there is no want of Justices to carry on the business of the county.'

⁵ *Cal. State Paps. Dom. 1680-1*, 272, Conway to Jenkins, May 12, 1681.

Law of 42 Elizabeth.¹ But similar instances are rare. When, in 1766, Conway was asked by the Justices of Surrey whether the buying and selling of corn by sample in the open market was punishable by law, he replied it was not his duty to provide legal interpretations.² This was doubtless true, but Conway could easily have referred the matter to the Law Officers and sent their opinion to the Justices had he so desired.³

In the course of time the Secretaries came to have certain duties in connexion with the prevention and suppression of riots. Trumbull, in 1697, informed the Governor of the Tower that a riot was apprehended, and directed him to hold the Militia of the 'Tower Hamlets' in readiness to suppress the threatened disturbance.⁴ It is probable that in subsequent years the Secretaries often took measures to safeguard the peace of the metropolis if not of other parts of the country also. When troops of the regular army were employed to quell a riot an order from a Secretary of State to the Secretary at War would probably be necessary, if the troops were to be moved from one place to another. It is uncertain when troops were first employed for this purpose, but we hear that Anne ordered Sunderland to send the Guards to disperse the riotous mobs in London at the time of Sacheverell's trial.⁵ For the period 1710-60 evidence is scanty. During the reign of George III, however, the Secretaries of State were frequently concerned with the maintenance of order. Thus Sandwich, in 1763, commanded the Secretary at War to quarter a detachment of Guards where they could be used to suppress a riot of the journeymen weavers in Spitalfields.⁶ Five years later the weavers again showed signs of turbulence and Shelburne bade the officer commanding at the Tower take precautions to secure tranquillity. In this same year the Duke of Newcastle requested the Secretaries to quarter a regiment at Newcastle, where riots were then in progress. Weymouth in reply assured the Duke the necessary orders had been given to the Secretary at War.⁶

¹ *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1680-1, 241, Jenkins to Sir W. Smith, Apr. 15, 1681.

² *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, ii, Nos. 327, 336.

³ In earlier times the Secretaries had been far more active. See Evans, *Secretary of State*, 272-4.

⁴ *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1697, 16, Trumbull to the Governor of the Tower, Jan. 21, 1697.

⁵ Tindal, iv. 1. 155. See also Cavendish, *Parliamentary Debates*, i. 334.

⁶ *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, i, No. 1029; *ibid.*, ii. 833, 839; '*Corr. of George III*', ii. 586.

Much light is shed on the whole question by a debate which took place in the Commons during the year 1769. Burke moved for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the Magistrates and the use of the military in the quelling of a recent riot in St. George's Fields. Now on the eve of the riot Weymouth had sent a letter to the Chairman of the Southwark Quarter Sessions, in which he ordered that Magistrate to call upon the troops if the civil power was flouted by the mob. The military, said Weymouth, could not be employed 'to a more constitutional purpose than in support of the authority and dignity of the Magistracy'. Burke, who fiercely denounced Weymouth's action, singled out this phrase for his special condemnation. The great orator declared: 'The military power cannot be employed to any constitutional purpose whatever. What the danger of the country's falling to pieces altogether might justify I cannot say.' The Attorney-General, in reply, stated that the troops on such occasions were not employed in their capacity of soldiers but simply as loyal subjects of the Crown, since it was the duty of every loyal subject to assist in the maintenance of the King's peace. Later in the debate, Barrington, the then Secretary at War, informed the House that troops had been used to suppress riots both in London and elsewhere since 1715. For the period prior to that year no documentary evidence was available as the records were very incomplete. But he had heard, from persons then alive and now dead, that troops had been used to quell riots during the reign of Anne. Burke's motion was of course defeated since the Ministry commanded a comfortable majority.¹ But the opinions to which he gave utterance show how exposed the Secretaries were to criticism for taking steps for the preservation of the peace that were plainly necessary. How could order be kept without the use of troops, when there was no police force? This was the question which Burke and his friends refused to face. Before long, however, events forced them to change their tune.

Both Stormont and Hillsborough were active during the Gordon Riots. Stormont, indeed, showed much energy and tact. While ready to give all such orders to the Secretary at War as he thought necessary, he was at pains not to offend the Magistrates by dictatorial methods. Hillsborough, though he issued fewer orders, was responsible for the useful suggestion that

¹ For this debate see Cavendish, *Debates*, i. 307 sqq.

the Tower ditch should be filled up, a suggestion which was adopted. The curious delay in ordering the troops to fire on the mob has been the subject of much comment. There was certainly a prevalent belief at the time that it was illegal for the troops to fire unless ordered to do so by a Magistrate. Since the Magistrates refused to do their duty, none dared for some time to use the military. Ultimately a Privy Council was held, at which Rockingham and others of the Opposition were present and at which the King, fortified by the advice of Wedderburn, declared he would order the troops to act. Nor did any oppose him. The credit for this decision has usually been given to George alone, but it is only fair to say that on the previous day the Cabinet had met at Stormont's office and had unanimously agreed 'that where the civil Magistrate declines to act with effect some other methods must be taken to preserve the peace and protect the lives and properties of Your Majesty's subjects'. This opinion was transmitted to the King in a document signed by all who had been present.¹ The King, therefore, when he made his declaration in Council, knew he had his chief Ministers at his back.²

There is in England no Ministry of Justice. The duties which fall to the holder of that office in other countries are here divided between the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary. The same statement will hold good for the period 1681-1782 if we substitute the words 'Secretaries for the Northern and Southern Departments' for the words 'Home Secretary'. During the years covered by this study the duties of the Secretaries in this respect were not very numerous. There could be no pardon under the Great Seal unless a warrant for it had passed the signet. Nor could a *nolle prosequi* be entered unless the Attorney-General had received a warrant to that effect from a Secretary.³ All petitions for the pardon of a convicted criminal passed through the hands of a Secretary, who if necessary referred them to another department. Thus the opinion of the Treasury might be taken upon the case of a coiner.⁴ Gradually it seems to have

¹ *Corr. of George III*, v. 3052. The signatories were Germain, Stormont, Hillsborough, North, Amherst, Bathurst, and Dartmouth.

² There is a full account of the riots in P. De Castro, *The Gordon Riots*. See especially pp. 46, 61, 157, 165-6, 239-40. Mr. De Castro's narrative can now be supplemented by *Corr. of George III*, v. 3041-67.

³ e.g. P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 7, p. 29.

⁴ *Calendar of Treasury Books*, viii. iii. 1499-1500.

become the practice for the Secretaries to tender advice to the Crown with regard to these petitions. On one occasion Hedges told his under-secretary, Ellis, to investigate the case of a man under sentence of death and prepare a report for submission to the Queen.¹ Frequently the Judge who had tried the case was consulted, and on the whole it would seem reasonable care was exercised in the consideration of petitions.² The final decision was taken in Cabinet, where the sovereign was present.³ But presumably the Secretary's advice was usually followed. Certainly men regarded them as having the power to determine whether or no pardons should be granted.⁴ The Judges, moreover, sometimes applied spontaneously to a Secretary on behalf of a criminal whom they thought deserving of mercy. Thus, in 1775, Mr. Justice Ashurst asked one of Suffolk's under-secretaries to secure the pardon of a boy and girl, neither of whom was over fifteen years of age, capitally convicted for stealing a sheep.⁵ The law was stern in the eighteenth century, but the men who applied it were not devoid of mercy. The Secretaries, however, were sometimes moved by less noble feelings. Newcastle was quite capable of allowing his electioneering interests to determine his advice to the Crown. Among his memoranda the following note may be found: 'Thomas Newman, smuggler in Horsham Gaol; has many friends in Sussex; to be released.— 40 or 50 double votes depend upon this.'⁶

It may be mentioned that the Secretaries were occasionally concerned with the enforcement of the law of deodand. We find Bromley submitting some curious problems to the Attorney-General in connexion with this. An infant had been killed by a tiger, which was therefore forfeit to the Crown. Arising out of this was a serious question. Was the tiger redeemable for a sum of money as were beasts of service? If not who was the proper person to supervise the seizure and execution of the said tiger?⁷

¹ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28895, f. 217, Hedges to Ellis, Apr. 2, 1702.

² e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Dom. 1703-4*, 441; *Corr. of George III*, i. 448.

³ e.g. *Cal. State Paps. Dom. 1702-3*, 333; P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., George I, 8. 78; *ibid.*, 9. 22; *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, iv, No. 51; *Corr. of George III*, i. 448-9. It is very curious that the sovereign continued to attend Cabinets for this purpose, while after 1717 he was rarely present at ordinary meetings.

⁴ Swift, *Journal to Stella*, 213, July 19, 1711.

⁵ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 34412, f. 322, Ashurst to Eden, Apr. 8, 1775. Such pardons would be on condition of transportation. Convicts rarely got free pardons.

⁶ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32993, f. 30^r.

⁷ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 7, pp. 196-7, Bromley to Attorney-

Matters such as this were of lesser moment. The duties of the Secretaries with respect to the prevention and punishment of political offences were most important. The Secretaries, as is well known, frequently issued warrants for the arrest of suspected criminals and for their committal to gaol when arrested. The rights of the Secretaries with regard to the issue of these warrants were ill defined and were more than once discussed in the Courts. But it seems better first to examine their practice prior to 1763 and then to discuss the various relevant cases.¹

The Secretaries paid very little attention to ordinary criminals. Nottingham, indeed, once sent a circular to the Justices of the Peace informing them that Mistress Wharton, a wealthy heiress, had been abducted by persons unknown, whom they were to arrest if they could discover them.² Townshend once received an anonymous letter, the writer of which offered to betray a gang of highwaymen in return for a reward of £300.³ But cases such as these were exceptional. As a rule the detection and apprehension of non-political criminals was left to others. Trumbull refused to issue a warrant for the arrest of some coiners, on the ground that it was none of his business.⁴ On the other hand the Secretaries had much to do with the suppression of political crimes. They acted sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, that is by giving orders to the other servants of the Crown. During the last years of Charles II, for instance, the Secretaries took some part in the effort which was then made to crush Nonconformity. Jenkins is found sending to a Magistrate a list of Dissenters who were preaching at Lyme and ordering him to prosecute them.⁵ After the Revolution the Nonconformists were no longer molested but Papists and Jacobites became objects of suspicion. In 1689 Shrewsbury ordered the

General, Sept. 22, 1713: 'An infant having been lately murdered by a tyger as appears by the Coroner's inquest and the tyger being by that means forfeited as a deodand, I desire your opinion whether it, being a beast of prey, may be redeemed for a sum of money as beasts of service in the like cases usually are. If you conceive that the tyger is not redeemable, you'll be pleased to let me know who is the proper officer to give order for seizing and killing it, since the mother of the child earnestly begs that it may not be suffered to live and that Her Majesty seems inclinable to gratify her in that request.'

¹ Miss Evans gives a detailed account of this branch of the Secretarial activities prior to 1680, and shows the gradual development of their powers. See her *Secretary of State*, chap. xi.

² *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1690-1, 164.

³ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Townshend MSS.* 89.

⁴ *Vernon Corr.* i. 9-10.

⁵ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 68, p. 18.

Sheriffs of Bristol to seize the horses of Papists and reputed Papists.¹ Frequently too the local authorities informed the Secretaries of the arrest of suspects or of any circumstances which seemed to them suspicious. With the information derived from them and from their numerous spies the Secretaries were usually able to discover those plots which were so frequent during the years following the Revolution.²

By 1681 it had become a regular practice for the Secretaries to issue warrants for the arrest of suspected political criminals. These warrants may be divided into ordinary and general warrants.³ Ordinary warrants were usually for the arrest of persons suspected of treasonable practices, sedition, or of composing, printing, or publishing a seditious or scandalous libel.⁴ Their form at first varied a little, but a document of the year 1715 appears to summarize the practice pretty correctly. Some words were always inserted in the warrant implying even if not definitely stating a charge. As a rule it was said that the person named was wanted for such and such an offence or the suspicion of such and such an offence. Sometimes, however, mention was made of the fact that an information had been laid against the party wanted; but this was rare. What was essential was that some kind of charge should be implied against that party named in the warrant.⁵ After the Revolution the issue of these warrants became very common, at least it was so during the reign of Anne, though what happened while William was on the throne is not certain, since no criminal entry books for his reign appear to be extant. For the eighteenth century, however, information is plentiful. Warrants were then issued for the arrest of persons wanted on one or more of nine counts. The detailed list is as follows: for suspicion of high treason and treasonable practices against His Majesty and the Government;

¹ *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1689-90, 290.

² For the use of spies see Chapter V.

³ For specimens of warrants see Appendix VIII.

⁴ I leave out of account here the warrants issued for offences against the Licensing Act. See *infra*, pp. 114-15.

⁵ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., George I, 2, 21, paper headed: 'Warrants issued by Secretaries of State for the taking up of persons upon suspicion without the mention of any information having been made against them.' Three examples are given: for suspicion of treasonable correspondence; for publishing a scandalous pamphlet; 'for divers disorderly practices'. Then: 'N.B. Numbers of warrants have been issued for taking up persons for suspicion of treasonable practices, but no one appears to have been granted for taking a person up (for being the supposed author etc.) without some words implying a kind of charge against them for the fact mentioned being inserted therein.'

for high treason in conspiring the murder and assassination of the King; for suspicion of treason and treasonable practices; for high treason; for coming out of France without leave; for high treason in compassing the death and destruction of the King; for high treason in coming out of France into this kingdom without His Majesty's leave; for high treason in corresponding with and assisting His Majesty's enemies; for publishing and dispersing seditious and scandalous libels against His Majesty and his Government.¹

The regular procedure after the issue of a warrant was this. The warrant was given to one or two of the King's Messengers who were charged with its execution. Some of these men had a special knowledge of the premises occupied by printers and spent most of their time in watching these and seizing such printers as might be wanted.² When the Messengers, entrusted with that duty, had apprehended their man, they brought him before a Secretary of State to be examined, as a clause in the warrant directed. At these examinations other Privy Counsellors might be present. Thus the Lord Privy Seal assisted Nottingham to examine Defoe as to his pamphlet the 'Shortest Way', and the Jacobite Murray in 1746 was examined by Pelham, Hardwicke, and the Secretaries.³ Sometimes too the 'Lords of the Committee of Council' were present and sometimes the 'Cabinet'.⁴ After examination the arrested party was either discharged or committed to gaol upon a fresh warrant and in due course brought to trial. If the persons thus committed were ill-treated by their gaolers they complained to a Secretary and sometimes at least obtained redress.⁵ But apart from this there appears to be no trace that the Secretaries exercised any supervision over the state of prisons.

¹ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 7, p. 3 (second numbers). 'Forms for filling up warrants for seizing persons.' Most warrants I have seen conform to one of these types.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Portland MSS.* iv. 400.

³ Luttrell, v. 323; *Brit. Mus.*, *Stowe MSS.*, 254, f. 3 (an account of Murray's examination in the hand of Thomas Astle).

⁴ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Criminal), 77, p. 46; *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Portland MSS.* iv. 667.

⁵ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 8, p. 62, Sunderland to the Keeper of the Marshalsea: 'Complaint having been made to me of the ill usage Mr. Peter Drake meets with in the Marshalsea, having irons put upon him which he had once bought off, but has them now put on again in hopes as is most probable of extorting money from him, I must acquaint you that he was sent to you to keep him in safe custody, not to punish him by putting him in irons and you are to take his irons off and let him have better usage for the future.'

The Secretaries were especially eager to secure the arrest and punishment of the authors, printers, and publishers of political libels. Their duties in this respect had been imposed on them by the Star Chamber in 1637 and again by the various Licensing Acts. According to these all books on history or politics were to be licensed by the Secretaries or one of them or by their deputy, appointed for that purpose. The Stationers' Company or 'one or more of the Messengers of His Majesty's Chamber by warrant under His Majesty's sign manual or under the hand of one or both of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State' were authorized to make search for and seize unlicensed books.¹ To suppress unlicensed books and—later—libels was not an easy task. The Secretaries did their best but had only indifferent success. One of the Messengers was usually ordered to keep an eye on periodicals and pamphlets in order that he might bring any suspicious passages to the notice of the Secretaries. We find the Treasury, in 1729, paying the expenses of a certain John Kent, who had performed this task.² The Secretaries also made use of informers, whom they rewarded with hard cash.³ Yet the number of prosecutions for libel shows that the Secretaries' action was not an adequate deterrent. Nottingham indeed was assured in 1703 that owing to his vigilance libellous pamphlets could only be printed in Holland.⁴ However this may be, libels could not be kept out of England. A few years later things reached such a pitch that Sunderland informed the Justices of Middlesex seditious libels were actually cried for sale in the streets and ordered them to take measures for stopping this.⁵ When the Tories displaced the Whigs libels became still more common. St. John, for all his zeal, could not prevent their publication. In vain did he have a dozen printers arrested at once in 1711. Less than a year later he still had occasion to curse seditious pamphleteers, while the Whigs denounced his proceedings as tyrannical.⁶ Later Secretaries had much the same experience.

General warrants were probably first issued by the Secretaries in consequence of the Licensing Acts. General warrants may be divided into two kinds. First, warrants to seize a person,

¹ Evans, *Secretary of State*, 265-7.

² *Cal. Treasury Books 1729-30*, 52-3, A. Cracherode to Treasury, Apr. 19, 1729.

³ *Cal. Treasury Papers 1702-7*, 153, Nottingham to Godolphin, May 25, 1703.

⁴ *Cal. of State Paps. Dom. 1702-3*, 580-1.

⁵ Luttrell, vi. 572.

⁶ Swift, *Journal to Stella*, Oct. 24, 1711; *Bolingbroke Corr.* i. 600; Macknight, 245-6.

unnamed, who is alleged to have committed an offence. Thus a warrant to arrest the murderer of A. B. or, say, the authors, printers, and publishers of an issue of *The Times*, would be a general warrant. Secondly, warrants to seize the papers, unparticularized, of a person named in the warrant. The power to issue such warrants would frequently be useful to the Secretaries. The authors, printers, and publishers of libels were often unknown. A skilful Messenger, armed with such a warrant could easily seize a number of persons, whom he suspected to have knowledge of the authorship of a libel. The Secretary who had issued the warrant would then proceed to cross-question the arrested parties, and might well extract information from them,¹ especially if he was not too scrupulous in his methods. Since there was no limit to the number of persons who might be arrested on a general warrant, it is plain their use was a danger to the public. The wonder is not that their validity was eventually questioned but that it was not disputed as soon as the last Licensing Act had expired, though even before, the legality of a general warrant for the seizure of persons was doubtful.

General warrants were certainly issued during the last years of Charles II. Thus Coventry signed a warrant which directed Messengers to search places where books were printing and binding; if the books were unlicensed they were to be seized, together 'with the several offenders', who were to be brought before Coventry 'or other His Majesty's Justice of the Peace'. Similarly Jenkins issued a warrant ordering two Messengers to proceed to a certain place and seize the printers found there, two of whom were named, and also the authors of a publication named in the warrant, 'if them you can discover'.¹ Nor did the Secretaries cease from issuing general warrants after the last Licensing Act had expired in 1695. They also on occasion issued warrants for the seizure of pornographic books.² Yet in 1680, at a time when there was no Licensing Act in force, the Commons had drawn up articles of impeachment against Chief Justice Scroggs and one of the charges had been that Scroggs had illegally issued general warrants for the seizure of libels, not named in the warrants, and also of their authors, printers, and

¹ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 54, pp. 12, 100.

² P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 83, p. 462, warrant, signed by Harrington, to seize a book called *Venus in the Cloister*, then printing at John Leach's house in the Strand.

publishers.¹ Scroggs was never actually tried, owing to a prorogation of Parliament, but he was dismissed from his post by the King soon after. Thus there was good ground for doubting the legality of general warrants. But the Secretaries did not trouble themselves about the matter. Curiously enough, however, general warrants, for the arrest of persons, seem to have been used very sparingly during the reign of Anne. Perhaps indeed the only one issued was that which Sunderland sent to the Surveyor-General of the coasts of Kent and Essex ordering him to arrest all persons whom he suspected to be in communication with the French.² The use of a general warrant for such a purpose is interesting; they were no longer employed for the seizure of libels and their authors, printers, and publishers alone. After Anne's death, moreover, general warrants became more frequent, though not immediately.³ Newcastle was peculiarly addicted to the use of general warrants for the arrest of persons and issued more than any other Secretary.⁴ Their most common purpose was still to authorize the apprehension of the authors, printers, and publishers of libels, but occasionally they were used against persons suspected of treason.⁵

At various times the right of the Secretaries to issue warrants for arrest and committal was challenged. Trenchard shortly before his death was furiously assailed in an anonymous pamphlet, which was probably inspired by the plotter, Fergusson. According to this pamphlet the Secretaries were

¹ Howell, *State Trials*, viii. 163-216, especially 192-3 and 216. The warrants themselves were attacked, not merely the right of Scroggs to issue them.

² P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 78, pp. 57-8. The Surveyor-General was ordered 'to seize or apprehend all such person or persons together with their papers as you shall find in conference with the enemy or as you shall have notice or just cause to suspect to be come from France or going thither or to carry on a correspondence or trade with the enemy'. This is the only general warrant I have found in the entry books for the period. Owing to the lack of extant entry books one can hardly tell what happened in William's reign. But see *infra*.

³ It is worth mentioning that warrants were sometimes issued with a blank left where the name of the person to be arrested should be inserted, e.g. P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 77, p. 196: 'My Lord Townshend's warrant directed to Jos. Smith for apprehending — and Benjamin Fosky, the first for being the author of a scandalous libel entitled the Flying Post or Post Master No — and the last for being the printer of the said libel.' The date is Aug. 23, 1715. Probably the Messenger would fill in the blanks. This cannot be called a general warrant.

⁴ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 82, contains copies of the criminal warrants issued by Newcastle in the years 1728-46; among these are only ten general warrants. The proportion is unusually high. Compare Entry Book 83 (Townshend, Harrington, Carteret, and Chesterfield.)

⁵ e.g. P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 83, p. 476.

not entitled to issue warrants for arrest, *qua* Secretaries.¹ Trenchard, moreover, often sent out Messengers equipped with warrants wherein were blanks, in which they could insert any names they pleased. In other warrants the names were inserted but not the offence. Nor was it always stated in the warrant that a sworn information had been laid.² These charges produced no immediate effect, but, in the following year, the Secretaries' right to commit was questioned in the Courts. A Habeas Corpus was obtained on behalf of Kendal and Roe, two men, whom Trumbull had committed to Newgate. Their Counsel argued that the Secretaries had not the power to commit; even if they were Justices of the Peace they could not commit unless they had taken the oath of that office upon a *dedimus*. Trumbull in any case had acted *qua* Secretary and not *qua* Justice. The Court, however, held that the committal was valid.³ But since this committal had been for high treason, it still remained undecided whether a Secretary could commit for libel. This point was settled by the case of *Regina v. Derby* in 1709. Derby had been arrested on a charge of printing a scandalous and seditious libel and committed to gaol by a Secretary. His counsel contended that the Secretaries could only commit for treason or felony, and also that they had not a right to examine persons taken into custody. But Lord Chief Justice Parker decided that the warrant was good and added that examination 'is a privilege and for the benefit of an innocent man; for perhaps on examination he will clear himself and be discharged'.⁴

With their powers thus confirmed by the Courts, the Secretaries had no hesitation in issuing both ordinary and general warrants for arrest and warrants for committal. But, though the legality of general warrants was still uncertain, no prisoner raised the point and therefore the Judges could not decide it. Nor do the public seem to have troubled themselves about the matter. In the years 1731-3 there was a vigorous discussion in

¹ 'Letter to Trenchard', 15: 'Neither have the very Secretaries any authority or jurisdiction over the liberty of the subject, in their quality and under the figure of Secretaries but merely as they are themselves Justices of the Peace . . . Though . . . Mr. Secretary doth often supplant Mr. Justice'. The Secretaries at this time were usually J.P.s, (see Evans, 363), but they acted *qua* Secretaries of State, rather than *qua* Justices. For the later period see the document printed in Evans, 367.

² 'Letter to Trenchard', 8.

³ The case is reported in Howell, *State Trials*, xii. 1359 sqq.

⁴ Howell, *State Trials*, xix. 1014 n.

the press as to the Secretaries' right to commit, but the question of general warrants for arrest was not directly raised. Those who denied the right to commit used practically the same arguments as had been used by Counsel for Kendal and Roe. Those who affirmed it said the Secretaries might commit at Common Law as did the Conservators of the Peace. To do so was incident to their office as it was to that of a Justice of the Peace, who committed, not in virtue of a clause in his commission, but *ratione officii*. Another point of interest in the discussion was the question of the right to issue warrants for the general seizure of papers.¹ This was again debated in the press a generation later, when one writer ascribed the origin of the practice to Townshend, and argued from the novelty of the proceeding to its illegality. Whatever may be thought of his law, however, his facts were wrong. Trenchard had been accused of issuing warrants containing a clause which commanded the seizure of the arrested man's papers. Sunderland in 1708 had certainly issued such warrants, as had all later Secretaries.² In the year 1733 the matter came up in Court. A man named Earbury who had been arrested and whose papers had been seized by the Messenger applied to the King's Bench for their restoration. Hardwicke, however, the then Lord Chief Justice, declared the Court was not competent to make a rule upon the Messenger, and therefore could not decide the point merely upon the motion before it.³

Had it not been for the boldness of John Wilkes there is no telling how long the Secretaries might have gone on issuing general warrants. In 1763, however, a series of libels upon the Government appeared in the *North Briton*. After the publication of number 45 of that periodical Grenville and the Secretaries agreed that measures must be taken to stop further libels of a similar character. Halifax accordingly issued a general warrant for the arrest of the authors, printers, and publishers of number 45. In virtue of this warrant forty-nine persons were seized and Halifax was able to obtain useful information from some of those who had been apprehended. Kearnsley admitted that Wilkes had employed him to publish the paper, while Balfé confessed

¹ *Gentleman's Magazine*, i. 477 ; *ibid.* ii. 914, 941. Here are quotations from *The Craftsman*.

² *Gentleman's Magazine*, xxxv. 19. See also *ibid.* xxxiii. 273 sqq. Also 'Letter to Trenchard', 15; P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 78, pp. 57-8.

³ Howell, *State Trials*, xix. 1016-17.

to printing it. Halifax thereupon decided to have Wilkes arrested, but, instead of issuing a new warrant, he contented himself with a verbal order. The only warrant available was therefore the above-mentioned general warrant. The Messengers assigned to execute the order came upon Wilkes in the street, but when they wished to arrest him he laid his hand upon his sword-hilt and swore he would never surrender in public. Accordingly all went together to Wilkes's house. Once there the demagogue demanded to see the warrant and, as soon as he saw it, disputed its validity. For several hours he refused to move from his home. Halifax sent him civil messages begging him to surrender, but these availed nothing. Eventually Mr. under-secretary Wood arrived and persuaded Wilkes to go peaceably. Then the house was ransacked under Wood's supervision in order to discover Wilkes's papers, all of which were crammed into a sack and carried off. Wilkes himself had been taken before Halifax and Egremont to be examined. If we are to believe his own account the scene was intensely comic. Egremont, haughty and supercilious, strove to intimidate him. Halifax on the other hand was all politeness and expressed his regret that Wilkes should be so obstinate in attacking the Government. Neither, however, succeeded in their obvious purpose. Wilkes, remaining cool and insolent, refused to answer any questions. Finally, he was sent to the Tower, whither he went cheerfully enough.¹

When Wilkes was sent to the Tower, the Secretaries knew that a Habeas Corpus had been applied for on his behalf. For various reasons, however, the writ could not be issued promptly and advantage was taken of the delay to commit Wilkes. But nothing was gained thereby. A new writ was obtained, directed to the Governor of the Tower, and the case was accordingly brought up for trial. Now Wilkes's friends had taken the unusual course of applying to the Court of Common Pleas instead of to the King's Bench. They thus secured that the case should be tried not by Mansfield, but by Pratt, who was more likely to take an unfavourable view of Ministerial authority. But, though even judges are not exempt from bias, and Pratt was not one of our best judges, his decisions in the great series of cases, which now began, were probably sound in law. But it may well be that some of his dicta and some of the reasons he

¹ Bleackley, *Wilkes*, 93 sqq.; Wilkes, *Letter to Grafton* (Ed. IV), 17 sqq.

gave for his judgements would not have found favour with Mansfield.

Counsel for Wilkes put forward three arguments when the latter was brought forward before Pratt. First, the warrant for committal did not state that a charge had been laid against Wilkes upon oath, but merely that he was the author of a seditious and treasonable libel. Secondly, the warrant did not set forth the portions of the libel alleged to be treasonable and seditious. Finally, the committal was a breach of Parliamentary privilege since Wilkes was an M.P. Now privilege covered all offences save treason and breach of the peace; therefore Wilkes should be discharged. Counsel for the Crown stoutly contested the first two points but on the third his case was patently weak. All he could do was to cite a precedent, which proved libel tended towards a breach of the peace. Pratt in giving judgement declared that, in spite of the first two objections, the committal was good, but decided libel was not a breach of the peace and therefore Wilkes must be discharged on account of privilege.¹ Wilkes thereupon proceeded to demand reparation for the injury done to him. He brought an action against Wood for trespass in his house, breaking his locks, and seizing his papers. Counsel for the prosecution argued that general warrants of search were illegal. No Magistrate could delegate such a power. Even in France and Spain this was not done. Were these warrants pronounced legal no man would be free from the possibility of the most vexatious molestation. Counsel for the defence said that warrants of this kind had been frequently issued from a date prior to the Revolution. Lord Halifax, who was called as a witness for the defence said that acting on information received he had ordered the arrest of Wilkes. On hearing that Wilkes refused to surrender he had told Weston, one of his under-secretaries, to go and persuade Wilkes. Weston, however, had excused himself on the plea of ill-health, whereupon Wood, under-secretary to Egremont, had been sent as a substitute. Pratt then inquired about the source of Halifax's information. His Lordship returned evasive answers and appeared much embarrassed. Eventually the Solicitor-General produced an affidavit made by Balfe, the printer. After further evidence had

¹ This case and those of *Wilkes v. Wood*, *Entick v. Carrington*, and *Leach v. Money* are reported in Howell's *State Trials*, xix. There are some useful comments in Broom's *Constitutional Law*.

been tendered to prove Wilkes was the author of number 45, Pratt summed up. The forcing of locks and the seizing of papers was, he said, a most serious thing. The only authorization for this had been a warrant which contained no list of the papers to be seized. Such a power, if possessed by the Secretaries of State, would be subversive of liberty. Could the Secretaries have a power which no other Magistrate had? If then general warrants for arrest were illegal, their illegality was a ground for awarding increased damages. The precedents which had been adduced by the defence did not justify a practice in itself illegal, that of seizing papers generally. The jury, after a brief consideration, found for the plaintiff and awarded £1,000 damages.

The case of *Wilkes v. Wood* decided that a general warrant issued by a Secretary to search for and seize the papers of the author—not named—of a seditious libel was illegal. That of *Entick v. Carrington* decided that a warrant issued by a Secretary of State to seize the papers of the author—named—of a seditious libel was also illegal. The history of the case is as follows. A certain John Entick brought an action for trespass against Nathan Carrington and three other King's Messengers, who had entered his house and seized his papers. This they had done in obedience to a warrant signed by Halifax in 1762. The defendants entered a plea of justification, and the case was tried before Pratt, now Lord Camden. After witnesses had been examined and Counsel heard, the jury returned a special verdict, in which they declared Halifax had issued a warrant for the apprehension of John Entick 'the author or one concerned in the writing of several weekly very seditious papers entitled *The Monitor or British Freeholder* which contain gross and scandalous reflections and invectives upon his Majesty's Government and upon both Houses of Parliament.' The warrant had been issued in consequence of information given by one John Scott to Edward Weston, under-secretary to Halifax. In pursuance of the warrant Entick had been arrested, his house ransacked, and his papers seized by the four defendants. These papers had been delivered to Lovell Stanhope, law-clerk to the Secretaries of State. Finally the jury declared that such warrants had been issued regularly by the Secretaries since the Revolution; but whether or no the defendants had been guilty of trespass the jury could not determine and they 'prayed the advice of the Court thereupon'. If the Court decided the defendants had

committed trespass the jury found them guilty and awarded Entick £300 damages. After this special verdict had been argued at the bar, Camden delivered judgment for the plaintiff. Since in the course of his judgement he elaborately examined the powers of the Secretaries, a summary of it must here be given.

In the absence of any statutory jurisdiction, said Camden, the Secretaries' powers must rest on the Common Law. Four questions therefore arose. Were the Secretaries, either *qua* Secretaries or *qua* Privy Councillors, Conservators of the Peace? If so, were they within the equity of 24 George II, c. 44? Had the defendants acted in obedience to the warrant? Was the warrant to seize the plaintiff's papers legal? The powers of the Secretaries, Camden observed, were 'pretty singular'. If they acted *qua* Privy Councillors they were the only Councillors so to act. Were they then Conservators? They never bound to the peace or to good behaviour, though to do this was one of the duties of a Conservator. They concerned themselves exclusively with political crimes. They committed in cases where the power of a Conservator to commit was doubtful. They had no power to administer an oath or to take bail. Whence came this jurisdiction? Some thought it pertained to the secretaryship; others to membership of the Privy Council. It was not for him, however, to question powers confirmed by precedent and by judicial decisions. But since it had been argued by the defence that the Secretaries were within the equity of the 24th George II, cap. 44, it was his duty to decide that point.¹ Now the Secretary of State was originally nothing more than the King's private Secretary. He kept the signet and countersigned warrants directed to the Privy Seal. His importance was derived from the conduct of foreign correspondence. But there was no evidence that he was a Common Law Magistrate. It had indeed been decided in Elizabeth's reign that any single Privy Councillor could commit, if cause was shown in the warrant, though the Courts would only remand upon his committal in cases of high treason. He committed moreover *qua* Privy Councillor, not *qua* Secretary of State. Under the Stuarts, however, the Secretaries had often committed, neither as Secretaries nor as Privy Councillors, but simply as the executors of the King's commands. Camden,

¹ This was an 'Act for the rendering of Justices of the Peace more safe in the execution of their duties and for indemnifying constables and others acting in obedience to their warrant'.

therefore, concluded that the Secretaries had no power either inherent in their office or as Privy Councillors to commit for what causes they pleased, though he was bound to adhere to the precedents set by *Rex v. Kendal* and *Regina v. Derby*. But the Secretaries were not Conservators either as Secretaries or as Privy Councillors, and even if they were Conservators as royal delegates that did not make them Justices of the Peace 'within the equity' of the 24th George II. As to the third question, Camden decided on technical grounds that the defendants had not obeyed the warrant. Finally the Lord Chief Justice declared that a warrant to search for and seize papers was illegal, since there was no justification for it in law and it was an infringement upon liberty and the rights of property. The practice of issuing and executing such warrants was 'subversive of all the comforts of society'. The fact that it was an old practice did not make it legal. The law did not recognize a right to search for libels, and no attention could be paid to the argument that such search and seizure was in the interest of the State.

In this same year also was finally decided the case of *Leach v. Money* and two others of the King's Messengers. This was an action brought by the printer, Leach, against the defendants for breaking into his house and imprisoning him. Leach had been arrested upon the warrant for apprehending the authors, printers, and publishers of number 45. After having been kept in custody for four days, Leach had been brought before Halifax and examined. Since it had come out that Leach was not the printer of number 45 he had been discharged. Subsequently, he had brought an action, which had been tried before Pratt and resulted in a verdict favourable to him. In 1765 the defendants had the case re-argued upon a writ of error. Their counsel contended that the appellants were within the equity of the 24th George II and so were not liable. The Secretaries, he said, had the jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace incident to their office. The Courts recognized their authority in cases of treason and felony and should do so in cases of misdemeanour. A seditious libel was an offence against Government and the public peace, which it was the duty of the Secretaries to safeguard. The validity of general warrants for arrest had never been contested in Court. Judges had bailed persons taken up upon them and so must have considered them legal. Counsel on the other side had argued that the Secretaries were neither

Justices by commission nor *qua* Secretaries nor *qua* Privy Councillors. No legal writers had ever treated them as such. Moreover not only was the warrant illegal but Leach, since he was neither the author, printer, nor publisher of number 45, did not come within the description in the warrant. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, after hearing counsel for the appellants in reply, said he looked upon the warrant as illegal. His words are worth quoting in part. 'Hale and all others hold such an uncertain warrant void, and there is no case or book to the contrary. It is said that the usage hath been so; and that many such have been issued since the Revolution. But a usage to grow into a law, ought to be a general usage, *communiter usitata et approbata*; and which, after a long continuance, it would be mischievous to overturn. This is only the usage of a particular office and contrary to the usage of all other Justices and Conservators of the peace. There is less reason for regarding this usage, because the form of the warrant probably took its rise from a positive Statute and the former precedents were inadvertently followed after that law had expired'. This, however, was only a dictum, delivered before the time for judgement had come. When the hearing of the case was renewed, counsel for the appellants acknowledged that the warrant had not been pursued, since Leach was neither author, printer, nor publisher of number 45, and therefore they admitted their case was bad. The Court accordingly affirmed the original judgement.

Thus general warrants for arrest were never formally condemned in Court. But some thought the Attorney-General, who had appeared for the appellants in *Leach v. Money*, had yielded upon another point precisely in order to avoid such a condemnation. The practical effect, however, was the same. The reason for issuing general warrants for arrest was to make it possible for a number of suspects to be apprehended, who could be cross-questioned until one or more of them gave the desired information. But if it was illegal to arrest a person not guilty of the offence named in the warrant, its utility disappeared. No more general warrants for arrest were issued, largely for this cause. Moreover in 1766 the House of Commons resolved that general warrants for arrest and for the seizure of the papers of an author, printer, or publisher of a libel were illegal.¹ When

¹ *Commons Journals*, xxx. 753, 772. For an account of the debates in 1764 and 1766 see Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, xv. 1393 sqq.; *ibid.* xvi. 207 sqq.

Wilkes's long deferred action against Halifax came up for trial Camden declared that general warrants for arrest had been considered both in the Common Pleas and in the King's Bench and had been deemed illegal by all the Judges concerned. Wilkes, of course, got heavy damages.

On all essential points Mansfield and Camden seem to have been in agreement about the law in these cases. Camden perhaps showed a tendency to encourage the award of heavy damages. But he doubtless expected the Government would pay, which they did. So Camden cannot be accused of undue severity towards the poor Messengers, who could scarcely be held very blameworthy. The case of Huckle serves well to illustrate both the attitude of Camden and the character of the Messengers. Huckle was a poor man, who had been arrested upon the warrant for taking up the authors, printers, and publishers of number 45. He was kept in custody for six hours and treated by the Messengers, who had apprehended him, with beer and beefsteaks. In spite of this generosity on their part, he afterwards brought an action against them and was awarded £300 damages. A motion for the retrial of the action on the ground of excessive damages was argued before Camden, who, in giving judgement, said that while £20 would probably be an adequate compensation for the injury sustained by Huckle, the jury had rightly taken into consideration the magnitude of the offence. The motion therefore failed.¹

After the decisions in these various cases the Secretaries seem only to have issued warrants for arrest and committal in cases of high treason or treasonable practices. They were, as a rule, at pains to avoid a breach of the law, but Rochford managed to blunder badly. In 1775 he issued a warrant for the arrest of one Sayre upon a charge of high treason. But the warrant also contained a clause ordering the seizure of Sayre's papers, which were accordingly carried away. Sayre himself was brought before Rochford to be examined. Soon after the arrest had occurred, however, Reynolds, Sayre's solicitor, heard the news and hurried to Rochford's office, where he demanded access to the prisoner. After repeated denials, this was at length granted and Reynolds was taken into the room where Sayre was being examined. Reynolds promptly told him to answer no questions

¹ Howell, *State Trials*, xix. 1404-5. Huckle's action was also for the illegal seizure of papers.

and to sign no document. Rochford exclaimed that this was very bad advice indeed and exhorted Sayre to take no notice of it. Sayre, however, now became silent, so Rochford committed him to the Tower. But the warrant of committal simply said Sayre was charged upon oath before Rochford with treasonable practices. A Habeas Corpus was granted on his behalf and the matter came before Mansfield who granted Sayre bail and observed the warrant of committal was bad, since it only stated a general charge. Shortly afterwards the case against Sayre was dropped. Then Sayre brought an action against Rochford, for false imprisonment and seizure of papers. As to the latter Rochford had no defence and a verdict was given for the plaintiff with £1,000 damages. Finally, however, judgement was entered for Rochford on a technical point.¹ But the affair did him no good, especially as the information laid against Sayre on the strength of which he had acted had been of a ridiculous character. Rochford resigned shortly afterwards and the public drew the obvious conclusion.

The duties of the Secretaries with respect to domestic affairs were neither very numerous nor, apart from criminal business, very important. In the days when there was little social legislation this could scarcely be otherwise. But it is interesting to note the way in which the Secretaries strove to make themselves into Magistrates. The elasticity of their office rendered it easy for them to extend their powers unless checked by the Courts. When, however, the Courts had curbed them they made no attempt to obtain statutory powers. Had that attempt been made it would probably have failed. The Parliaments of George III were less ready to increase the powers of the executive than are the Parliaments of George V.

¹ The case is reported in *State Trials*, xx. 1286 sqq.

NOTE A

The Isle of Man

In 1760 the Crown purchased the Isle of Man. For the purposes of administration the island was included in the Northern Department.¹ The Secretary for the Northern Department corresponded with the Governor of the Island. The chief subject of correspondence was military, for it would appear that troops were usually stationed on the Isle of Man. But there are also references to local politics, to questions of jurisdiction, and to questions of patronage. The total bulk of the correspondence is small.²

¹ *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, ii. 172.

² The correspondence for the years 1760-75 is calendared in the *Calendar of Home Office Papers*. For specimens see vol. i, Nos. 1810, 1851, 1903, 1960, 2058; vol. ii, Nos. 7, 57, 76, 96, 133, 183, 345, 458; vol. iv, Nos. 442, 463, 601, 624, 641, 659.

CHAPTER V

THE SECRETARIES' OFFICE AND EMOLUMENTS, SECRET SERVICE, AND THE *GAZETTE*

THE Secretaries of course employed a staff to assist them in the performance of their duties. But the numbers of that staff were small indeed compared with the number of those employed in the great Ministries at the present day. Very dissimilar too were the conditions of employment. The Civil Service, as we know it, is a creation of the nineteenth century. Its members are selected by competitive examination, they receive a fixed salary from the State by way of remuneration, and, after having served for a term of years, they may retire with a pension. Was there a Civil Service in the eighteenth century? Scarcely, in the modern sense of the term. Moreover, conditions in the Secretaries' Office were so peculiar that it would not be correct to call the clerks there employed Civil Servants, in any reasonable sense. They were neither appointed by the State nor paid by the State, but selected by the Secretaries and entirely dependent upon them. This is all the more curious in that other departments were staffed by employees of the State. For instance, both the Secretary to the Board of Trade and the clerks in the Privy Seal Office were paid by the Treasury. Perhaps the explanation is that the secretaryship, a comparatively recent office, did not 'go out of Court', till late. The Secretaries were long regarded as the King's personal servants rather than as the servants of the State.¹ Before the change occurred the Secretaries were employing assistants, whom they appointed and treated as they pleased. Since the arrangement was convenient to them no alteration was made.

In discussing the Secretaries' staff it is convenient first to state the numbers of those employed in the Southern and Northern Departments and then in the Scotch and Colonial Offices. For the earlier part of the period here surveyed, however, information is not very plentiful.² In 1684 there were two under-

¹ One may compare the position of the sovereign's private secretary at the present day. It has been suggested that the time may come when the holder of this position will change with the Ministry.

² The sources are: (a) Chamberlayne's *Angliae Notitia* (after the Union *Magnae Britanniae Notitia*). This work corresponds to *Whitaker's Almanack* and its informa-

secretaries in each office.¹ They were assisted by a small number of clerks.² Henceforth there were regularly two under-secretaries in both the Northern and Southern Departments. The number of clerks, however, varied. In 1694, Nottingham employed four and Trenchard three.³ In 1704, there were four clerks in each office and two chamber-keepers.⁴ In 1710, Sunderland employed six clerks and Boyle five, but in the following year Dartmouth had only four while St. John had six.⁵ In 1758, Pitt employed eight clerks and Holderness nine. Between 1760 and 1782, the number of clerks in the Southern Department varied from eight to fourteen, and was usually ten; in the Northern Department, the number varied from eight to twelve and was usually eight. It is curious that the creation of the Colonial Department did not lead to a reduction of the staff in the Southern Department, which was larger in the years 1770-82 than in the years 1760-8.⁶

Whether there was any distinction of title between the clerks in the earlier years of the period is uncertain. But in 1723 there was certainly a 'chief clerk' in the Northern and Southern Departments.⁷ In 1758, however, the head clerk was known as the 'first clerk', a title which he continued to bear until 1782. During the last two decades of the period, moreover, two or three of the clerks in each office were known as 'senior clerks'.⁸

The staffs of the Scotch and Colonial Offices were smaller. Queensberry had two under-secretaries, three clerks, and one tion is fairly correct. Unhappily the work did not appear annually but at irregular intervals. There were twenty-five editions between 1682 and 1755, the date of the last edition. (b) *The Court and City Register*. This was an annual publication and contains lists of the Secretaries' staff from 1740 to the end of the period. (c) Certain documents in Shelburne MSS. 134. These are described later. (d) Casual allusions in various places, not very numerous, but often useful. The list of under-secretaries given by Beatson (*Political Index*, i. 406 sqq.) is not reliable.

¹ Chamberlayne, *Angliae Notitia*, 1684, pt. ii. 7-8. Chamberlayne talks of the Secretaries' 'secretaries'. But on Dec. 27, 1681, Wood could write: 'John Cook who hath been under-secretary to several Secretaries'. See Clark, *Life and Times of Wood*, ii. 563. The term 'under-secretary' soon became usual. It was first used in an official document, as far as I know, in 1694. See *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1694-5, 230-1. See also *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Portland MSS.* iii. 440, A. Harley to Sir E. Harley, Sept. 14, 1689.

² See the document printed in Evans, *Secretary of State*, 192-3.

³ *Angliae Notitia*, 1694, pt. ii. 243.

⁴ *Angliae Notitia*, 1704, 530. The number of chamber-keepers remains constant.

⁵ *Magnae Britanniae Notitia*, 1710, 513-16; Boyer, *Political State of Great Britain*, i. Appendix 2-3.

⁶ These figures are taken from the *Court and City Register*.

⁷ *Magnae Britanniae Notitia* 1723.

⁸ *Court and City Register*.

130 THE SECRETARIES' OFFICE AND EMOLUMENTS, chamber-keeper in 1710. But Roxburgh, in 1723, and Tweeddale, in 1745, had only one under-secretary. In the latter year also the number of clerks was only two.¹ The Colonial Office at first employed one under-secretary, but after 1770, two; the number of 'chief clerks' fluctuated between one and three; that of clerks between three and six.²

The appointment of their assistants rested solely with the Secretaries. But care was taken not to employ persons whom the sovereign distrusted. Shrewsbury turned out Wynne at William's wish.³ Newcastle, in 1729, was careful to select for a vacant under-secretaryship one who was *persona grata* to George II. Since the King was then in Hanover, Newcastle did not actually ask his consent, but he took care to submit the matter to the Queen and secure her approval.⁴ Such precautions were very reasonable. The case of Gregg had shown how dangerous a disloyal clerk might be.

Employment in a Secretary's office was usually of a permanent character, in fact if not in theory. An incoming Secretary, as a rule, took over most of his predecessor's staff, or at least of his predecessor's clerks. For the under-secretaryship was far superior to a clerkship, and a change of secretary often brought with it a change of under-secretaries. In the first part of the period, however, under-secretaries were usually promoted clerks and frequently remained at their post as long as they were fit for their work. The career of William Bridgeman affords a good instance of this. Originally a clerk, he held, by 1673, the position of an under-secretary, even if that was not his title. After having served Arlington, Williamson, Sunderland, and Middleton he is found as under-secretary to Trenchard, whom he only quitted in order to become Secretary to the Admiralty.⁵ When Trumbull succeeded Trenchard, he continued one of the latter's

¹ *Magna Britanniae Notitia* 1710, 515; *ibid.*, 1723, 484; *ibid.*, 1745, pt. ii. 31.

² *Court and City Register*.

³ Foxcroft, *Halifax*, ii. 225-6; *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Portland MSS.* iii. 440.

⁴ *Brit. Mus.*, Add. MSS. 32687, f. 346, Newcastle to Townshend June 24, 1729: 'I thought I could not better supply his place (*sc.* the late under-secretary's) than by one bred up to the business and have therefore appointed Mr. Couraud to succeed him, for whose behaviour I think I may from long knowledge of him be responsible. I would not however have ventured to have done it without previously receiving the King's pleasure, had I not known His Majesty's goodness to Mr. Couraud. . . . 'I have had the honour of acquainting the Queen with this who was pleased to think I was right.'

⁵ Evans, *Secretary of State*, 163-5, 191-2; *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Report XI*, App. iv. 200-1; Luttrell, iii. 279; *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1694-5, 230.

under-secretaries and found a new post for the other.¹ When Vernon followed Trumbull, he kept on Ellis and, to fill the other under-secretaryship, brought back Hopkins, the man who had left upon Trumbull's appointment.² Vernon liked Hopkins so well that, upon removing to the Southern Department, he took Hopkins with him.³ Hedges, who was appointed to the Northern Department at the same time, kept Ellis and filled Hopkins's place with Tucker, who had been under-secretary to Trumbull.⁴ Ellis and Tucker again served Hedges, when he was reappointed to the Northern Department in 1702, and apparently followed him to the Southern in 1704. For we hear that Hedges dismissed Ellis in 1705, while in 1710 Hopkins is found as under-secretary to Sunderland.⁵ In 1711, one of Dartmouth's under-secretaries was Richard Warre, who had been a clerk in the Southern Department twenty years previously and had served Nottingham—in 1702-4—and Harley as under-secretary.⁶ George Tilson was under-secretary to Boyle in 1710 and is found serving Townshend in the same capacity in 1729, and appears to have been an under-secretary during the whole intervening period. More noteworthy still is the career of Edward Weston. He became under-secretary, to Townshend, in 1729 and continued as such in the Northern Department till 1746, when he left in order to go to Ireland as Harrington's secretary, for the latter was then made Lord-Lieutenant. In 1761, however, Weston returned to his old position in the Northern Department where he served under Bute, Grenville, and Halifax. In October, 1764, he resigned to enjoy a repose which he surely deserved.⁷

What manner of men were the under-secretaries? Some, as has been said, were promoted clerks. Others, however, had never served in the office before their appointment. It was not strange that an incoming Secretary should often appoint an under-secretary from among those he already knew, whether or no he had been a clerk in the office. As one might expect, then, men

¹ Luttrell, iii. 468.

² Luttrell, iv. 316.

³ Luttrell, iv. 705.

⁴ Luttrell, iv. 705.

⁵ Luttrell, v. 169, 555; *Magnae Britanniae Notitia*, 1710, 515.

⁶ *Angliae Notitia*, 1694, pt. ii. 243; *ibid.*, 1702, 513; *ibid.*, 1704, 530; Luttrell, vi. 595.

⁷ *Magnae Britanniae Notitia*, 1710, 516; *ibid.*, 1723, *ibid.*, 1726 (For Tilson). *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Polwarth MSS.*, contain much of Tilson's correspondence as under-secretary to Townshend, Stanhope and Methuen. For Weston see *Hist. MSS. Com.*, *Weston Underwood MSS.*, 199-200, 451.

of the most different characters became under-secretaries. Literature was well represented among them. Matthew Prior, that admirable writer of light verse, after acting as Jersey's secretary, when the latter was Ambassador to Louis XIV, became under-secretary to Jersey.¹ Addison was appointed by Hedges, at Godolphin's request, and remained under-secretary for over three years.² When Addison himself became Secretary of State, he appointed the poet Tickell, then a Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, as one of his under-secretaries.³ To descend to lower levels, mention may be made of Nicholas Rowe, under-secretary to Queensberry.⁴ Rowe was a dramatist and at any rate sufficient of a poet to be made Laureate, a few years later. His poems and dramas are not often read to-day, but his edition of Shakespeare keeps his memory alive amongst commentators. Nor should one omit the name of Robert Wood, who, besides being under-secretary to Pitt and others, was the author of a work on Homer, which shows much critical power and may still be read with entertainment.⁵ Turning from literature to philosophy we find David Hume, the greatest metaphysician of his age, acting as under-secretary to Conway.

All the above doubtless became under-secretaries in order to earn their living. Others, however, had a different motive. It happened from time to time that an under-secretaryship was regarded as a useful preparation for a political or diplomatic career. The elder Horatio Walpole was under-secretary to Boyle.⁶ Townshend's second son entered his father's office and stayed there for a time.⁷ Charles Jenkinson, the future Cabinet Minister and Earl of Liverpool, took it as a favour that Holderness allowed him to serve as an unpaid clerk. Later, Jenkinson became under-secretary to Bute. After Bute had ceased to be Secretary, Jenkinson devoted himself entirely to politics.⁸

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Bath MSS.* iii. 330. Prior to Dorset, Apr. 4, 1699: 'I think I see it already destined by the higher powers that his Lordship (*sc.* Jersey) will be Secretary and I his Vernon'. See also Luttrell, iv. 517; Legg, *Prior*, 119.

² Aikin, *Addison*, ii. 214; Luttrell, v. 569; *ibid.* vi. 391. The appointment was a reward for Addison's poem on Blenheim.

³ *Hearne's Collections*, vi. 51.

⁴ *Magnae Britanniae Notitia*, 1710, 515.

⁵ *Essay on the Original Genius of Homer*, 1775. For a specimen of Wood's wit see pp. 333-4.

⁶ *Vernon Corr.* iii. 347.

⁷ *Chatham Corr.* ii. 407 n. 2.

⁸ *Grenville Papers*, i. 180; Almon, *Anecdotes of Chatham*, i. 267. See also the article on Charles Jenkinson in the *Dict. Nat. Biog.*

Another future Peer was William Eden, who entered Suffolk's office early in life.¹

Many of the under-secretaries were also Members of Parliament. Between 1708 and 1747 at least eight had seats in the Lower House.² Between 1761 and 1762 the number of under-secretaries in the Southern and Northern Departments who were elected to Parliament was also eight. The total number of under-secretaries in these Departments during the period was twenty-one.³

It was only to be expected that the relations between the Secretaries of State and their under-secretaries should frequently be of the most confidential character. Between Shrewsbury and Vernon there was a real friendship.⁴ Newcastle was supposed to be under the influence of Stone. According to Horace Walpole, Weymouth was ruled by Robert Wood.⁵ Perhaps the most interesting case is that of Suffolk and Eden. Suffolk was by no means an ideal Minister, but he had a certain desire for efficiency. Eden, however, was too fond of pleasure to be very much attached to his duties. Suffolk therefore continually begged Eden to pay a little more attention to work. When Eden, braced by these exhortations, showed himself indisposed to waste his time in talking to persons who had come to the office without having any business there, he received the warmest congratulations from Suffolk. This much having been achieved, Suffolk hoped that still further progress would be made and suggested that for the future Eden should prepare drafts of dispatches, without consulting him at every turn, except in cases of a sudden diplomatic crisis. During certain negotiations with Russia, in 1772, Eden was instructed not to be content with reading dispatches but to draw up a summary of a proposed agreement with the arguments for and against. The effect of such admonitions at first seemed somewhat doubtful. For Suffolk had occasion to complain that Eden was lacking in 'those official habits and qualities', which were desirable in one who held his position. 'You leave the labouring oar too much upon me', Suffolk informed him. But eventually Eden was able

¹ See *infra*.

² The names are J. Addison, H. Walpole, J. Pringle, T. Hare, T. Townshend, A. Stone, and C. Amyand. See *The British Parliamentary Register* for an alphabetical list of M.P.s.

³ Namier, *Structure of Politics*, i. 49. The eight were R. Wood, C. Jenkinson, W. Burke, R. Sutton, W. Eden, T. Whately, A. Chamier, and B. Laughton.

⁴ See p. 8.

⁵ Walpole, *George III*, iv. 2 n. 2.

to satisfy his not very exacting task-master and was rewarded by the offer of a seat in Parliament 'without trouble and expense'.¹

Of the clerks there is little to be said. Once appointed, they were usually kept on as long as they were capable of work. Most of them seem to have been of humble origin. An extant list of Shelburne's clerks in 1766 shows that one was the son of Stephen Duck, the peasant poet, two were the sons of valets, and one was of foreign extraction.²

It is impossible to lay down hard and fast rules as to the division of duties among the Secretaries and the clerks. But a little may here be added to what has been said in Chapter III. A document has recently been printed, which describes the arrangements in Middleton's office.³ According to this, the under-secretaries—who are there called clerks—both corresponded with envoys. The senior under-secretary received applications 'about office business' and communicated them to the Secretary and also prepared drafts of warrants and commissions. The junior under-secretary was in charge of all in-letters and was supposed to produce them when wanted. He also copied all the Secretary's letters into entry books. The work of the four clerks consisted mainly of copying letters and warrants and translating documents from the Latin or modern foreign languages. According to another document, probably composed in 1761, it was the duty of the under-secretaries 'to prepare material and get everything ready for the business they see likely to arise'. They opened and docketed all in-letters and then sent these to the Secretaries.⁴ Hume tells us that when he was under-secretary to Conway he spent five hours a day in the office—from 10 a.m. till 3 p.m.—and had little to do when he was there. He passed a good deal of this time in reading books, writing private letters and talking to friends.⁵ The under-secretaries, in fact, were at this time supposed to be in immediate attendance on the Secretaries of State in order to receive and supervise the execution of their orders. Any departure from this practice was apt to cause trouble. We learn that, when Grafton appointed a certain Mr. Stanhope to be one of his under-

¹ See Suffolk's Letters to Eden in Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 34412, especially ff. 172^r, 177, 182, 183, 252^r, 273^v.

² See Appendix XI.

³ Evans, *Secretary of State*, 192-3.

⁴ Evans, *Secretary of State*, 367-8.

⁵ Burton, *Hume*, ii. 384, Hume to Blair, Apr. 1, 1767. Hume says he went to Conway's house, but I think he refers to the house in Cleveland Row, then used as an office.

secretaries, he directed him to perform the duties of the first clerk, who was old and infirm. Stonehewer, the other under-secretary, was alone to be in immediate attendance on Grafton. Stanhope on discovering this felt much surprise and promptly consulted his kinsman Lord Chesterfield, who told him he must not remain in such a position. Stanhope, thereupon, sent in his resignation four days after his appointment.¹

Mention should here be made of a scheme proposed to Shelburne for the distribution of office business in 1766. It was suggested that the 'first clerk', as had always been the practice, should attend to the execution of ordinary domestic business and order the subordinate clerks to perform the necessary copying of documents under the direction of the under-secretaries; the 'senior clerks', also under the supervision of the under-secretaries, were to be responsible for cyphering, decyphering and writing dispatches for Shelburne's signature; the junior clerks were to be employed in all ordinary business. On post days, all the clerks were to attend from 10 a.m. until dismissed, and again from 7 p.m. till the mail was sent out. On other week-days, the attendance of only three 'senior' and two 'junior' clerks was to be required. On Sundays, unless there was an emergency, nobody was to attend. Finally, it was proposed that three additional clerks should devote their whole time to Colonial affairs.²

Some further information may be derived from a report of a committee to inquire into the fees received in public offices. This report, which was presented in 1786, states that

'The business of the Secretary of State's office appears to consist in receiving intelligence, conducting correspondence, preparing and issuing warrants, and managing transactions relative to the executive government of the British Empire. Such of the business as relates to the British Dominions and to the four States of Barbary is carried on in the Home Department, where there is a subordinate office for the affairs of the Colonies. Such, on the other hand, as relates to the foreign powers of Europe, and the United States of America is carried on in the Foreign Department. The duty of the Principal Secretaries of State is to lay all such business before Your Majesty, to receive Your Majesty's commands thereon and give the necessary orders accordingly in the respective Departments. The duty of the under-secretaries is to attend to the execution of such orders, to

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Weston Underwood MSS.* 392-3.

² See Shelburne MSS. 134, pp. 141 sqq.

prepare drafts of such special letters and instructions as occasion may require; to transact themselves whatever is of the most confidential nature, and generally to superintend the business of the office in all its branches. The duty of the chief clerk is to distribute the ordinary official business among the clerks, to see that all warrants and other instruments are duly prepared, transmitted to the proper persons for signature, and delivered to the respective parties when application is made, and the regular fees paid for the same; likewise that the office books are properly kept and the public dispatches punctually transmitted.' . . . 'The remaining clerks, who are distinguished by the rank of senior and junior in the Home Department, though without any such distinction in the Foreign, obey such orders as they receive from their superiors in the office, but have no particular branches of business assigned to them. The attendance of the efficient under-secretaries is constant and unremitting; that of the chief clerks is likewise constant; and the other clerks, though not always employed, are in daily attendance and expected to be ready for the execution of any business in which their superiors may think necessary to employ them'.¹

Besides the under-secretaries and clerks, the holders of certain other posts assisted or were supposed to assist the Secretaries of State. Until 1832 there was a Latin Secretary, but his office was a sinecure or at least became so early in the period. He was paid by the State and received a salary of £200.² At the beginning of the period there was a French Secretary; but the office appears to have lapsed soon afterwards.³ We also hear of an Interpreter of Oriental Languages, a German Translator and an Embellisher. But references to them are infrequent. Finally, the Secretaries shared the services of a Law Clerk, who assisted at the examinations of persons under arrest.⁴

Though neither the under-secretaries nor the clerks received any salary from the State, they were not for that reason left without remuneration. A number of fees were payable whenever certain classes of documents passed through the Secretaries' office.⁵ Besides the Secretary's fee, there

¹ Parliamentary Reports, 1792-3, vol. x (103). The pages are unnumbered.

² Evans, *Secretary of State*, 172-3. The Latin Secretary appears in the *Magnae Britanniae Notitia* and the *Court and City Register*.

³ Evans, *Secretary of State*, 173; *Cal. State Paps. Dom.* 1693, 96.

⁴ *Cal. Treasury Paps.*, 1720-8, 390, 495, 547; *ibid.*, 1708-14, 174; *Corr. of George III*, iii. 1307.

⁵ A table of these fees, compiled in the late eighteenth century, has been printed in *English Historical Review*, xxxv. 526. A similar table, which shows the fees were

was an under-secretary's fee, a clerk's fee and a chamber keeper's fee. Whether or no these fees were always divided respectively between the two under-secretaries, the clerks, and the two chamber keepers, is uncertain. It would appear, however, that the senior under-secretary in Middleton's office took all the under-secretaries' fees. Moreover the document, which tells us this, also tells us that he received no salary, while the other under-secretary was paid £200 per annum and the clerks from £60 to £40 per annum each. What was done with the clerk's fees we are not told, save that one of the clerks received 2s. 6d. 'out of each signature that passed the office'. In a later age at least, however, the minimum clerk's fee was 5s.¹ Twenty years afterwards the Secretaries apparently paid no salaries. The accounts kept by Nottingham during his second term of office are extant and a summary of these has been printed, in which there is no reference to the salaries of under-secretaries or clerks.² It may be added that, in 1718, the under-secretaries presented a petition, apparently to the Secretaries, in which they complained of the small amount of their fees. Owing to various circumstances, said the petition, the total of fees was then considerably less than it had been a generation previously and compensation should be given, either in the form of a salary or in some other way.³ Since there is proof positive that no salaries were paid to the under-secretaries in the Northern and Southern Departments a few years later, it may be concluded that they never had a salary during the eighteenth century. It becomes probable, therefore, that they divided fees between them.

The clerks' fees appear to have gone to the 'first clerks' in the eighteenth century; for, while there is no evidence that these received a salary, we find that salaries were paid to the other clerks in 1724. An extant account book containing particulars of the salary and expenses of Carteret and Newcastle in 1724-30 shows that salaries were then paid to these clerks. In 1725, for instance, Newcastle was paying three salaries of £100 per annum, three of £50 and two of £25 to his clerks and a salary

of the same amount in George I's reign, may be found in P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., George I. 66.

¹ Evans, *Secretary of State*, 192-3.

² Finch, *Burley-on-the-Hill*, i. 194 sqq.

³ For the petition see Appendix X.

of £14 to each of his chamber-keepers.¹ Presumably too, Townshend was doing much the same. Chatham, a generation later, paid out £517 2s. *od.* in salaries annually.²

The under-secretaries and clerks enjoyed a further source of income, apart from those previously mentioned. They had the right to frank letters and newspapers for transmission in the post. This privilege was evidently most lucrative, for there were bitter complaints when it was curtailed. In 1765 the economical Grenville secured the passage of an Act, which withdrew their right to frank letters, though they were still allowed to frank newspapers. The clerks, who felt themselves aggrieved, did not delay to complain in due form. They presented, soon afterwards, a lengthy memorial to Conway and Grafton, which reveals how severe the blow had been. While their privilege had remained intact, the clerks had made a great deal of money by serving private individuals. It was estimated that the four principal clerks in each office had made £200 per annum apiece in this way. They also said the cost of living had risen greatly during recent years, while salaries had remained small. Until a few years previously, £80 had been the highest salary.³ Egremont and Halifax, however, touched by the miserable situation of their subordinates, had raised the salaries of four clerks to £100. The former, moreover, had declared his intention to use his influence, as soon as peace had been made, in order to secure an augmentation of his clerks' emoluments by some unspecified means, but his death had prevented the realization of the project. On top of this disappointment had come the curtailment of their postal privileges. Halifax and Sandwich had indeed exerted themselves to procure some compensation for their clerks, but Grenville had obstinately refused to do anything for them.⁴

The position of the unhappy clerks was thus by no means enviable. It appears that the salaries of the eight clerks in Conway's office were raised by considerable amounts at this time. Among the Shelburne MSS. is a list of the clerks in the Southern Department with their salaries. The document is undated, but must refer to a time posterior to the presentation of the memorial. Of the eight clerks there mentioned two were

¹ Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MSS. C. 367. ² P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 71. 1.

³ So says the memorial; but Newcastle, as we know, had paid some salaries of £100.

⁴ Shelburne MSS. 134, pp. 101 sqq.

receiving salaries of £120, three, salaries of £100, one, a salary of £80, and two, salaries of £50.¹ Another similar document of about the same date shows that of the nine clerks in the Northern Department two were in receipt of salaries of £170, two of salaries of £100, two of salaries of £80, and three of salaries of £50. Yet even this did not satisfy them; for they wished the salaries of £170 to be raised to £300, those of £100 to £250, those of £80 to £200, and those of £50 to £100.² The wish was not granted; but, in 1769, compensation was at last received for the loss of the right to frank letters. Henceforth the Post Office paid £500 a year to the Southern, Northern, and Colonial Departments. This sum was distributed amongst their subordinates by the Secretaries in varying amounts. Some figures which are available for the Northern Department would seem to indicate that the division was capricious. Salaries were then also increased.³

The under-secretaries and first clerks in the Southern and Northern Departments depended upon fees and gratuities for their emoluments. These last amounted to £1,721 11s. 6d. in 1784, and presumably to a similar sum in earlier years. They were divided in an unknown proportion between the under-secretaries, first clerks, and chamber keepers.⁴ Much more considerable were their gains from fees. Towards the end of the seventeenth century Mr. under-secretary Ellis made it a matter of complaint that his total emoluments came to less than £500.⁵ In 1699, it should be said, Jersey and Vernon agreed that the fees of the Southern and Northern Departments should be pooled and divided equally, and the arrangement endured till the end of the period.⁶ Henceforth the under-secretaries in each department fared alike. Between September 21, 1710, and September 30, 1711, the fees of the under-secretaries amounted to £580 9s. 8d. apiece and those of the first clerks to £344 4s. 10d.⁷ But in time of peace the amount of the fees diminished, since these were in great part derived from the issue of military commissions. From a memorandum, made in December, 1713, it appears that the net profits of the under-secretaries during the previous year had only been £128 apiece. This figure was

¹ Shelburne MSS. 134, p. 119.

² Shelburne MSS. 134, p. 128.

³ P.R.O., Foreign Office, 95, 591.

⁴ Parliamentary Reports, 1792-3, vol. x (103).

⁵ *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Bath MSS.* iii. 335.

⁶ See *infra*.

⁷ *Bolingbroke Corr.* ii. 82.

exceptionally low; since the extant fee books of the Northern and Southern Departments for the years 1727-30 and 1733-82 show that the amount of the fees then received was much higher.¹

Some of the under-secretaries and clerks were fortunate enough to hold a sinecure besides their employment in the Secretaries' office. Thus Couraud became Latin Secretary.² Again, Mr. under-secretary Ramsden was both Latin Secretary and Collector and Transmitter of State Papers. Stone, one of Newcastle's under-secretaries, was made Keeper of the State Paper Office.³ In fact, it became the practice for each under-secretary and first clerk to hold a sinecure; so much so indeed, that they claimed to obtain one as a matter of right. In 1773, Porten, under-secretary to Rochford, wrote an urgent letter to his master to the following effect. He had discovered on the day of writing from the newspapers that the Hon. Charles Howard, who held the post of German Translator, had just died. At the previous vacancy Suffolk had nominated to the post. Now it was Rochford's turn and Porten therefore asked to be appointed. He had already tried in vain to be made Gazette Writer and Master of the Revels in Ireland, but had been consoled by a promise that he should have the next post at Rochford's disposal. All his colleagues were provided with sinecures and so were sure of a fixed income, when they retired. But though he had served for fifteen years no provision had been made for him. Rochford showed himself quite ready to appoint Porten, but did not know whether it was for him or for Suffolk to fill the empty place and so referred the matter to the King.⁴ It would appear from this that sinecures were granted not only to supplement the income of the Secretaries' assistants but also as a substitute for a pension on retirement. Though the State did not formally acknowledge that these men were entitled to retiring pensions, it was felt they had some sort of a claim. Occasionally, moreover, such a pension was granted. In 1772 representations were made to North on behalf of a clerk, who had been compelled to resign by old age and infirmity. North, so far from raising objections, at once asked the King to consent.⁵ On the whole the Secretaries were very willing to apply to the Crown on behalf of their subordinates; sometimes too willing. When, for instance, the office of

¹ See Note A at end of chapter.

² *Cal. Treasury Books, 1729-30*, 605.

⁴ *Corr. of George III*, iii. 1307-8.

³ *Court and City Register, 1758*, 106.

⁵ *Corr. of George III*, ii. 1118.

Law Clerk fell vacant in 1774, Suffolk, whose turn it was to appoint, asked the King whether it would not be possible for Eden to draw the income of the office; though he could not be appointed since he held a seat in the House of Commons. 'Eden', wrote Suffolk, 'certainly deserves particularly well and may be really useful hereafter in the vacant employment'.¹

When a Secretary attended the King abroad, he naturally took some of his staff with him. Those selected received payments from the Treasury to defray their expenses. Thus, in 1723, the following sums were paid to three of Townshend's assistants who had gone to Hanover with their master. Tilson, an under-secretary, got £300, Wace, first clerk, £200, and Couraud, a clerk, £100.² Similar payments were made to clerks who followed the Secretary in attendance, when the Court was at Windsor or Hampton Court.³

The above remarks apply only to the Southern and Northern Departments. There appears to be little or no information about the salaries, if any, paid to their subordinates by the Secretaries for the Scotch Department. But it is probably safe to assume that the practice in that was similar to the practice in the other Departments. As to the Colonial Office we are better informed. We can indeed only conjecture that the clerks received salaries, but the fee books of the office show that the under-secretaries received a fixed amount per annum in fees plus salaries, or allowances. The fees of the Colonial Department did not come to a great sum. In the year April 5, 1771, to April 5, 1772, the under-secretaries' fees were £495 16s. 8d. In time of war they were far less; in the year July 5, 1777, to July 5, 1778, £186 os. od.; in the year July 5, 1780 to July 5, 1781, £325 os. od. The half of any of these sums would not have been a great amount; but, after 1770, there were two under-secretaries in the Department. It appears from certain notes in the fee books that the Secretary of State made up the emoluments of

¹ *Corr. of George III*, iii. 1533. The statement that Eden could not be appointed because he was an M.P. is only a conjecture. But Suffolk says the previous Law Clerk had resigned on being elected to Parliament, since that post was incompatible with a seat in the House. Now Eden was also an M.P.

² *Cal. Treasury Papers*, 1720-8, 245. For other such payments see *ibid.*, 341; *Cal. Treasury Books*, 1729-30, 141, 257; *ibid.*, 1731-4, 223, 325, 345; *ibid.*, 1735-8, 18, 168; *ibid.*, 1739-41, 241, 408, 460, 580.

³ *Cal. Treasury Books*, 1731-4, 152, 196, 460; *ibid.*, 1735-8, 574.

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the under-secretaries to a fixed sum, which, after the middle of 1776, was £500 per annum.¹

A brief description of the position of the under-secretaries and clerks, with regard to their emoluments after 1782, may be of interest here. The under-secretaries were, in 1786, in receipt of a salary of £500 each. They also received fees and gratuities. The chief clerks had no salary, but depended upon fees and gratuities. The other clerks received salaries, not from the State but from the Secretaries. Thus, in 1784, the 'first senior clerk' in the Home Office had a salary of £553 and the 'sixth junior clerk' one of £70. In the Foreign Office the 'second clerk' had a salary of £410 and the 'tenth clerk' one of £80. The Committee of inquiry, from whose report these facts are taken, recommended that the number of under-secretaries be reduced to one, with a salary of £1,500. Also, that all fees and gratuities be paid into a general fund, managed by the chief clerk, from which offices expenses should be paid. Sinécures should be abolished. The chief clerk should receive a salary of £800; the others, eight in number; salaries varying from £500 to £100. If the general fund proved inadequate to meet these charges, it should be supplemented from the Civil List. The committee concluded by stating that they had no desire to reflect upon any individual and that they had found no trace of fraudulent practices.²

The Secretaries of State had the right to requisition the services of the King's Messengers for the purpose of conveying dispatches to foreign parts and arresting suspected persons. The Messengers, however, were, at first, all under the control of the Lord Chamberlain. But in 1772 a change was made. It was then decided that the Secretaries for the Northern and Southern Departments were to select sixteen Messengers, who were to be entirely at their disposal. When any of the sixteen died or was dismissed, his successor was to be appointed by the Secretaries.³

¹ P.R.O., State Papers, Dom., Various, 32, Fee Book of the Colonial Office. This contains quarterly statements of the fees of the Secretary, under-secretary, clerk and chamber keeper. To these are added at times certain notes, rather obscure in character, from which I infer what is said above.

² Parliamentary Reports, 1792-3, vol. x (103).

³ P.R.O., State Papers Dom., Various, 9, pp. 77-8, Rochford and Suffolk to the Lord Chamberlain, May 6, 1772: 'We are commanded to acquaint your Lordship that His Majesty has signified his pleasure to us, his two Principal Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, that out of His Majesty's present Messengers, Ordinary and Extraordinary, we do immediately chuse sixteen to attend solely on our offices, to receive our directions and to be paid by our orders only. The enclosed paper contains the names of those we have chosen, being such as appeared most proper

Besides such salaries as they might pay to clerks, the Secretaries had other expenses in connexion with their office. Nottingham kept accounts of his disbursements during the years 1702-4. It appears, from the printed summary, that his total expenditure during this time was £4,191 1s. 2d., but this includes secret service payments. Actual expenditure on the office was small. For instance he spent £2 10s. 7d. upon scuttles, brooms, and mops, £56 on wood and coals, £5 3s. 6d. on charcoal, £21 10s. 0d. on tallow candles, and 8s. 6d. on chimney sweeping.¹ The extant account book of the receipts and expenditure of Carteret and Newcastle during the years 1724-30 shows that little change had occurred, save perhaps that salaries were then paid to clerks.² It may be added that the Secretaries did not have to pay for the stationery used in their offices. The cost of this, which was not inconsiderable, was defrayed by the Treasury. Shrewsbury's office in less than four months used stationery to the value of £310 19s. 0d.³

As is well known, the records of the secretaryship are by no means complete nor all the extant records in the Public Record Office. Had the Secretaries done their duty, they would have kept the originals of all in-letters and copies of all out-letters and warrants. These they would have left behind them when they retired, for eventual transmission to the State Paper Office. This, however, was by no means the regular practice. Each Secretary ordered matters as he pleased. It is not certain that in-letters were always preserved, and if out-letters were always copied it is strange that for certain periods there are apparently no copies extant of some classes of documents.⁴ With regard to in-letters the greatest carelessness prevailed. Pitt was apparently the first to have a classified summary kept of their contents.⁵ But his example was not followed. Burges, who was made under-secretary in the Foreign Office in 1789, records that 'the immense number of dispatches which come from and go to foreign courts are piled up in large presses, but no note of them is taken,

to us to undertake the foreign journeys. It is also His Majesty's pleasure that when any vacancies happen by death or removal of one of the said sixteen, they shall be filled by our appointment.' See also Parliamentary Reports, 1792-3, vol. x (103). The Messengers were paid by the Clerk of the Cheque.

¹ Finch, *Burley-on-the-Hill*, i. 194 sqq.

² For a specimen of Newcastle's accounts see Appendix IX.

³ *Cal. State Papers. Dom.* 1694-5, 243.

⁴ e.g. Letters to the Secretary of War.

⁵ Williams, *Chatham*, i. 328.

nor is there even an index to them; so that if anything is wanted the whole year's accumulation must be rummaged over before it can be found, and frequently material concerns must be forgotten for want of a memorandum to preserve their memory. As to the past it would be an Herculean task to put things right'.¹

Doubtless one cause of the loss of so many records was the common practice that a Minister, on retiring, carried off with him such documents as he chose. Granted that it has always been difficult to draw a line between public and private correspondence, the men of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were none the less fairly unscrupulous. The result was that when a Secretary wanted to inspect an old document he often did not know where to find it. Perhaps it had been removed by a predecessor, perhaps it was in the State Paper Office, perhaps it was hidden away in his own office. If it was a copy that was wanted, it was not always certain that a copy had ever existed. Trumbull in 1697, was unable to find a copy of the ratification of a treaty made with Denmark in 1690.² When the British plenipotentiaries at Ryswick wished to know the amount and conditions of the dowry granted to Mary of Modena, Trumbull was quite unable to help them.³ In 1702, one of Nottingham's under-secretaries was directed to search for certain treaties, which had been concluded in the previous reign. He reported that they were probably not in the office, but might be in Nottingham's own keeping, or, more probably, Blathwayt might have them.⁴ Nor did things improve for some years. In 1711, St. John wished to consult some papers, which had been in the office of Queensberry, who had died a few days before. Upon application to the clerks of the late Secretary, he was

¹ *Burges Papers*, 131-2.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS.* i. 2. 742.

³ *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 28895, f. 86^r, Trumbull to Ellis June 9, 1697. Cf. 'I must confess I cannot (at present) think where you will find a copy of this settlement.'

⁴ *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 29588, f. 186, Warre to Nottingham, Sept. 8, 1702: 'I have seen no treaty since I came into the office. I will speak with Mr. Yarde about them tomorrow and after that wait on the Commissioners. Mr. Aglionby tells me he believes your Lordship has some in your keeping, but if they relate not to the payment of money, I believe they are not within this letter. I have spoke with Mr. Ellis who tells me there are several in the office but that Mr. Blathwayt has the greatest number.' Yarde was Warre's fellow under-secretary. Aglionby was also employed in Nottingham's office. Ellis was under-secretary to Hedges. What the treaties were I do not know, but, if they were concluded early in William's reign, the 'Commissioners' may be those persons who had the custody of the Great Seal at that time.

informed they were not in the office, but had been in the Duke's possession. Accordingly, Bolingbroke was forced to ask 'Mr. Boyle' for the papers.¹ One can only conjecture that Boyle was Queensberry's executor, or perhaps his private secretary. Sunderland, in 1710, and Dartmouth, in 1713, both carried away many official papers.² All Bromley's entry books, however, are said to have been handed over to his successor. But, since there was no 'catalogue' of them, it proved impossible to find a book of treaties when wanted.³ When, in 1725, Townshend desired to see a copy of a letter to the King of Spain, which contained a promise to restore Gibraltar, he was uncertain whether such a copy could be found in Newcastle's office or whether it was in the possession of Carteret, who had been Secretary for the Southern Department when the letter was written, and so might have taken it away.⁴ Newcastle was a great offender and removed much diplomatic correspondence, which, owing to a lucky chance, has at length found its way to the British Museum.

One of the few Secretaries who condemned this practice was George Grenville. He scrupulously refrained from appropriating any public documents and severely censured those who had done otherwise. Some of the Secretaries, he wrote, maintained they had a right to carry papers away.⁵ That Grenville could use such language in 1766 is very significant. The idea that a Minister's correspondence was his own property was long in perishing.⁶

If the Secretaries had heavy expenses, they also enjoyed considerable emoluments. In 1681, each Secretary received an annual patent salary of £100 and an allowance of £1,850. These sums the Secretaries continued to receive until the end

¹ *Bolingbroke Corr.* i. 174. I do not know whether this Boyle was the ex-Secretary of State. It is doubtful whether all Queensberry's official papers were ever returned. In 1713 a fruitless search was made in the offices of Bolingbroke, Bromley, and Mar for one of Queensberry's entry books. See *Cal. Treasury Papers, 1708-14*, 535.

² *Cal. State Paps. Col. 1710-11*, 669; *Hist. MSS. Comm., Dartmouth MSS.* iii. 71.

³ P.R.O., State Papers Dom., George I, i. 53, 55.

⁴ Chance, *Alliance of Hanover*, 134-5.

⁵ *Grenville Papers*, iii. 310. See also W. Knox, *Extra Official Papers*, 11.

⁶ It would scarcely be germane to the purpose of this study to discuss the history of the State Paper Office, where the Secretarial records were supposed to be deposited and in great part were deposited. There is a calendar of papers relating to the history of the Paper Office in the thirtieth Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records. See also F. S. Thomas, *The State Paper Office*.

of the period. The Secretaries for Scotland and the Colonies were treated in exactly the same way as their colleagues.¹ There was also another payment to the Secretaries. Originally the Secretaries of State had been entitled to diet as members of the royal Chamber. The senior Secretary, however, had had a larger mess than the junior. In the seventeenth century the diet was commuted for a money payment, which under Charles II amounted to 16s. per diem for the senior and 6s. 8d. per diem for the junior. But in 1689 William fixed the board wages of the Secretaries at £730 per annum for the senior and £292 per annum for the junior Secretary.² Now these board wages were paid, not by the Treasury, but by the Cofferer. Unhappily the Cofferer's accounts, though extant, make no specific mention of this payment. But it is known that Queensberry, upon his appointment, was given the same board wages as the other two Secretaries. The presumption is therefore that each of the three then received £730 per annum.³ It must be added, that certain deductions were made from the patent salary, allowance, and board wages, at the time of payment, for the fees of the Treasury officials or of the Cofferer and his assistants. In the eighteenth century too, a Civil List tax was payable on all these sums. Thus, when Conway held office, as we learn from the Shelburne MSS., the patent salary was in effect worth £85 19s. od., the allowance £1,052, and board wages £645.⁴

Special grants were sometimes made to a Secretary as a reward for his services. Sunderland, in 1680, was given a pension of £1,000 a year for twenty-one years.⁵ Stanhope was given £5,000 in 1718, partly as a mark of the King's appreciation and partly as recompense for the expenditure incurred by him during his journeys abroad.⁶ It was, moreover, usual to grant a large sum to the Secretary who followed the King to the Continent. Harrington received £3,000 in 1732 for this service and Carteret the same amount a decade later. Newcastle

¹ For the position in 1680 see Evans, *Secretary of State*, 211-13. The *Calendar of Treasury Books* furnishes evidence for the years 1681-9 and 1729-45. For later years see P.R.O., Chatham Papers, 71. 1; *ibid.*, Civil List Accounts. The reference for these last is Treasury 38.

² Evans, *Secretary of State*, 217-21.

³ See Appendix I.

⁴ Shelburne MSS. 134, p. 129.

⁵ *Cal. Treasury Books*, 1679-80, 532.

⁶ P.R.O., Treasury Minute Books, 24, p. 87, Sept. 20, 1718: 'Earl Stanhope to have £5000 in consideration of his eminent and faithful services and the charges and expenses of his journey to and from the Courts of France and Spain'.

was given £3,000 also for his journey in 1748, but apparently Holdernesse got nothing in 1755.¹

Each Secretary received a quantity of white plate—usually about 1,000 oz.—from the Jewel Office, for his use while he remained Secretary. Not infrequently, however, he was allowed to keep it, when he retired, as a mark of the sovereign's favour. Those who were not so fortunate often showed great reluctance to return their plate. Chesterfield, in 1768, still had in his possession plate which had been granted to him for his use as Ambassador and Secretary of State.²

The above-mentioned emoluments were only a part and the lesser part of the Secretaries' total gains. For they received large sums in fees for obtaining the royal signature to certain classes of documents. In the first year of a reign the amount of fees was especially large, since a demise of the Crown rendered all offices vacant and all commissions void. Years of war were also very lucrative, owing to the great number of military commissions then issued. In ordinary times, however, domestic business was the chief source of profit. Hence there was some competition between the Northern and Southern Departments to secure such parts of it as were profitable. In 1699, however, a sensible arrangement was made, which put an end to this. Vernon and Jersey agreed to pool their fees and divide them equally. The plan proved as satisfactory as it was equitable, and the two departments continued to divide their fees until 1782.³ Queensberry, soon after his appointment, claimed that the fees of all three offices should be pooled and then shared equally and his claim was eventually granted. But this arrangement was not renewed after his death. Later Secretaries for Scotland and all Secretaries for the Colonies had to content them-

¹ For Harrington see *Cal. Treasury Books*, 1731-4, 224. For Carteret, *ibid.*, 1742-5, 194. For Newcastle P.R.O., *Treasury Minute Books*, 31, p. 125. I can find no trace in the *Treasury Minute Books* of a grant to Holdernesse in 1755.

² There were frequent references to the grant of plate in the *Calendar of Treasury Books*, e.g. *Calendar 1681-5*, i. 76. For proof that grants were made until the end of the period see P.R.O., *Treasury*, 52. 70, p. 278. Jenkins and Harley among others, were given their plate upon retirement. See *Cal. Treasury Books*, 1681-5, ii. 1108. For Chesterfield see P.R.O., *Chatham Papers*, 71. 1. Docquet of a warrant to discharge Chesterfield and his heirs of 5891 oz. of white plate and 895 oz. of gilt plate. The date is March 1768.

³ *Vernon Corr.* ii. 282-3. For later years see Finch, *Burley-on-the-Hill*, i. 194; P.R.O., *State Papers Dom.*, Various, 26-35, *Secretaries' Fee Books*. These last show that not only the Secretaries' fees but also those of the under-secretaries, clerks, and chamber keepers were divided.

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selves with their own fees, which were much less in their total amount.¹

Precise figures are lacking as to the annual amount of the fees during the earlier part of the period. The fees taken in St. John's office between September 21, 1710 and September 30, 1711, came to £3,719 12s. 8d. The total of the fees taken in the Northern and Southern Departments together was, in 1727, £10,800 18s. 8d., in 1730, £2,330 os. 4d., in 1747, £3,920 1s. 0d., in 1759, £5,481 14s. 4d., in 1772, £2,318 10s. 0d., in 1781, £4,583.² Prior to the establishment of the Colonial Secretaryship, the amount of fees in the Southern Department was considerably higher than that in the Northern; afterwards the reverse was often the case. The fees taken in the Colonial Office naturally amounted to much less. In the year April 5, 1769 to April 5, 1770, these came to £531; in the year April 5, 1773 to April 5, 1774 to £640; in the year July 5, 1776, to July 5, 1777, to £619 3s. 4d.; in the year July 5, 1779 to July 5, 1780, to £1,020; in the year July 5, 1780 to July 5, 1781, to £1,130. The great increase in the last years was due to the large number of military commissions which passed through the office.³ For the fees of the Scotch office no precise figures seem to be available; but their amount cannot have been considerable.

The Secretaries also received small sums from the Signet Office. These were sometimes not more than a few shillings per month and never more than a few pounds.⁴

The *Gazette* was under the control of the Secretaries and the profits from it were divided between them.⁵ Between October 25, 1717 and December 25, 1719, these amounted to £902 12s. 5½d. Pitt when Secretary of State estimated his share at £250 per annum. In 1784 the total profits were £594. So the amount seems to have been pretty constant.⁶

¹ See Chapter I. Also *Hist. MSS. Comm., Report XI*, App. IV. 318. This last shows that Mar did not share with the others. The fee books show that neither Tweeddale nor the Colonial Secretaries shared. So one may infer that Montrose and Roxburgh did not.

² The monthly totals for each office are given in the Fee Books.

³ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 32, Fee Book of the Colonial Office. Quarterly statements of the fees are there given.

⁴ Carteret's 'dividends' from the Signet Office amounted to 3s. 4d. in Jan. 1724; Newcastle's in Aug. 1724, to £2 6s. 8d., in Jan. 1728 to £1, in Feb. 1729, to £2, and in May 1729, to £6. See Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MSS. C. 367.

⁵ Evans, *Secretary of State*, 292.

⁶ P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., George I, 19. 60; *ibid.*, Chatham Papers, 71. 1; Parliamentary Reports, 1792-3, vol. x (103).

At first, the *Gazette* was really managed by the Gazette Writer, but his office eventually became a sinecure.¹ The under-secretaries had also a good deal to do with the conduct of the *Gazette*, though of course they could only act by the direction of their masters.² The *Gazette*, however, was by no means always well managed. Complaints were not infrequently made that it published inaccurate news or insufficient news. Harley and Hedges appear to have tried to save money by entrusting the conduct of the *Gazette* to one of their clerks, thus avoiding the payment of a salary to a Gazette Writer.³ The results were deplorable, but they were not prepared to pay £400 per annum to a competent editor. Attempts were therefore made to dispense with an editor. It was suggested that materials for insertion should be collected by a clerk, while each of the under-secretaries should furnish news and the secretaries themselves should communicate portions of dispatches when they thought fit.⁴ But, whether or no this plan was adopted, it was certainly not long in operation. For, by 1707, that competent journalist Richard Steele was Gazette Writer and taking a keen interest in his work.⁵ But even then the management of the *Gazette* was not always approved. The Admiralty on one occasion protested at the appearance and wording of a passage in the paper. Steele defended himself by saying he had only obeyed what he conceived to be Sunderland's orders.⁶ Ten years later, Sunderland, then again Secretary, marked the paucity of news in the *Gazette* and made efforts to secure a regular supply of information from abroad by means of the British envoys to foreign Courts. Weymouth is found exerting himself to the same effect forty years afterwards.⁷ Nor were envoys the only persons commanded to furnish news. Dartmouth, in 1712, ordered Captain Delaval to send to his office such information as he thought suitable for insertion in the *Gazette*. Carteret, in 1743, directed Stair to do the same.⁸ In time of war, however, the veracity of

¹ Parliamentary Reports, 1792-3, vol. x (103).

² For an example see Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28895, f. 72^r, Trumbull to Ellis, Jan. 24, 1696-7.

³ Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS. viii. 187-8, j. de Fonville to Harley, July 18, 1705.

⁴ Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS. viii. 216, 'Proposals with regard to the *Gazette*', Mar. 18, 1705-6.

⁵ *Addisoniana*, i. 182.

⁶ Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 34518, f. 67^r, Steele to Sunderland, May 10, 1707.

⁷ Hist. MSS. Comm., Polwarth MSS. i. 218; *Calendar of Home Office Papers*, ii. 1245.

⁸ Hist. MSS. Comm., Delaval MSS. 192; P.R.O., State Paps. Foreign, Military

the *Gazette* was often suspect. Germain was particularly accused of suppressing bad news and exaggerating good.¹

The Secretaries each received an annual sum from the Treasury for secret service. At the beginning of the period, the Secretary for the Southern Department got £3,000 and the Secretary for the Northern £2,000.² By 1707, however, both Secretaries were in receipt of £3,000, and henceforth this was the rule.³ Both the Secretaries for Scotland and the Secretaries for the Colonies received the same amount.⁴ These sums were originally intended to be spent on the procuring of information. But in the reign of George III, at least, they were perhaps regarded as an additional salary to the Secretaries.⁵ This, however, would still leave them able to spend money on secret service, since they could and did receive additional sums for that purpose from time to time.⁶ Further, they sometimes obtained an order from the King directing the payment of money by the Treasury to persons who had served them.⁷

It was the duty of the Secretaries to procure intelligence for the Government. They employed spies in Britain to detect plots and spies abroad to discover the designs of foreign powers. Burnet censures Nottingham for employing agents in the Capital whose information he used to discredit the Whigs in William's eyes.⁸ However this may be, the Jacobites were then the chief objects of suspicion, and the Secretaries devoted much attention to collecting information about them. When an ardent adherent of the exiled James II tried to persuade Sir

Expeditions, 12, Carteret to Stair, April 22, 1743.

¹ Almon, *Anecdotes*, iii. 278 sqq.

² Evans, *Secretary of State*, 215, 358. See also *Clarendon Corr.* i. 655. Payments are recorded in the *Calendar of Treasury Books*. As a rule the annual sum was drawn in instalments; often in quarterly instalments. For the position in William's reign see the document in Evans, 358.

³ Brit. Mus., Harleian MSS. 22, 63, Privy Seal Docquet Book, f. 164, a warrant for the payment of £3,000 to Harley 'for Her Majesty's secret service without account.' Similar documents for this period may be found in Harleian MSS. 2262-3. All are for £3,000. See also Appendix I.

⁴ e.g. Harleian MSS. 2263, f. 344 (for Queensberry); Lansdowne MSS. 885, f. 150 (for secret service money in 1721-5); P.R.O., Home Office, 42. 1. 44 (for the Colonial Secretary).

⁵ Cavendish, *Debates*, i. 294, Report of a speech by G. Grenville.

⁶ e.g. Roxburgh received £13,500 between Mar. 25, 1721, and Mar. 25, 1725. See Brit. Mus., Lansdowne MSS. 885, f. 150.

⁷ e.g. *Cal. Treasury Papers*, 1557-1696, 291; *ibid.*, 1702-7, 253; *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Abergavenny MSS.* 5, Rochford to J. Robinson, Feb. 8, 1772.

⁸ Burnet, iv. 5.

Ralph Dutton to take a commission from the ex-monarch, Sir Ralph thought it his duty to report the matter forthwith to Trenchard.¹ It was Trenchard who employed a certain Denis de Lafuye to make reports concerning persons who criticized the Government in public places.² Harley was especially zealous in this matter. Not indeed that Harley was very eager to detect Jacobites, but he had a great desire to ascertain the state of public opinion. One of his agents was Daniel Defoe whom he sent travelling about the country to propagate 'principles of temper, moderation, and peace.'³ But spies who offered him information of Jacobite plots, Harley did not much encourage. He even appointed the wretched Gregg to a clerkship in his office, though he was not a man of good character. Other and later Secretaries were more alert, and Chesterfield records that the plans of the Jacobites were seldom long hidden from the Government.⁴ Spies were also used to watch any person whom the Ministers might think dangerous. Thus Wilkes was at one time kept under observation.⁵ After all there were then no police to do such work.

Spies in foreign countries were regularly employed, though details as to their work are not very common. We find Trumbull in 1695, paying £100 to Étienne Seignoret, who in return was to send news from France.⁶ Nottingham, in 1702, received several letters from a certain J. H. in Rotterdam.⁷ Among the Newcastle MSS. are found several letters from spies abroad.⁸ Rochford, in 1772, was paying at least one spy in France.⁹

As may be imagined, the spies employed by the Secretaries were not always very satisfactory persons. Shrewsbury made use of one Matthew Smith, who gave him intelligence of Jacobite plots. Shrewsbury, however, did not think his services very valuable and, in consequence, gave Smith very little money. Smith, who of course wanted as much as he could get,

¹ *Cal. State Papers Dom.* 1694-5, 142.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS.* i. 2. 603.

³ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Portland MSS.* iv. 137. ⁴ Chesterfield, *Letters*, iii. 964.

⁵ *Grenville Papers*, ii. 155-60. Reports made to the Secretaries by their spies.

⁶ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Downshire MSS.* i. 2. 529.

⁷ *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 29588, f. 127, J. H. to Nottingham, Aug. 11, 1702.

⁸ e.g. *Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 32803, f. 131, Extract of letter from a spy in Paris about the movements of French troops. The date is Apr. 1743. *Ibid.*, f. 160, Newcastle to 'Mr. Thomson'. 'Private and particular in cypher'. May 19, 1743. Newcastle directs Thomson to convey letters from '101', a spy in Paris.

⁹ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Abergavenny MSS.* 5.

was furious at this treatment. When Fenwick accused Shrewsbury of being a Jacobite, Smith seized the chance to secure his revenge. Peterborough, then at enmity with Shrewsbury, tried to prove him a Jacobite and got Smith to offer evidence to that effect before the House of Lords. Smith maintained that though he had given early intelligence of the Assassination Plot, Shrewsbury had not informed the King. The Peers, however, attached no credence to his tales. But, even after this disgrace, more was to be heard of Smith. In 1699, there appeared a work entitled *Memoirs of the Secret Service*, which purported to be by Smith. It was, however, generally believed that it had been inspired by Peterborough and perhaps not written by Smith at all. In any case the purpose of the book was simply to defame Shrewsbury. Probably it did not have much effect. It may prove that Shrewsbury was a fool to have had dealings with such a man as Smith; it certainly proves Smith was a scoundrel.¹

Another spy of low character was Dudley Bradstreet, whom Newcastle employed during the '45'. Dudley Bradstreet was nothing more or less than a common adventurer. Born and bred in Ireland, he eventually came to London, where for some time he earned a living by criminal means. Soon after the outbreak of the Jacobite rebellion, he offered his services to Newcastle and his offer was accepted. At first, he was told to spy on the disaffected in London. While engaged on this task, he professed to have discovered a plot to seize the Tower. Subsequently, he was sent forth in order that he might join the army of Charles Edward, as a pretended Jacobite. This he was able to do and, if we are to believe his own account, he gave the rebels false information, which caused the retreat from Derby. But this statement can scarcely be accepted at its face value. Shortly afterwards Bradstreet made his way back to London and claimed a reward. Newcastle at first gave him fair words but nothing more. Bradstreet wanted not merely money, but also a commission in the Army. Newcastle, however, so far from yielding to his importunities soon gave him the cold shoulder.

¹ In the Bodleian catalogue the *Memoirs of the Secret Service* is assigned to Davenant. But see R. Kingston, *A Modest Answer to Captain Smith's Immodest Memoirs*, published in 1700. Kingston says (p. 7) the 'Memoirs' were really written by 'Mr. Thomas Brown, a stiff Jacobite and a mercenary poet that will write anything for or against any man for money' and implies that the book was inspired by some great personage. For Peterborough's connexion with Smith see *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Buccleuch MSS.* ii. 2. 430, 434, 438-9, 621, 623-4.

In despair Bradstreet presented a petition to the King through the aid of a Page of the Back Stairs. George was convinced that he deserved some recompense and ordered Newcastle to give him £120, which would provide for him till the return of Cumberland, with whom Bradstreet had been in touch, while with the rebel army. On Cumberland's report would depend Bradstreet's chances of better things. Bradstreet thereupon hoped Cumberland would procure him a commission. The Duke, however, when he returned, refused to do anything for Bradstreet, who was left lamenting.¹

If Smith and Bradstreet are typical, one cannot congratulate the Secretaries on their choice of spies. A scoundrel, whose only object is money, will obviously report not what he believes to be true but what he thinks will get him cash. It is to be feared that the Secretaries spent a good deal of public money on their spies without much result.²

The Secretaries also made use of another and surer method of obtaining information; this was the opening of letters. In 1689, Sir Samuel Morland told Shrewsbury he possessed the secret of opening sealed letters and resealing them in such a way that none could discover they had been opened. This secret he had communicated to Charles II and Arlington many years previously and, as a result, letters had been opened in this way at the Post Office, until the great fire had consumed the Post Office together with the necessary implements. Then the secret had been lost, but Morland offered to place it at the disposal of the Government. William, however, declined to accept the offer. Shrewsbury endorsed the paper containing it with the words: 'the King made a very honourable answer that Sir Sam should be considered but he thought the secret ought to die with him, as too dangerous to be encouraged.' None the less the Secretaries, at least soon afterwards, often directed the opening of letters in the London Post Office. The Act of 9 Anne cap. 10 prohibited the opening of letters in the Post Office, except 'by an express warrant in writing under the hand of one of the Principal Secretaries of State for that purpose.' In 1735, a committee of the Commons to inquire into this practice

¹ See *The Life and Adventures of Captain Dudley Bradstreet*, especially pp. 112 sqq., 148 sqq., 158. The work is an autobiography. I have used the reprint of 1929.

² For an unfavourable opinion of the spies employed abroad see Williams, 'The Foreign Office of the First Two Georges' (*Blackwood's Magazine*, 1907).

resolved that it was an infringement of privilege to open the letters of an M.P., save in virtue of a Secretary's warrant.¹ In 1742, a secret committee of the Commons investigated the practice of opening letters. They found that, ever since 1718, there had been a separate department in the Post Office for opening foreign correspondence. The cost of this department was defrayed by the Crown and was in 1742 over £3,500 a year. But it was probable that the department had really existed before 1718 in a slightly different form and with its members paid by the Secretaries. In 1742 the department was still under the Secretaries' control, though not paid by them. It included four decipherers and five clerks.² The chief decipherer was Dr. Edward Willes. This man was born in 1693 and after a University education took Holy Orders. 'I find', says his biographer, 'by the information of a respectable descendant he recommended himself to the Ministry of the day by important communications and services in the secret department about the time of Bishop Atterbury.' Willes remained chief decipherer until his death, in 1773, nor were his services in that capacity unrewarded in his other profession. He became Rector of Barton, Prebendary of Westminster, Dean of Lincoln, Bishop of St. Davids, and finally, in 1743, Bishop of Bath and Wells. In the words of one of his descendants, his 'talents were of the first order, especially in the secret department'.³

The 'secret department' had a long life. Even in 1844, we are told, the clerks of the Foreign Office used to attend the Post Office in order to open the correspondence of foreign envoys in England. These, however, were not the only letters to be opened. In 1844 Sir James Graham authorized the opening of Mazzini's letters. When this became known there was an outcry and a Parliamentary Committee was set up to inquire into the matter. The Committee found that letters had been opened in the Post Office during the years 1660-1711, and also, after the Act of that year, in virtue of a Secretary's warrant. The earliest warrant the committee could discover was one dated September 20, 1712. By means of opening letters in the Post Office the Government had found out the treason of Atterbury. In 1758 the chief evidence against a certain Dr. Hensey, then tried for

¹ *Commons Journals*, xxii. 464.

² *Ibid.*, xxiv. 331.

³ S. H. Cassan, *Lives of the Bishops of Bath and Wells*, ii. 166-8.

high treason, was that of a clerk who had opened and read his letters. Many letters had of course been opened during the '45'. But warrants had also been issued for the opening of letters which might contain information as to ordinary non-political crimes such as murder and forgery.¹

The great bulk of the letters opened seem to have been diplomatic. For this there is good evidence. There are preserved in the Public Record Office one hundred volumes of 'Intercepted Correspondence'. The series commences in 1726 and ends in 1766. The documents are 'copies, translations, and extracts from the original correspondence of the foreign Ambassadors resident in England'. These letters were intercepted, deciphered—if in cipher—and copied in whole or part. When the language of the original was other than French or English, translations were made as well as copies and sent to the Secretaries or other chief Ministers.² By these not very honourable means the Secretaries often gained useful knowledge. Neither then nor later were scruples felt at such proceedings.

NOTE A

Fees paid to the Secretaries' Staff.

The fee books in the P.R.O. record in detail every payment of a fee to Secretaries, under-secretaries, clerks, and chamber-keepers. They also give the total sum received by each for every month. I give here the figures for certain typical years of peace and war. Since the fees of the Northern and Southern Departments were pooled I give the sum total for both offices in the first table. In the second I give figures for the Colonial Office.

TABLE A. *Northern and Southern Departments.*

	£	s.	d.
(Year 1728)			
Under-secretaries	1,563	19	8
Clerks	464	15	5
Chamber-keepers	195	10	0

¹ Parliamentary Papers, 1844, vol. xiv (582).

² P.R.O., State Papers Foreign, Intercepted Correspondence, 1. At the beginning of the volume is inserted a letter from F. S. Thomas describing the character of the series. From this letter my statements are taken.

	£	s.	d.
(Year 1759)			
Under-secretaries	2,009	3	4
Clerks	647	10	0
Chamber-keepers	284	8	0
(Year 1772)			
Under-secretaries	1,471	4	0
Clerks	452	5	0
Chamber-keepers	189	19	0
(Year 1781)			
Under-secretaries	1,549	14	8
Clerks	639	5	0
Chamber-keepers	234	7	6

TABLE B. *Colonial Department.*

(April 5, 1769–April 5, 1770)			
Under-secretary	239	10	0
Clerk	71	0	0
Chamber-keeper	28	18	0
(July 5, 1776–July 5, 1777)			
Under-secretary	223	16	8
Clerk	68	0	0
Chamber-keeper	22	10	0
(July 5, 1780–July 5, 1781)			
Under-secretary	325	0	0
Clerk	115	0	0
Chamber-keeper	45	17	6

NOTE B

The Site of the Secretaries' Offices.

The offices for the Secretaries for the Northern and Southern Departments were situate at Whitehall. Arlington, to judge from a contemporary map, had had commodious premises. Trevor's office, however, had apparently only consisted of four rooms.¹ Soon afterwards, however, both the Secretaries had offices in the Cockpit, where also were situate the Treasury offices and the Council Chamber. The Cockpit escaped destruction in the great fire which destroyed a large part of Whitehall in 1698.² The offices remained

¹ Evans, *Secretary of State*, 166.

² E. Hatton, *A New View of London*, i. 719; Defoe, *A Tour thro' London* (ed. Sir M. M. Beeston and E. B. Chancellor), 64.

at the Cockpit until the reign of George III, with one or two brief intervals.¹ But in 1761 Bute removed his office from the Cockpit to Cleveland Row, St. James's. In 1771 the office of the Southern Department was also removed to Cleveland Row. It sometimes happened, however, during these years that a Secretary on being transferred from one Department to another did not change his office but remained where he was.

The Colonial Office was at Whitehall.²

The Scotch Office was not always at the same place. Queensberry had rooms at the Cockpit, which after his death were taken over by the Treasury. Mar therefore was ordered by the Queen to hire a house in the neighbourhood of Whitehall. Accordingly he took a house in Craig's Court which was later used by Montrose. Tweeddale's office, however, was in the Cockpit.³

¹ Harrington had to leave the Cockpit in 1734 for a brief period owing to structural alterations there. See *Cal. Treasury Books*, 1731-4, 394, 397.

² Hertslet, *The Old Foreign Office*, 253 sqq.

³ *Cal. Treasury Papers*, 1714-19, 174; *Magnae Britanniae Notitia*, 1745, pt. ii. 31.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

THE history of the secretaryship is closely connected with the history of the transition from government by the King to government by a Ministry. Charles II and James II had ruled as well as reigned. William, though he controlled foreign policy, had in other matters been largely subject to the influence of his Ministers and the pressure of Parliament. The three sovereigns who followed William, though by no means mere ciphers, had been less able to determine the course of events than their Ministers. Even George III, strong-willed as he was, had continually been thwarted by his nominal servants. If he achieved a species of triumph in 1770, yet, though the policy of the Government for the next twelve years was substantially his own, he was forced to depend for its execution on such men as Germain and Weymouth. Perhaps better men were available, but they could not have been employed, since they would probably not have found the requisite support in Parliament. Almost everything of importance was managed by either the head of the Treasury or the Secretaries of State. They were the persons really responsible for success or failure.

Hence it was that in the eighteenth century the Secretaries were almost always representatives of the aristocracy, that is, of the governing class, which inevitably annexed the greater administrative posts. Louis XIV, who sought to depress the aristocracy of France, had chosen his Ministers from the middle class; for which reason these had been unpopular with the great families. St. Simon and many of his fellows longed to see the day when the real power of government would once more be in the hands of the nobility. For a brief space an attempt to restore their control was made. The Regent Orléans, who was at first so weak that he had to seek support where he could find it, set up a number of Councils to manage the departments formerly managed by the Secretaries of State. As might have been expected, this experiment in government by committee was not a success, and within the few years the Secretaries were restored to their former position.¹ As a result the aristocracy continued to look upon the Secretaries with a mixture of scorn

¹ P. Viollet, *Le Roi et ses Ministres*.

and envy. When, in the middle of the eighteenth century, Belle-isle took a Secretaryship, some thought he had lowered himself thereby.¹ The Secretaries in France always remained the servants of their King in a very real sense. They were scarcely regarded as the servants of the state. Perhaps for this reason it continued to be the practice for an in-coming Secretary to pay his predecessor a large sum by way of compensation.² In England, on the other hand, this was apparently never done after the first appointment of Sunderland in 1679.

How far was the British aristocracy capable of supplying good Ministers? The eighteenth century is certainly not the least brilliant period of English history, and the Secretaries were not the least distinguished of those who then held high office. Stanhope may fairly be put among our great diplomatists and Pitt among our great War Ministers. Of the lesser men, Newcastle possessed certain qualities of persistence and, at times, of intelligence, which perhaps deserve a measure of half-contemptuous praise. Holderness and Harrington and others of their type were at least unable to do much harm if they could not do much good. Not until the time of George III did the country suffer from a series of really bad Secretaries. Seldom has our aristocracy been nearer to political bankruptcy than during the first twenty years of his reign. Yet taking the period as a whole it may be said that most of the Secretaries were fairly successful in doing what was expected of them. The general level of ability among the Ministers of the eighteenth century was probably as high as that of Ministers in subsequent generations. It would not be fair to blame the statesmen of the eighteenth century for not introducing those great administrative changes which are so marked a feature of nineteenth-century history. Such changes could only be made when public opinion demanded them, and in the eighteenth century there was little interest in administrative questions. The old system was workable after a fashion and so was deemed satisfactory.

One of the most curious things in our history is the long persistence of the clumsy division of duties between the Secretaries. The French were at least more advanced in this respect. For under Louis XIV there was a Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a Secretary for the Navy, and a Secretary for War, even if

¹ Viollet, 280-1.

² Viollet, 266-70.

domestic affairs were awkwardly divided. But in England changes were slow. The Secretaries preferred to intrigue against each other rather than to agitate for a more sensible organization. How could it be expected that two determined and capable men should share the management of foreign affairs without friction? The surprising thing is not that there was so much but that there was so little. Even so, however, there was enough to make reform desirable long before it came. We hear indeed of suggestions for such reform as early as the seventeenth century. James II, when an exile at the Court of Louis, advised his son if he ever came to the throne to have four Secretaries of State, one for Foreign Affairs, one for Home Affairs, one for War, and one for the Navy.¹ James was plainly influenced by the French example. In England suggestions of this kind were much later. Fox, indeed, told George II, in 1754, 'that what he would desire was to be Secretary for the Department of War'.² But nothing came of the hint. George III, however, apparently realized the need for a change and in 1771 toyed with the plan of a drastic reorganization. Desiring to make Suffolk Secretary and discovering that the latter knew no French, he wrote to North: 'A thought has occurred to me . . . whether Lord Rochford could not transact the whole department of Foreign Affairs which is the case at every other Court and then Lord Suffolk might have the home departments which would be composed of all domestick affairs with the additions of Scotland and Ireland'.³ The appointment of Halifax instead of Suffolk, settled the difficulty for a time. But on Halifax's death a few months later Suffolk was chosen to succeed him in the Northern Department. We can only conjecture either that the King did not press the suggestion for a change or, more probably that such a change would not have been palatable to North and Suffolk. The former might have found a Minister for all Foreign Affairs an uncomfortably strong colleague. The latter might have thought domestic affairs alone a poor share of business. In 1782, however, the Opposition, inspired by zeal for efficiency and economy, demanded the abolition of the Colonial secretaryship and the division of duties between two Secretaries only. If the King reluctantly consented to abolish the third secretaryship he was certainly ready to separate foreign and domestic affairs.

¹ Clarke, *James II*, ii. 640. ² Ilchester, *Fox*, i. 364. ³ *Corr. of George III*, ii. 882.

The changes of 1782 were thus due to the King and the Opposition. The latter thought of saving money. The King was able to secure a sensible division of labour between the two Secretaries who were left. Fox announced the change to British envoys in the following circular: 'The King having on the Resignation of the Lord Viscount Stormont, been pleased to appoint me one of His Principal Secretaries of State and at the same time to make a new arrangement in the Departments by conferring that for Domestic Affairs and Colonies on the Earl of Shelburne, and entrusting me with the sole direction of the Department for Foreign Affairs, I am to desire you will for the future address your letters to me.'¹ The change thus notified, however, had not been authorized by any Order in Council; it was simply the result of the King's wish. Informally introduced, it was received almost without comment.² The men of the eighteenth century were not much interested in administrative questions. The Colonial secretaryship, however, was abolished by a statute in terms which implied that it was not regarded as an ordinary secretaryship. The Act of 22 George III, cap. 82, referred to 'the office commonly called by the name of third Secretary of State or Secretary of State for the Colonies'. Fifteen years later, however, Pitt affirmed in the Commons the sounder doctrine which has prevailed. He attacked the view that 'each office of Secretary of State has (not by custom or convenience for practical purposes, but by law) a particular designation, department, or division.' 'I say,' he continued, 'the office of Secretary of State has no such department, designation, or division, but is in the legal sense independent of any such distinction'. 'The title of the office', he added, 'is "one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State"'. By the grant and delivery of the seals every one of these persons becomes a legal organ to countersign any act of State, and he is placed afterwards in that department of business which His Majesty thinks fit to allot for him'. Such is undoubtedly the correct view.³

Since 1782 the importance of the secretaryship has vastly increased. There are now seven or eight Secretaries instead of two or three. Recent legislation has added and future legislation will probably continue to add to their duties. Yet what the

¹ Anson, *Law and Custom of the Constitution*, ii. 1. 165-6.

² I have not been able to find any interesting contemporary comments.

³ Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, xxxiii. 697.

office has gained has in a sense diminished the power of individual Secretaries. When there were only two Secretaries one might and often did dominate the other. Thus the position of the dominant partner in the Cabinet must have been exceedingly strong. Now though the Secretary for Foreign Affairs need not fear the intervention of a colleague in his own department, yet besides other Ministers there are six or seven fellow Secretaries also in the Cabinet. To dominate a Cabinet at the present day can be no easy task. Nowadays it would be impossible for a Secretary to be as powerful as the elder Pitt had been. Moreover it seems unlikely that a Secretary of State can now be Prime Minister for any length of time. The position of Prime Minister scarcely allows its holder to perform the executive work of a Secretarial department. It is true that a Prime Minister recently took the Foreign Secretaryship, but the burden proved too great and the experiment has not been repeated. The eighteenth century was the golden age for the Secretaries of State.

NOTE ON THE APPENDICES

IN the transcripts of documents in the Appendices the spelling of the original has been preserved. But with regard to capitals and punctuation modern usage has been followed. Abbreviations have been extended without comment. Thus 'Ld' has been extended to 'Lord' and 'Maty' to 'Majesty'. Since the abbreviations in the originals are all of this unambiguous character it did not seem necessary to indicate their existence.

QUEENSBERRY AND FELLOW SECRETARIES IN 1709

P.R.O., State Papers Domestic, Anne, 10. 67. Two documents dealing with Queensberry's claim that the fees of all three Secretaries should be pooled and then divided equally. The first document is endorsed: 'Memorial about the third Secretary of State, 1709'. It reads as follows:

'Before the Union of the two Kingdoms of England and Scotland there were two Principal Secretaries of State for the Kingdom of England and two Principal Secretaries of State for the Kingdom of Scotland.

'By the Union it was supposed that these four offices did cease or at least these four offices were superseded, the stile of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland being drowned in that of Great Britain, and therefore Her Majesty was pleased to constitute and make the Earle of Sunderland and Principal Secretaries of State for the Kingdom of Great Britain, whereby they had the same power to transact matters in that part of Great Britain called Scotland in relation to the Secretaries' office there, as the Principal Secretaries of State for Scotland had before the Union. But the keeping of the signet for Scotland (which before was in the keeping of the Principal Secretaries of State for Scotland) was committed to the Earle of Mar, who had likewise power to present to Her Majesty instruments relating to Scotland to be signed by Her Majesty in order to pass the signet in his keeping.

'That the business of Scotland which was to pass the Secretaries' office being by the Union as much as one half of the business which passed the Secretaries' office for England before the Union Her Majesty thought fitt to increase the number of her Secretaries in proportion to the business which was to pass that office by vertue of the Union and therefore to make a third Secretary of Great Brittain, and that no business should be appropriated to either of the said three Secretaries but either of them might be equally enabled to transact any affair which was to pass the said office, except foreign affairs, which were otherwise provided for. The 3rd February 1709 Her Majesty was pleased to appoint the Duke of Queensberry her 3rd Principal Secretary of State for Great Brittain. But the foreign affairs were to continue for sometime in the same course of dispatch as they were in before.

'The usual profits arising by the execution of the two offices of Principal Secretaries of State for England before the Union were, and since the Union are, brought to account between the two said Secretaries and equally divided between them, which course was taken to avoid a manifold inconvenience; so that whatever business

pass through either of the offices, tho' it should be more in one office than in another yet the profits were equal to both Secretaries.

'The Duke of Queensberry being now constituted one of the Principal Secretaries of State for Great Brittain thinks he has the same power as well in that part of Great Brittain called England as in that part called Scotland, for transacting matters relating to the Secretaries' office, as either of the other two Secretaries of State have had excepting in the matter of foreign affairs, Her Majesty in making the said Duke a third Secretary having reserved the transacting of foreign affairs to the other two Secretaries, an equal trouble of which the said Duke is ready to undertake, if Her Majesty shall think fit to employ him therein; and therefore apprehends that he is entitled to an equal share of all the casual profits arising within the said three offices with the other two Secretaries of Great Brittain as well for business relating to that part of Great Brittain before the Union called England as well as that part called Scotland, his powers as Secretary of State by Her Majesty's commission extending as well to the one Kingdom as to the other; and therefore the said Duke had reason to apprehend that his profits by the execution of the office should be equal with the other Secretaries'. But the Earle of Sunderland and Mr. Boyle, the two other Secretaries, pretend the said Duke is only entitled to the profits of business which passes the Secretaries' office relating to Scotland, and only to such profits of the said business as the Earle of Mar as Keeper of the signet of Scotland by his commission was entitled unto, whereas the Earle of Mar's commission was restrained to business relating to Scotland nor was he by his commission enabled to demand the fees due to a Secretary of State, but the said Duke is constituted Secretary of State of Great Brittain and endowed with as ample power to transact affairs relating to Great Brittain as the other Secretaries of State.'

The reply to Queensberry's memorial is as follows:

'Some heads in answer to the Memorial of the Third Secretary of State.

'As to the change of title of the two Secretaries of State for England by the Union, it is true they became Secretaries of State for Great Britain, but nevertheless the two Secretaries of State which were for Scotland continued to act as formerly and not only had the advantage of business which might arise from thence but also got the issuing commissions to several regiments which were paid upon the English establishment upon pretence that they were commanded by Scotch Colonels and to be men raised in Scotland.

'That as no exact calculation has been seen of the business of Scotland in general which may fall under the care and cognizance of a Secretary of State, or in what proportion it is to that of England, it cannot positively be asserted whether it be one third or no; but

as that part of the business which the third Secretary chiefly intends, which is that from whence the profits arise by the customary and stated fees, it is well enough known that the business of Scotland bears little or no proportion to that of England ; but as the business of both nations is now in general under the stile of Great Britain without any appropriation, all that can be said is that those who were formerly Secretaries of State for England are likely to have a greater diminution of their profits by a third Secretary of State having equal power to transact all affairs in Great Britain than ever they shall compensate by their being empowered to do business relating to Scotland.

‘Her Majesty has undoubtedly for several weighty reasons thought fit that the management of foreign affairs should be continued in the same method as formerly. Yet it may be observed that Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to allow the third Secretary of State not only the same salary and board wages as to the other two, but also the same sum for secret service, as if he had had an equal share in foreign business.

‘But as there are no profits that attend the execution of that part of a Secretary of State’s office which relates to foreign affairs, so it is presumed that the coming into a share of that business is not so much the intention of the third Secretary of State as that thereby he may with more reasonable colour demand an equal division of the profits arising from domestick affairs. But any one that has been informed of the nature of the business in the Secretaries’ office knows very well that there is no such connexion in those matters as from a willingness to undertake a part of the foreign affairs to argue a claim to equal profits arising from the business done for particular persons at home.

‘It is likewise well known that as these profits are accidental and not essential to the making a Secretary of State, so the division of them which was lately introduced by the Secretaries in England, very surely of their own accord and not by direction, and may be laid aside at pleasure, and tho’ two of the present Secretaries of State have thought fit to continue to divide the profits arising in their two offices, yet they see no good reason why they should admit a third into that copartnership.

‘But if they have allowed the 3rd Secretary of State to enjoy indirectly the profits of the signet in Scotland ’tis a matter of kindness and generosity, for undoubtedly they have an equal right to put in their deputys for the passing of business under the signet there, and as, at the same time, the 3rd Secretary is not debarred doing the business of any person in England who shall think fit to apply to him for the same, so there seems less reason to complain if he has the only profitable branch of business in Scotland and an equal power of doing business here with the other two Secretaries of State.’

APPENDIX II

NEWCASTLE AND HALIFAX IN 1751

Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 32725, f. 160. Extract of a letter from Newcastle to Halifax, dated September 10, 1751.

'I had yesterday the honour of your Lordship's letter and am not at all surprised that you expected to have heard something from me before this time. My silence was as painful to myself as it could be disagreeable to you. The reason of it was that I had nothing to say. I was indeed in hopes that if things seemed to be clearing up a little I might have found such an amendment as might have encouraged me to have made the proposals with a prospect of success. But so far from it, tho' in foreign affairs I have the honour to be consulted, and the particular business of my office as far as regards them goes on tolerably well, it is the reverse with regard to home administration. Whatever passes of that kind (and I believe it is very little) is in another channel. This has singly occasioned the delay. For I am very apprehensive that how reasonable soever and right for the publick this proposal is, going thro' my hands it would miscarry. And for that reason only I have been afraid to make it.'

APPENDIX III

HOLDERNESSE AND HALIFAX IN 1752

The letter given below is found in a volume of MSS. formerly belonging to Horace Walpole, now in the British Museum. For the reasons given in the text I suspect Walpole or some other wit wrote this letter by way of a skit on Holdernessee. The other documents in the same volume are of a miscellaneous character and include some light verse and a narrative—perfectly serious—of the adventures of Stanislas Leszczyński in 1733. I have looked for the original of Holdernessee's alleged letter in the Newcastle MSS. but have not found it there.

Add. MSS. 35335. ff. 62 sqq. [f. 62^r]. Copy.

'Hanover Square,
Jan. 30, 1752.

'My Lord,

'I have reflected very seriously on the conversation I had the honour to have with your Grace last Friday morning and take leave to send you the result of my thoughts thereupon. Your Grace told me as you have before hinted to me that His Majesty was desirous I should resign that part of my Province as Secretary of State which regards the direction of the West Indies in order to its being vested

in my Lord Halifax and the rest of the Board of Trade, and you added "that by doing it with a good grace and without any more reluctance I should engage His Majesty's favour to me very particularly and that it would be a signal obligation to your Grace otherwise."

'Your Grace knows very well that I was so far from seeking the high station to which it has pleased His Majesty and your Grace to raise me, that when you gave me the first intimation of it at the Hague I cou'd not believe you was in earnest, tho' I was then given to understand that I was only to be a stop-gap, and to hold the seals but till a proper person could be resolved upon. As the most momentary possession of an office to which my vainest wishes had never dared to aspire would be a signal honour to me, I cheerfully embraced the offer of accommodating your Grace, trusting that it would recommend me to your future favour and knowing there have been many instances of such compliance in subordinate courtiers. But, unfortunately for me, this too ready acquiescence with your [f. 62^v] Grace's intentions made you think me a *proper* person to *remain* in the office to which you had only designed to raise me for a time, and made you look upon me as one so devoted to your will that I should be a fit creature to fill that station where you have always been used to find or to fancy you found a rival. Accordingly you sent for me from the Hague after having acquainted everybody with your intentions of procuring the seals for me. However, I waited for them some time making a very disagreeable figure, everybody knowing I was to have them and nobody thinking I was fit for them. I speak plainly, my Lord, both to your Grace and of myself. I am conscious how little qualified I am to make a first rate Minister, and what the world says of one, I am but too sensible, is true—at the same time I am content to be a cypher, I am unwilling to be a tool. The seals were given to me without any conditions and it was above a fortnight before I received the least hint of the present scheme of divesting me of the best feather in my cap, that was so little, I own, made for my head.

'I have already told your Grace that I submitted to a temporary vacancy, of which I had found many examples; I cannot submit to set a precedent, which I can scarce think any man of quality will be found low enough to follow. If my Lord Halifax's abilities, which I don't mean to detract from are so considerable, why was he not made Secretary of State?—I should have thought myself highly honoured with succeeding his Lordship in the Board of Trade. But it is very hard to be set above him only to tell the world, by obliging me to this sacrifice, how much I am below him. Or if the Province had been divided before my nomination, I might have thought myself honoured with accepting the remnant; for there is some

difference between giving up what one has and accepting a portion of things one could never expect to enjoy entirely. But be that as it may, my Lord, if I was ever fit to be Secretary of State I am so still. [f. 63^r] It was your Grace's fault if you raised me above my deserts; it will be my own if I make myself lower than I was even before my exaltation.

'I shall say little of the reasons why I should be unwilling to part even with the most considerable emoluments of my office because the manner of taking them from me affects me more than the loss itself; and this must be my answer which I shall beg your Grace to lay at His Majesty's feet, that I should not be worthy of the honour of carrying his seals, after having so ignominiously consented to diminish the lustre of them while in my possession.

'To your Grace I say this; I have the highest veneration for your person. I shall always retain the deepest sense of the obligations I have to you, and that I may do so must beg you will not lay an indignity upon me that would cancel your favours. It would be with an ill grace, my Lord, to give up the best part of your boon without reluctance, and whatever I might *expect* from my compliance, I am certain I should *deserve* neither His Majesty's favour nor your Grace's. It may be impertinent in me to offer your Grace any advice; but if my Lord Halifax is so formidable as to make it necessary to oblige him by this sacrifice I do not see how it will content him. Your Grace knows what was lately said, that you are perpetually obliged to buy off opposition by sacrificing first this thing, then that—when my Province is parcelled out it may come to the turn of your Grace's to be aimed at—and therefore I am persuaded that the best service I can do you is to refuse my acquiescence with this your pleasure, which might hereafter be drawn into a precedent against yourself. While I am entire Secretary of State, your will shall be my law, but I do not desire to abridge the opportunity I might have of observing myself your Grace's creature. Consider, my Lord, how devoted a colleague you have in me, consider that you will expose yourself to all those jealousies and uneasinesses which you have been constantly subject to with all your other partners, if by forcing me to resign my office you leave it open to be seized by whoever shall be most capable of bullying himself into it.

'I am with most profound submission and gratitude, your Grace's most obedient, humble servant,

Holdernessee.'

APPENDIX IV

A PLAN FOR THE CREATION OF A COLONIAL
SECRETARYSHIP

Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 33030, f. 295^r sqq. A document endorsed: 'Considerations on the Appointment of a Secretary of State for the Plantations.' This document is found among the Newcastle MSS.; its date must be 1751-7, its composer was probably Halifax.

[f. 295^r] 'As to the manner of appointing a Secretary of State for Plantation affairs.—It may be either by an Order in Council, setting forth at large the reasons and motives for such appointment and directing a patent in the usual form to be passed and seals prepared. Or by a minute entered on the Council books stating shortly that His Majesty upon a consideration of the great increase of Plantation business and of the convenience and advantage which will result from having it transacted in one uniform method has thought proper to appoint to be one of his Principal Secretaries of State of this Kingdom for His Majesty's Colonies and Settlements in America and elsewhere.

'This last appears to have been the method taken whenever a Secretary of State for Scotch affairs has been appointed, and there has usually been a declaration in the said minute of Council that such appointment should not alter or interfere with the method before established with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs, which may also be proper in the case of the appointment of a Secretary of State for Plantation affairs.

'As to the passing the usual patent and preparing seals, the same method may be taken as was observed upon the appointment of the Scotch Secretary of State's office.

'As to the salary and other appointments, it [f. 295^v] is presumed it will be thought proper to put the Secretary of State for Plantation affairs as nearly upon the same foot with the other Secretaries of State as the case will allow.

'The appointments of the Secretaries of State according to the best information that can be obtained are as follows: viz.

Salary by patent	100
Additional salary	1850
Board wages	730
Secret service money	3000
Fees of office deducting the share to the under-secretaries and other expences of clerks etc.	1400
Profits of the <i>Gazettes</i>	400
	<hr/> 7480

'If therefore the same salary, additional salary, board wages, and secret service money be allowed to the Secretary of State for Plantation affairs, and he keeps his salary as first Commissioner of Trade, his appointment will stand thus:

Salary by patent	£100
Additional salary	1850
Board wages	730
Secret service money	3000
Board of Trade salary clear	2300
	<u>7980</u>

From which the sum of £600 must be deducted for the expence of Secretaries, clerks, etc., which with the fees of office computing them at £500 will defray that charge. 600.

'And then the amount will be 7380. 0. 0.

'It must, however, be observed that as the fees arising from Plantation business, computing them at £500 per annum, will be transferred from the other offices to the office of the Secretary of State for Plantation affairs, it will be so much a diminution of the profits of the other Secretaries arising from fees, which supposing this calculation be exact will make the appointment of the Secretary of State for Plantation affairs £150 more per annum than theirs. If this should be the case, it is proposed that the £150, or whatever shall appear upon a more exact enquiry to be the difference in favour of the Secretary of State for Plantation affairs should be deducted either from his salary or secret service money, as shall be thought proper. But this or any other method the Duke of Newcastle shall approve will be certainly agreeable to Lord H[alifax].'

APPENDIX V

REPORT OF A DEBATE ON THE COLONIAL SECRETARYSHIP

Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 34412, ff. 393^r-395^v. This document, which is in Wedderburn's hand, purports to be a report of a debate in the House of Lords on the Colonial Secretaryship. A small portion of it has been quoted by Dr. Basye (see Appendix VI).

The creation of a third Secretary was objected to on two grounds—as illegal—as inexpedient.

To prove the first it was argued that in this Government every executive office had its distinct departments fixed by usage. The King can do no wrong. The Ministers are responsible. Every act

of the royal authority therefore must pass through some known officer, who is accountable for it and it is criminal, i.e. is impeachable for one officer to act in another department—for example if the Treasurer should instruct or send orders to an Ambassador, this direction would not justify the person acting under it and he would be criminal for issuing order which belongs to another department. This was the Earl of Danby's case.

'The office of the King's Principal Secretary is an ancient office, having legal as well as political functions.—It is but one office, by usage at least, since the reign of Henry the 8th. It may be exercised by two Secretaries, but more cannot be joined in it.

[f. 393^v] 'The Regency Act in 1751 appointed a Council of Regency of certain officers and it is plain the number is intended to be limited. Amongst these are the Principal Secretaries of State *for the time being*.—There were then but two. Had it been supposed there would ever be more than two the plan of the Act is defeated; for if there might be three there might be any given number.

'The Regency Act of 1765, says in the description of the Council, which is more accurate than the former Act in all respects, *The Two Principal Secretaries*.—If three are appointed, which of them claims under this description; does it go by seniority of appointment and is there a priority of one Department over another; a question to be tried who is one of the Regents of the Kingdom—how and in what court to be decided. The inference, is, the Legislature must have supposed there could only be two.

[f. 394^r] 'If it ever was legal to multiply and divide an ancient office—to make two Chancellors, two Chief Justices of the Bench, two Privy Seals, two Attorneys, etc, etc. Can that be legal after the act of Succession of 4 Anne c. 8 and 28 and 6 Anne c. 7 and 27 has expressly declared that no greater number of commissioners can be made for the execution of any office than have been employed in the execution of the same office at some time before the first day of that Parliament, viz. 23 Oct., 1707. It would be too plain an evasion to say there are not more commissioners but there are persons joined in the office. The sense of the Act applies equally to the one case as to the other.

'In defence of the legality it was urged that there had been three Secretaries, for there had been at different periods since the Union a Secretary for Scotch affairs. The reply to this was plain. That at the Union there were two Scotch Secretaries; their office was not expressly abolished by [f. 394^v] the articles of Union. It remained till the year 1725.—It then ceased till the year 1742/3 when it was revived for two years and again laid aside. While it existed the office was merely confined to Scotland; the Secretary only signified the King's pleasure in matters arising in Scotland, had the custody

of the Scotch signet, but never issued a warrant nor addressed an order to the offices in England.

'This precedent would not have answered the objections founded on the Act of Succession. It was afterwards found though not known to any side at the time that there was an instance in the reign of Edward 6th, where for about 3 months there had been three Secretaries, Petre, Cecil, and Cheeke, the King's preceptor, and all three had received a writ to Parliament.—This very suspicious and from the history very bad precedent, the times being then totally irregular, was the only instance that could be discovered to answer the objections from the Act of Succession.

[f. 395^r] 'The expediency of the measure was attacked from the confusion it might introduce in case of a Regency; the doubt that would arise whether any warrant of any of the three would be valid.

'But above all the impropriety of making America a distinct department, separating it still further from great Britain by erecting a peculiar officer for all affairs here.

'It was added that the Board of Trade was in its constitution merely a Board of reference; a Committee of Council with the addition of some persons supposed to be conversant with the detail of commerce. That it could not be an office of Government; for the government of the Colonies must be carried on by the King in Council—there cannot be two Councils—and it was more improper to make the First Commissioner of Trade [f. 395^v] a Secretary of the Colonies than any other of the King's servants—he having a Board to assist and to support him; he would naturally assume to decide where his office was only to report, and must by degrees raise, if he could, his Board above the Council, and would himself be without controul in his new made department.

'These were the topics of a debate which arose at the end of the session in which Lord Hillsborough was appointed Secretary. It would have been renewed in the following session, but other matters drew more attention and this was neglected.'

APPENDIX VI

GERMAIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN 1775

Dr. Basye was the first to draw attention to the documents in this and the previous Appendix.¹ The document here given is the draft of a declaration, to be signed by the King, defining the spheres of Germain and the other Secretaries. See Chapter VII. The document is in the hand of Eden, one of Suffolk's under-secretaries.

¹ Basye, 'The Secretary of State for the Colonies' (*American Historical Review*, xxviii. 13-23). I am much indebted to this valuable article.

Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 34412 f. 392.

To be signed by the King at top and bottom and to be delivered by His Majesty to each of the Secretaries of State.

pleasure

from his appointment.

(3)

(3)

As described in an Act passed in the fifth year of my reign entitled etc. etc.

[f. 392^r]. 'As I have given directions that the appointment of the Earl of Dartmouth to be Secretary of State for the Colonies *in addition* to my two other *ancient Secretaries of State* shall be revoked, and that a warrant shall be made out for the appointment of Lord Geo. Germain to be one of my Principal Secretaries of State in the same form and manner in which the Secretaries of State for the Northern and Southern Departments have hitherto been appointed (it is my intention), in order to obviate any inconveniences which may arise *in the course of business, that this sort of appointment shall make no difference with regard to the duties of the third Secretary of State, who is always to be considered as separate from the other two, and that the Ministers filling the Northern and [f. 392^v] Southern Departments shall in all events be considered as the two Principal Secretaries of State at whatever period they may be appointed. And further it is my pleasure that my Secretaries for the Northern and Southern Departments shall exclusively as heretofore transact all matters respecting the interior of Great Britain or any other parts of my dominions and all other matters which have been executed within the said Departments subsequent to Lord Hillsborough and Lord Dartmouth being made Secretaries of State. And it is equally my pleasure that my Secretary for the Colonies shall transact exclusively all matters in his own Department in the same manner as has been hitherto done by his predecessors therein.'*

APPENDIX VII

NEWCASTLE AND NAVAL INSTRUCTIONS

Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 28132. f. 83.

Norris's Journal, Nov. 22, 1739. The incident described took place at a Cabinet meeting at Walpole's house.

'In the discourse about proper Instructions the Duke of Newcastle said tho they came from his office, he never sined any of them. I told him that what I had received from Lord Townshend, when Secretary of State, that were sined by the King, his Lordship countersigned them, and that I understood it was the law of our country, which I would not pretend to assert in the Lord Chancellor's presents, but I had taken formally judg Gilbert's that Instructions sined by the Crown and coming from the Secretary's office with the seale of the office ought to be countersined by the Secretary, or inclosed in a letter under the Secretary's hand, expressing those were His Majesty's Instructions that he was commanded to send; and it is hiley resonable it should be so, for how can a commander in chefe kno the King's hand, who never sees the Crown writs, and often knows nothing of the contents of them but what he is informed from the Secretary; and as it is a knone maxim in law that the Crown can do no wrong, it is from that principale that the law holds the officer under the Crown from whence those orders are drawn to be answerable to the Government for the same; for if it were not so how often mite the first officers of the Crown, by accidents gett the hand of the Crown to papers that wout be preiudicial to the Government, and by the signett of their office confirmne the same without being accountable for same; and in my private opinion no man of honor, in so great a trust, ought to continue in his employment, that should refuse the giving the public the proper testimony of what he transact; and it is at most but an evasion that may be found out; for the date of any Instructions, with the sele of the office it passes, will prove who was the Secretary of State of that Province from whom those orders came.'

APPENDIX VIII

SPECIMENS OF WARRANTS FOR ARREST

Of the two warrants given here the first is general in so far as it contains a clause for the seizure of papers, while the second is general in the usual sense of the term.

P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Various, 7, p. 14 (second numbers).

'Common Warrant for apprehending any person.'

'Charles Lord Viscount Townshend, Baron of Lynn, Knight of the

most noble Order of the Garter, one of the Lords of His Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, Principal Secretary of State etc. These are in His Majesty's name to authorise and require you (taking a Constable to your assistance) to make strict and diligent search for of whom you shall have notice and them or any of them having found to seize and apprehend for and bring them or any of them together with their papers before me to be examined and further dealt with according to law. In the due execution whereof all Mayors, Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace, Constables and all other His Majesty's officers civil and military and loving subjects whom it may concern are to be aiding and assisting you as there shall be occasion. And for so doing this shall be your warrant.

'Given at Whitehall the . . . day . . . 1723/1724 in the tenth year of His Majesty's reign.

'Townshend.'

'To

of His Majesty's Messengers in Ordinary.'

P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., Entry Books, 87, pp. 139-40.

'George Grenville Esq. One of the Lords of His Majesty's most honourable Privy Council and Principal Secretary of State etc.

'These are in His Majesty's name to authorise and require you, taking a Constable to your assistance, to make strict and diligent search for the author, printer and publisher of a certain paper entitled 'The London Chronicle or Universal Evening Post' from Saturday, July 10, to Tuesday, July 13, 1762. No. 866. And them or any of them having found to seize and apprehend and bring together with his or their papers in safe custody before me to be examined and further dealt with according to law. In the due execution whereof all Mayors etc. And for so doing this shall be your warrant. Given at St. James's the sixteenth day of July, 1762. In the second year of His Majesty's reign.

George Watson and Robert Blackmore

Two of His Majesty's Messenger in } George Grenville.'
Ordinary.

APPENDIX IX

NEWCASTLE'S EXPENSES AND THOSE OF LATER SECRETARIES

Bodleian Library. Rawlinson MSS. C. 367 is an account book of the expenses of the Secretary for the Southern Department during the years 1724-30. It appears to have been kept by one of the office staff. Statements of accounts are sometimes for one month, sometimes for two. I have selected a specimen which shows the quarterly payment of salaries to clerks.

NEWCASTLE'S EXPENSES

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'Disburst for his Grace the Duke of Newcastle in the Months of May and June, 1725.

'Paid for fees for a new Privy seal for £3,000 secret service as per particulars:

	£	s.	d.	
At the Treasury	2	2	0	
Stamps for the warrant	0	7	6	
Signet Office	1	18	0	
Office Keeper	0	2	6	£13 0 6
Privy Seal Office	0	5	0	
Stamps	6	0	0	
	£	s.	d.	
For the Deal List $\frac{1}{2}$ a year to Lady Day 1725	2	0	0	
Expresses in May	1	3	0	
Paid to Mrs. Griffiths for Newspapers sent to Newcastle				
House from the 5th April to 11th May last	1	4	0	
To do. for newspapers sent to Mr. Ledgem (? Ledger)				
from 29th August to 31 May last	2	19	2	
To Benjamin Turner for charcole from 21 Sept. 1724				
to 31st May last	8	15	0	
To John Turner for wax lights from 4 April 1724 to				
May 12, 1725	40	2	6	
To John Crawford by his Grace's as per receipt	10	10	0	
To Clerks of the House of Lords for writing the minutes				
during the last session and bringing the same	5	3	0	
To the Clerks of the House of Commons for revising				
the minutes	3	3	0	
To the Messengers of said House for bringing the				
minutes	2	0	0	
Sent (? Lent) to his Grace by Mr. Noble	26	5	0	
Paid to Mr. Davids, Mr. Gregory and Mr. Couraud				
£25 each for a quarters salary due at Midsummer				
1725	75	0	0	
To Mr. Maskelyne, Mr. Stepney and Mr. Wiggs				
£12. 10. 0 each	37	10	0	
To Mr. Milnes and Mr. Moore £7. 10. 0 each	15	0	0	
To Mr. Ward and Mr. Noble, office keepers £4. 0. 0				
each	10	8	0	
To Mary Bickford, the office cleaner	3	0	0	
29 June 1725. Paid to Mr. Delafaye for my Lord Duke				
To Philip Holden for candles from 3rd April 1724 to				
to 23 March 1724	53	14	0	
Expresses in June last	1	0	0	
	317	12	2'	

Newcastle's expenses seem to have been about £700 per annum to judge from these accounts. A generation later expenses were higher. Among the Shelburne MSS. (134, p. 133) is a list of the expenses in the Southern Department at the time when Shelburne took office. The total is £1352 15s. The increase is to be accounted for mainly by the larger salaries now paid. These amount to £900. Other items are much the same.

APPENDIX X

PETITION OF THE UNDER-SECRETARIES
IN 1718

P.R.O., State Paps. Dom., George I, 14. 5. The document is in the same bundle as other documents of the year 1718. See Chapter V.

'So great an alteration having been made in the process of time in the course of business which formerly passed through the Secretary's office that the income of the under-secretaries and first clerks is reduced to less than a quarter of what those places were estimated at forty years ago,¹ and yet the necessary qualifications for these employments and the pains and attendances of those who possess them and the trust reposed in them being still the same, they humbly presume they may hope for encouragement and that, if their employments be not made altogether so beneficial as they were to their predecessors they may at least in some degree partake of His Majesty's bounty.

'They do therefore beg leave with all submission to propose:

'Firstly, that they may have such salary allowed them in compensation of the decrease of their fees as shall be judged reasonable; or,

'Secondly, that if this be not practicable, four employments, which by the nature of them seem to have an immediate relation to the Secretary's office, may be annexed thereto with equal salaries as those of Keeper and Register of the Paper Office, Latin Secretary, French Secretary (to be united)² . . . ; for which offices compensation may be made to those who now enjoy them either in money or by giving them other employments; or if neither of those methods be thought proper,

¹ This paragraph has been erased in the original and the following words substituted, in the margin.

'The business of the Secretary's office consists of foreign and domestic affairs; for the former of which and a great part of the domestic there are no fees paid; nor have the under-secretaries, upon whom the labour lies, any manner of compensation. In former times the fees of domestic business were so considerable that it made them sufficient amends, but by the creation of new officers and alterations which have been made by degrees for many years in the course of business the income of their places is (especially in time of peace) become less than a quarter of what it was estimated heretofore.'

² Here follows a word of seven or eight letters which I cannot read.

'Thirdly, that the several officers who have an allowance for contingencies either in the receiving or issuing any parts of the revenue, and who all have some business done for them at the Secretary's office, at least by inserting advertisements in the *Gazette* may under that pretence be directed to make annual presents to the said officers, which last method would not in the least burden the Civil List.

'They beg leave further to represent that the Secretary and clerks of the Admiralty have salaries and fees; that the Clerks of the Council have also salaries and, moreover, from time to time obtain gratifications from the King for the business they transact, which being for the public service is dispatched without fees; that the Clerks of the Signet and Privy Seal have allowances and fees; that those and all Law Officers have fees for whatsoever papers pass thro' them, tho' for the public service, and that the Secretaries and clerks of the Treasury have annual presents in the nature of those above mentioned, which are a valuable part of their perquisites.'

APPENDIX XI

SHELBURNE'S CLERKS IN 1766

The following document is found in Shelburne MS. 134, pp. 123-5. It contains details as to the various Clerks in Shelburne's office in 1766. It seems to have been written by William Burke, then an under-secretary.

'Mr. Brown, First Clerk.

This gentleman is the son of an old clerk in the office, but hath succeeded to the first Clerkship lately on the death of Joseph Richardson Esq.

Duck.

The gentleman is the son of the late Stephen Duck of Kew and Richmond Gardens; he (*sc.* Duck senior) was unhappy in his mind and put an end to his life by drowning himself,¹ which so affected his son that he fell into a melancholy and was obliged to quit the office for some considerable time; but now he appears at the office again and I believe he is perfectly well. When the Duke of Bedford was Secretary of State he was much in his favour and the Duke had him down to Wooburn in the Summer time and occasionally at other times.

Sneyd.

This gentleman was born in Ireland but his family is Sneyds of Staffordshire; he was recommended to the Duke of Bedford by Sir Richard Boxley; he is married and has a family.

¹ For Stephen Duck, the peasant poet, see *Dict. Nat. Biog.*

Brietzcke.

This gentleman was recommended to my Lord Holderness when he was Secretary of State by my Lady Harrington; his father was a Prussian and vallett de chambre to the late Duke of Grafton. His mother is one of the House keepers at Sommor House.

Haines.

This gentleman I know little on; his father was a deputy clerk in the Privy Seal Office.

Pollock.

This gentleman is the son of Pollock the Messenger. I have always heard very good account of him as a sober diligent young man and minded his own business.

Fenhoullett.

This gentleman is the son of Sir Peter Fenhoullett who was an exxon to the Yeoman of the Guards; the late Mr. Richardson was the means of bringing him into the office and during his decline he kept him at his own house and sent him his keys to the office for any papers he wanted.

Collins.

This gentleman I know nothing on.

Morin.

The son of Morin now in the office.

John Sommer, chamber keeper.

Was a servant to the late Lord Townshend; he is a Hanoverian, and my Lord took him there in King George the 1st's time; my Lord gave him another little place belonging to the King's House at Newmarkett; he is a very trusty sensible man; he continued in my Lord's service till he died, tho he had those places many years before.

John White.

An old vallett de chambre to the present Earl of Chesterfield where he still is.

As to a Porter.

There is no such person belonging to the office by any appointment but it is usuall to have some person to employ under the sanction of the Secretaries and clerks to carry out their letters and go of their errands.'

APPENDIX XII

LIST OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, 1681-1782

There are lists of the Secretaries prefixed to the Public Record Office 'Lists and Indices' of State Papers Domestic and of State Papers Foreign. There is also a list in the *Complete Peerage*, ii, Appendix, pp. 637 sqq. All these are generally accurate, though not

LIST OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, 1681-1782 181
always so. The exact date when each Secretary received the seals is not always known and the date given is therefore sometimes that on which he took the oath of office; but this was often taken on the same day, and in any case soon after. Nor is it always possible to determine on what day a Secretary surrendered the seals.

Southern Department.

- Robert, Earl of Sunderland. Transferred from the North, Apr. 1680.
Dismissed, Jan. 31, 1680/1.
- Sir Leoline Jenkins. From the North, Feb. 1680/1. Resigned,
Apr. 2, 1684.
- Robert, Earl of Sunderland. From the North, Apr. 1684. Dismissed,
Oct. 28, 1688.
- Charles, Earl of Middleton. From the North, Oct. 1688.
- Charles, Duke of Shrewsbury. Feb. 14, 1689. Resigned, June 2,
1690.
- Daniel, Earl of Nottingham. From the North. Sole Secretary from
the resignation of Shrewsbury till the appointment of Sidney and
from the dismissal of Sidney to the appointment of Trenchard.
Nottingham was dismissed in Nov. 1693.
- John Trenchard. From the North, Nov. 1693. Died, Apr. 27, 1695.
- Charles, Duke of Shrewsbury. From the North, Apr. 1695. Resigned,
Dec. 12, 1698.
- James Vernon. Sole Secretary from Dec. 1698 to May 1699.
- Edward, Earl of Jersey. May 14, 1699. Dismissed, June 27, 1700.
- James Vernon. Sole Secretary June 1700, to Nov. 5, 1700. South
only, Nov. 5, 1700, to Jan. 4, 1701/2.
- Charles, Earl of Manchester. Jan. 4, 1701/2. Dismissed at the end
of April or beginning of May 1702.
- Daniel, Earl of Nottingham. May 2, 1702. Resigned in the middle
of May, 1704.
- Sir Charles Hedges. From the North, May 1704. Dismissed, Dec.
1706.
- Charles, Earl of Sunderland. Dec. 3, 1706. Dismissed, June (13-14),
1710.
- William, Lord Dartmouth. June 15, 1710. Resigned, Aug. 6-13,
1713.
- Henry, Viscount Bolingbroke. From the North, Aug. 1713. Dis-
missed, Aug. 1714.

- James Stanhope. Sept. 27, 1714. Transferred to the North, Dec. 12, 1716.
- Paul Methuen. Appointed to act in Stanhope's absence, June 22, 1716. Continued as Southern Secretary until Apr. 1717. He was dismissed on or just before Apr. 16.
- Joseph Addison. Apr. 16, 1717. Resigned, Mar. 14, 1717/18.
- James Craggs. Mar. 16, 1717/18. Died, Feb. 16, 1720/1.
- John, Lord Carteret. Mar. 4, 1720/1. Dismissed at the end of March or beginning of April 1724.
- Thomas, Duke of Newcastle. Apr. 6, 1724. Resigned, Feb. 10, 1745/6.
- John, Earl Granville. Sole Secretary, Feb. 10, 1745/6. Resigned, Feb. 14, 1745/6.
- Thomas, Duke of Newcastle. Feb. 14, 1745/6. Transferred to the North after Feb. 6, 1747/8.
- John, Duke of Bedford. Between Feb. 6 and Feb. 12, 1747/8. Resigned, June 13, 1751.
- Robert, Earl of Holderness. June 18, 1751. Transferred to the North on or just after Mar. 12, 1754.
- Sir Thomas Robinson. Mar. 23, 1754. Resigned, Oct., 1755.
- Henry Fox. Nov. 14, 1755. Resigned, Nov. 13, 1756.
- William Pitt. Dec. 4, 1756. Dismissed, Apr. 6, 1757. Reappointed, June 27, 1757. Resigned, Oct. 5, 1761.
- Charles, Earl of Egremont. Oct. 9, 1761. Died, Aug. 21, 1763.
- George, Earl of Halifax. From the North. Dismissed, July 10, 1765.
- Henry Seymour Conway. July 10, 1765. Transferred to the North, May 1766.
- Charles, Duke of Richmond. May 23, 1766. Dismissed, July 29, 1766.
- William, Earl of Shelburne. July 30, 1766. Resigned, Oct. 19 or Oct. 20, 1768.
- Thomas, Viscount Weymouth. From the North, Oct. 21, 1768. Resigned, Dec. 12-17, 1770.
- William, Earl of Rochford. From the North, Dec. 1770. Resigned, Nov. 9, 1775.
- Thomas, Viscount Weymouth. Nov. 9, 1775. Resigned, Nov. 24, 1779.
- Wills, Earl of Hillsborough. Nov. 24, 1779. Resigned, March 1782.

Northern Department.

- Sir Leoline Jenkins. Apr. 26, 1680. Transferred to the South, Feb. 1680/1.
- Edward, Earl of Conway. Feb. 2, 1680/1. Dismissed, Jan. 1682/3.
- Robert, Earl of Sunderland. Jan. 28, 1682-3. Transferred to the South, Apr. 1684.
- Sidney Godolphin. Apr. 14, 1684. Dismissed, Aug. 1684.
- Charles, Earl of Middleton. Aug. 24, 1684. Transferred to the South, Oct. 1688.
- Richard, Viscount Preston. Oct. 28, 1688.
- Daniel, Earl of Nottingham. Mar. 5, 1688/9. Sole Secretary from the resignation of Shrewsbury to the appointment of Sidney. Then South.
- Henry, Viscount Sidney. Dec. 26, 1690. Resigned (or dismissed), Mar. 3, 1691/2.
- Sir John Trenchard. Mar. 23, 1692/3. Sole Secretary from the dismissal of Nottingham to the appointment of Shrewsbury. Then South.
- Charles, Duke of Shrewsbury. Mar. 4, 1693/4. South after Apr. 27, 1695.
- Sir William Trumbull. May 3, 1695. Resigned, Dec. 1 or 2, 1697.
- James Vernon. Dec. 2, 1697. Sole Secretary from Dec. 1698 to May 14, 1699, and from June 27, 1700, to Nov. 5, 1700. South Nov. 5, 1700, to Jan. 1, 1701/2.
- Sir Charles Hedges. Nov. 5, 1700. Dismissed at the end of Dec. 1701.
- James Vernon. From the South, Jan. 1701/2. Dismissed at end of April or beginning of May 1702.
- Sir Charles Hedges. May 2, 1702. Transferred to the South, May 1704.
- Robert Harley. May 18, 1704. Resigned, Feb. 13, 1707/8.
- Henry Boyle. Feb. 13, 1707/8. Resigned, Sept. 1710.
- Henry St. John. Sept. 21, 1710. Transferred to the South, Aug. 1713.
- William Bromley. Aug. 17, 1713. Dismissed, Sept. 1714.
- Charles, Viscount Townshend. Sept. 17, 1714. Dismissed early in Dec. 1716.
- James Stanhope. From the South, Dec. 1716.

- Charles, Earl of Sunderland. Apr. 15, 1717. Resigned, Mar. 2, 1717/18.
- James, Viscount Stanhope. Mar. 18-21, 1717/18. Died, Feb. 4, 1720/1.
- Charles, Viscount Townshend. Feb. 10, 1720/1. Resigned, May 16, 1730.
- William, Lord Harrington. June 19, 1730. Resigned, Feb. 12, 1741/2.
- John, Lord Carteret. Feb. 12, 1741/2. Resigned, Nov. 24, 1744.
- William, Earl of Harrington. Nov. 24, 1744. Resigned, Feb. 10, 1745/6.
- John, Earl Granville. Feb. 10, 1745/6. Resigned, Feb. 14, 1745/6.
- William, Earl of Harrington. Feb. 14, 1745/6. Resigned, Oct. 28, 1746.
- Philip, Earl of Chesterfield. Oct. 29, 1746. Resigned, Feb. 6, 1747/8.
- Thomas, Duke of Newcastle. From the South. Resigned, Mar. 1754.
- Robert, Earl of Holderness. From the South, Mar. 1754. Resigned, June 9, 1757. Reappointed, June 29, 1757. Resigned Mar. 12, 1761.
- John, Earl of Bute. Mar. 25, 1761. Resigned, May 1762.
- George Grenville. May 27, 1762. Resigned on or about Oct. 9, 1762.
- George, Earl of Halifax. Oct. 14, 1762. Transferred to the South, Sept. 1763.
- George, Earl of Sandwich. Sept. 9, 1763. Dismissed, July 1765.
- Augustus, Duke of Grafton. July 10-12, 1765. Resigned, May 14, 1766.
- Henry Seymour Conway. From the South. Resigned, Jan. 20, 1768.
- Thomas, Viscount Weymouth. Jan. 20, 1768. Transferred to the South, Oct. 1768.
- William, Earl of Rochford. Oct. 21, 1768. Transferred to the South, Dec. 1770.
- John, Earl of Sandwich. Dec. 19, 1770. Resigned, Jan. 12, 1771.
- George, Earl of Halifax. Jan. 22, 1771. Died, June 6, 1771.
- Henry, Earl of Suffolk. June 12, 1771. Died, Mar. 1, 1779.
- David, Viscount Stormont. Oct. 27, 1779. Resigned, March 1782.

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Sir Robert Walpole was made Secretary on Mar. 23, 1723, and continued as such until the return of Townshend and Carteret from the Continent.

Scotch Department.

James, Duke of Queensberry. Feb. 3, 1708/9. Died, July 6, 1711.

John, Earl of Mar. Sept. 30, 1713. Dismissed, September 1714.

James, Duke of Montrose. Sept. 24, 1714. Dismissed, Aug. 4-8, 1715.

John, Duke of Roxburgh. Dec. 13, 1716. Dismissed at the end of August, 1725.

John, Marquis of Tweeddale. Feb. 16, 1741/2. Resigned, Jan. 3, 1745/6.

Colonial Department.

Wills, Earl of Hillsborough. Jan. 20, 1768. Resigned, Aug. 1772.

William, Earl of Dartmouth. Aug. 14, 1772. Resigned, Nov. 1775.

Lord George Germain. Nov. 10, 1775. Resigned, Feb. 1782.

William W. Ellis. Feb. 17, 1782. Resigned, March 1782.

APPENDIX XIII

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. UNPRINTED SOURCES

It is possible to form a tolerably correct estimate of the general importance of each Secretary from the printed sources alone. These, too, are usually fairly full for general political history. They furnish, however, comparatively little information for administrative history. Manuscripts, therefore, have chiefly been consulted for the second part of this study, though some of those which I have been able to consult have proved very useful for the first part.

I have made use of certain manuscripts in the British Museum, the Public Record Office, and the Bodleian Library; also of a photostat of Shelburne MSS. 134. Of these the following have proved the most profitable.

The dispatches of foreign envoys in London are often valuable for general as well as purely diplomatic history. Portions of these are printed in various works or at least cited (see section B of this biblio-

graphy). There are also available in London two most useful series of transcripts. The Bachet transcripts in the P.R.O. contain copies of the correspondence of the French envoys with Paris. The series begins in the sixteenth century and ends in 1714. The transcripts are useful for the years 1681-8, though a good many of the dispatches for that period are in print. The same may be said of the years 1697-1702. But for the last years of Anne's reign their value is greater. They illustrate both the shares of Bolingbroke, Dartmouth, and Oxford in the making of the Treaty of Utrecht and also shed light on Bolingbroke's policy. Of even greater value, however, are the transcripts of Bonnet's dispatches in the Brit. Mus. (Add. MSS. 30000 A-E). L. F. Bonnet was the Prussian Resident in London 1696-1720. His dispatches for the years 1697-1701 have been transcribed and the transcript placed in the Brit. Mus. Bonnet was remarkably well-informed and intelligent. He often refers to debates in Parliament and usually comments on Ministerial changes. His judgements on persons are shrewd.¹

Add. MSS. 18730 is the diary of Lord Anglesea 1675-84. It is useful for the dismissal of Sunderland in 1681 and for a few other topics.

Add. MSS. 35104 is a letter-book of Conway's. It is useful for Conway's resignation. Most of the letters are in Blathwayt's hand.²

Add. MSS. 29588-9 are letters to Nottingham 1694-1725. These are useful for Nottingham's second term of office. Among these are the letters of Hedges to Nottingham, when Hedges was with the Queen at Bath. There are some interesting references to the Cabinet.

The enormous mass of the Newcastle and Hardwicke MSS. (Add. MSS. 32686 sqq. and 35349 sqq.) is an almost inexhaustible mine of information. Many of the letters, however, have been printed, especially of those dealing with Ministerial changes. For the purpose of this study the chief value of these MSS. lies in the information they give on certain special subjects, for which references are given below.

Brit. Mus., Stowe MSS. 251 contains transcripts of many letters written by public men, 1723-48. Mention may here be made of the correspondence of Townshend and Walpole, June 1723 to Jan. 1723-4. These letters are useful for the quarrel of Carteret with Townshend.

Brit. Mus., Lansdowne MSS. 885 includes Lord Coningsby's 'History of Parties', a work written for presentation to George I. It records one or two facts of interest not found elsewhere, and also contains a good deal of gossip, which is no more reliable than gossip usually is.

The relations of the Secretaries with the under-secretaries are

¹ The dispatches are written in French.

² Blathwayt was under-secretary to Conway.

illustrated by Add. MSS. 28895. This contains letters from the Secretaries to J. Ellis, 1695-1705. Particularly important are the letters of Trumbull, which show both Trumbull's indolence and his great confidence in Ellis. Also Add. MSS. 34412, Papers of William Eden. These include many letters from Suffolk (see Chapter V.)

For administrative history and the history of the Cabinet the papers in the Public Record Office are naturally the most useful. But these can often be supplemented by those in the British Museum and elsewhere. The documents in the P.R.O. are described more particularly in the various 'Lists and Indices', which have been published. To repeat here the information therein contained would be useless. But something may be said of the nature and completeness of the various sources in the P.R.O. Among the State Paps. Dom., Various, are three volumes—vols. 7-9—described as Secretaries' Precedent Books. They consist of transcripts of various documents illustrating different branches of the Secretaries' work. The first volume contains documents of the years 1677-1725; the second, of the years 1706-80; the third, of the years 1740-1810. The last two volumes appear to be in the same hand and bear on the cover the following inscription:

'William Pollock.
For Lord Viscount Sidmouth,
from Hannah Pollock
Executrix.'

W. Pollock was a clerk in the Office, which he appears to have entered in the early years of George III's reign. (See Shelburne MSS. 134, p. 125.) Whether he compiled these two volumes for his own interest or by order is uncertain.

The first volume is certainly written in a different hand. It contains one document dated 1677; but the rest belong to the years 1689-1725.

All the three volumes are most useful and illustrate almost every branch of the Secretaries' activities. There are numerous specimens of criminal warrants. But though not equally full on other subjects the Precedent Books are scarcely less valuable. They supply e.g. information on the summoning of Cabinets and on the relations of the Secretaries with the Army.

The Secretarial records in the P.R.O. consist of:

1. Entry Books of warrants and out-letters. Occasionally also of in-letters.
2. Bundles of in-letters. Sometimes, however, these have been bound up in volumes. The binding is sometimes contemporary, sometimes modern.
3. Bundles of miscellaneous papers. Most of these have been

classified according to the reigns of monarchs. Thus a document written in September 1714 would be among State Paps. Dom., George I.

For the relations of the Secretaries with Scotland the chief sources are the entry books of Scotch warrants and out-letters, as also the bundles of in-letters. These indicate quite clearly which Secretary was doing the work at any particular date.

The sources for Irish business are of a similar nature.

For military affairs the sources are somewhat deficient. The work of the Secretary at War can be studied in the War Office Entry Books, Out-Letters, though most of the letters for William's reign are missing. Missing also are the greater part of the letters from the Secretaries of State, written before 1756. But a few specimens are in the second of the Precedent Books (State Paps. Dom., Various, 8). After March 31, 1756, however, the letters are extant (see War Office, i. 678 sqq.). State Paps. Dom., Entry Books (Military) contain orders and 'Instructions' issued by the Secretaries. The bundles of domestic (military) papers contain miscellaneous documents which show the work the Secretaries were doing. They include letters from the Secretary at War. See also for these War Office, Out-Letters, General. There is much as to campaigns in the Colonies among the Colonial Office records (Colonial Office, 5, e.g. vol. 9 for the years 1710-13; vol. 42 for the expedition against Carthage and Venturina).

For campaigns on the Continent see State Papers Foreign, Military Expeditions. These contain, besides miscellaneous papers, much correspondence of the Secretaries with Generals. For the Militia see besides the Entry Books (Military) in the State Paps. Dom. the Militia Entry Book in the Home Office Papers (51.1). This is an entry book kept by Holderness, 1758-60. Also e.g. State Paps. Dom. (Military) 30. For the Ordnance see besides the letters and warrants to the Board in the Entry Books (Military) the letters from the Board to the Secretaries in State Paps. Dom. (Military) 34.

The relations of the Secretaries to the Navy can conveniently be studied both in the Secretarial and Admiralty Records. The Secretarial Entry Books of Out-Letters (Naval) and the Admiralty Entry Books of In-Letters (Secretary of State) both begin in 1689. Among the State Paps. Dom. (Naval) are many letters from Admirals at Sea to the Secretaries. The Chatham Papers in the P.R.O. are also useful (e.g. 78). Some naval documents are also to be found in Colonial Office, 5. For purposes of comparison the Admiralty Entry Books of 'Orders and Instructions' and 'Secret Orders and Instructions' are useful; since these show what kind of orders were issued by the Admiralty in accordance with the directions of the Secretaries and what kind were not. It may be added that Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.

35855 is a letter-book containing the correspondence of Trenchard with Admirals Killigrew and Shovell, Apr.-Nov. 1693.

The correspondence of the Secretaries with the Colonial Governors is found in the Colonial Office Records, as also are the 'Journals of the Board of Trade'. There are also some very useful documents on the efforts of Halifax to extend the powers of the Board of Trade and the creation of the Colonial Secretaryship in the Brit. Mus., e.g. Add. MSS. 32994, ff. 286 sqq. (Halifax's proposals in Dec. 1751). Cf. 33030, ff. 287-8 and f. 291; Add. MSS. 32725, f. 91; Add. MSS. 32975, f. 104, Newcastle to Conway, May 7, 1766.

See also Appendixes II-IV.

See also the correspondence of Hillsborough and Shelburne with regard to the changed status of the Board of Trade in 1766. This is to be found in Shelburne MSS. 134, pp. 55 sqq., 67 sqq.

For domestic affairs the chief sources are the entry books. No entry books of criminal warrants for the reign of William III appear to have survived. But this seems to be the only serious gap.

The foreign correspondence of the Secretaries in so far as it is in the P.R.O. may be found in the State Papers Foreign. For the diplomatic correspondence in the Brit. Mus. see Miss Davenport's list in Report XVIII of Hist. MSS. Comm., App. II. There are some 150 volumes of diplomatic correspondence among the Newcastle MSS. Among these may be found much useful information as to 'private' letters and the employment of foreign spies.

The chief unprinted sources for the Secretaries' emoluments are the fee books (State Paps. Dom., Various, 26-35). These cover the years 1727-33 and 1746-82 for the Northern and Southern Departments and also the years 1768-82 for the Colonial Department.

As to the emoluments of the clerks see Foreign Office 95.5.91. I.V. Also Shelburne MSS. 134, pp. 101 sqq. The former gives details as to the salaries and allowances—from the Post Office money—of the clerks in the Northern Department in 1769, 1770, and 1775. The latter is a representation of the clerks concerning their pecuniary losses owing to the curtailment of their right to frank.

See also Appendixes IX-X.

The MSS. of Shelburne are at present in the W. L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A. Owing to the courtesy of Mr. W. L. Clements I have been able to procure a photostat of vol. 134 of these MSS. The volume includes abstracts of the various Orders in Council which concern the Board of Trade and several other documents already in print. Of the remainder I have transcribed some in my Appendixes and given references to others either there or in this note on MSS. Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MSS. C. 367 is an account book of the expenses and receipts of the Secre-

tary for the Southern Department in the years 1724-30. See Appendix IX for an extract.

B. PRINTED SOURCES¹

There are a great number of works which contain a few scraps of information and no more. Of these, therefore, it is often impossible to give a description. All that can be done is to record their title. But I have endeavoured to indicate the value of the more important sources. Generally speaking, memoirs are useful because of the characters of various persons contained therein and the reports of opinions current at the time; occasionally too they are the best sources for Parliamentary debates. Such portions of the non-official correspondence of the Secretaries, as are available, are naturally of the first authority. Diplomatic correspondence shows who supervised the execution of foreign policy, but not necessarily who formed it. It may be added that since the men of the period were not interested in administrative history, there is a remarkable lack of comment on the various changes that occurred.

I. *Historical Manuscripts Commission.*

The Appendixes to the first eight reports are so brief as to afford little of value. There is some useful information about Fox, however, in the Digby MSS. (Report VIII, App. I) and some of Preston's papers are calendared in the Graham MSS. (Report VII, App. I).

The later volumes of the series are fuller. Among these the following deserve special mention.

The Finch MSS. contain much of Nottingham's correspondence. The calendar so far goes to the end of 1690.

Buccleuch MSS., vol. ii, contains large portions of Shrewsbury's correspondence during his second term of office and for some years later. There are also a very few letters written during his first term of office. Shrewsbury's notes of Cabinet (Committee) meetings are here given, though wrongly described as Privy Council minutes. The portions of Shrewsbury's correspondence edited by Coxe and James supplement this volume.

Downshire MSS. comprise much of Trumbull's correspondence. But for the period of his secretaryship they are somewhat disappointing, since they include few letters written by Trumbull himself.

Portland MSS., vols. iii-x, contain the Harley papers. It need scarcely be said that they are of prime importance for the reign of Anne. For the reign of George they are not very helpful. Vol. viii. contains a number of petitions addressed to Harley as Secretary of State and also a number addressed to the Queen.

¹ The place of publication is London unless otherwise stated.

Polwarth MSS. (3 vols.) contain diplomatic correspondence of the British envoy to Copenhagen, 1716-25.

Bath MSS. (3 vols.) contain the Prior papers, which are useful both for diplomatic affairs and the general politics of the latter years of William and the reign of Anne.

Report XIV, App. IX, contains the correspondence of R. Trevor, who held diplomatic posts at The Hague during the reign of George II. Also the Onslow MSS. Among these are an interesting little essay on opposition by Speaker Onslow and remarks on the chief politicians of his age.

Lord Egmont's Diary is useful for the latter part of Walpole's Ministry. Egmont gives notes of debates in Parliament and some gossip not always reliable. But he records some remarks of Sir John Shelley, Newcastle's brother-in-law which are illuminating.

Dartmouth MSS. (3 vols.) are mainly useful for Colonial history during the reign of George III. But vol. i illustrates the connexion of the Secretaries with the Navy in the years 1681-8.

Weston Underwood MSS. (Report X, App. I) are useful for the career of Edward Weston, for many years an under-secretary.

Knox MSS. (Various Collections, vi) are the papers of William Knox, for many years under-secretary in the Colonial Department.

II. *Calendars of State Papers.*

Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series. (Covers the years 1681, 1689-97, and 1702-4. 12 vols.)

The Calendar of Home Office Papers. 4 vols. (Covers the years 1760-75.)

Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series. (Covers the years 1681-1718.)

Journals of the Board of Trade. 8 vols. (Covers the years 1704-49.

The journals for the earlier years are calendared in the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial.*)

It should be added that much information about military and naval affairs may be found in the *Calendar of State Paps. Dom.* The *Calendar of Home Office Papers* is also useful for the Army and the Colonies. Both contain papers relating to Ireland, and the latter papers relating to Scotland.

Calendar of Treasury Books. (Covers the years 1681-8 and 1729-45.)

Calendar of Treasury Papers. (Covers the years 1681-1728. Both this and the *Calendar of Treasury Books* are extremely useful for the emoluments of the Secretaries.)

III. *General.*

Addisoniana. 2 vols. 1803. (Anecdotes. Occasionally useful.)

Albemarle Papers. Ed. C. S. Terry. 2 vols. New Spalding Club, 1902. (Correspondence of the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, 1746-8.)

- Anon. *History of the Rise and Fall of Count Hotspur*. 1717. (Hotspur is Townshend, whom the pamphlet attacks, while it mildly champions Stanhope. Interesting.)
- *Letter to Mr. Secretary Trenchard*. 1695. (A violent attack. Accuses Trenchard of various illegalities in issuing warrants, &c. Perhaps inspired by R. Fergusson.)
- *Biographiana*. 2 vols. 1799. (Of little value.)
- *An Apology for a Late Resignation*. Ed. 2. n.d. (?1748). (Defends Chesterfield's conduct and resignation. Sometimes supposed to have been inspired by him; but Chesterfield denied this. Cf. a reply entitled *The Resignation Discussed*.)
- Aubrey, J. *Brief Lives*. Ed. A. Clark. 2 vols. Oxford, 1898. (Useful for Jenkins.)
- Bedford Correspondence*. Ed. Lord John Russell. 3 vols. 1842. (Correspondence, 1742–70. Useful for the 'Bloomsbury Gang', elections, and the Peace of Paris.)
- Bolingbroke Correspondence*. Ed. G. Parke. 2 vols. 1798. (For the years 1710–14. Very valuable both for diplomatic history and party politics.)
- Bolingbroke, Viscount. *Works*. 5 vols. 1754.
- Boyer, A. *The Political State of Great Britain*. 1711–40. 60 vols. (Useful for Parliamentary debates.)
- Bramston, Sir John. *Autobiography*. Ed. Lord Braybrooke. Camden Society, 1845. (Useful for the Parliament of 1685, and for rumours as to Sunderland's fall in 1688.)
- British Diplomatic Instructions*. Camden Society. France, 3 vols. (1689–1744); Denmark, 1 vol.; Sweden, 2 vols. Ed. L. W. G. Legg and J. F. Chance.
- Buckingham, Duke of. *Works*. Ed. 2. 2 vols. 1729.
- Burges, J. B. *Letters and Correspondence*. Ed. J. Hutton. 1885. (Burges became under-secretary in the Foreign Office in 1789. Useful for office methods.)
- Burke, E. *Works*. 16 vols. 1826–7. (Speech on economic reform.)
- Burnet, G. *History of his Own Time*. Ed. G. M. Bouth. 6 vols. Oxford, 1833. (Valuable; especially for the years 1681–97.)
- Cavendish, Sir H. *Debates in the House of Commons*. 2 vols. 1841. (Debates for 1768. Especially a report of a debate on the riot in St. George's Fields, a discussion of the right to use troops.)
- Chatham Correspondence*. Ed. W. S. Taylor and J. H. Pringle. 4 vols. 1838.
- Chesterfield, second Earl of. *Letters*. 1829. (Occasionally useful.)
- Chesterfield, fourth Earl of. *Letters to Lord Huntingdon*. Ed. A. T. Stewart. 1923.
- *Letters*. Ed. J. Bradshaw. 3 vols. 1892. (The former work is occasionally useful; the latter—which includes the 'Characters'—

- frequently. The letters to S. Dayrolles contain many interesting remarks on politics.)
- Clarendon Correspondence*. Ed. S. W. Singer. 2 vols. 1828. (Corr. of second Earl of Clarendon and diary 1687-90. Clarendon was a Viceroy of Ireland, for a space, under James II.)
- Clerk, Sir J. *Memoirs*. Ed. G. M. Gray. Roxburgh Club. 1895. (Useful for the early employment of the term 'Prime Minister' and for Tweeddale.)
- Cobbett, W. *Parliamentary History*. 36 vols. 1806-20.
- Cole, C. *Historical and Political Memoirs*. 1735. (Cole was Manchester's secretary; his 'Memoirs' mainly consist of Manchester's diplomatic correspondence during his embassies to Paris, and Venice. Useful for Godolphin's attempt to control foreign affairs.)
- Correspondentie van Willem III en van Bentinck*. Ed. N. Japikse, 's Gravenhagen. 2 vols. 1927-8. (Most of the letters are in French or English. The volumes include several letters by Englishmen; e.g. Henry Guy, Shrewsbury, and Sunderland. Useful for Shrewsbury, and the Partition Treaties.)
- Cowell, J. *Law Dictionary*. Ed. of 1727. (See article on Secretary of State for a lawyer's view of the Office.)
- Cowper, Mary Countess. *Diary*. Ed. the Hon. S. Cowley. 1864. (Useful for political intrigues in 1716.)
- Cumberland, R. *Memoirs*. 2 vols. 1807. (Cumberland was for many years Secretary to the Board of Trade. He knew, liked, and admired Germain.)
- Defoe, D. *Minutes of the Negotiations of M. Mesnager*. Ed. 2. 1736. (Published anonymously and purports to be a translation from the French, but is by Defoe. Useful for Harley's character, and policy in 1710-11.)
- Dodington, G. B. (Lord Melcomb). *Diary*. Ed. P. Wyndham. Ed. 3. 1785. (Covers the years 1749-61 with some gaps. Useful for Halifax's intrigues at the Board of Trade; also for Pitt and Fox.)
- George III. *Correspondence*. Ed. Sir John Fortescue. 6 vols. 1927-8. (Most valuable for every aspect of this study.)
- Glover, R. *Memoirs of a Celebrated Literary and Political Character*. 1813. (Published anonymously. Useful for politics in 1742; also for Pitt in 1744, 1746, and 1756-7; also for Holderness in 1756.)
- Grafton, Duke of. *Autobiography*. Ed. Sir W. R. Anson. 1898. (Written in the early nineteenth century. Useful; but Grafton's account of his tenure of the secretaryship is meagre.)
- Grenville Papers*. Ed. W. G. Smith. 4 vols. 1852. (Very useful for the years 1762-5. Contains passages from George Grenville's diary. Grenville not only had a good opinion of himself but apparently thought most of the world shared it.)
- Grimblot, P. (Editor). *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and their*

- Ministers*. 2 vols. 1848. (The French Documents are translated. Copies of several of Tallard's letters are among Bachet's transcripts in the P.R.O. Grimblot's volumes contain letters of the years 1697-1700. Useful for the Partition Treaties.)
- Hardwicke, second Earl of (editor). *State Papers*. 2 vols. 1778. (Has some interesting letters from Shrewsbury and Sunderland to Somers. Some diplomatic correspondence of 1714-26.)
- Hatton Correspondence*. Ed. E. M. Thompson. Camden Society, 1878. 2 vols. (Corr. of 1601-1704. Mainly letters to Viscount Hatton. Occasionally useful.)
- Hervey, John Lord. *Memoirs of the Reign of George II, 1727-37*. Ed. J. W. Croker. 2 vols. 1848. (Pro-Walpole and anti-Newcastle. Anecdotes of the royal family, Newcastle, Carteret, Chesterfield, Harrington, &c. Useful documents on the Cabinet in 1740, given in an Appendix. Hervey was often in a position to know the truth, but sometimes sacrificed it to his love of epigram.)
- Hill, the Hon. B. *Diplomatic Correspondence*. Ed. W. Blackley. 2 vols. 1845. (Hill was envoy to Turin from July 1703 to May 1706.)
- Howell, T. B. (Editor.) *State Trials*. 34 vols. 1809-28.
- James II. *Life*. Ed. J. S. Clarke (see Ranke, vi. 29. Useful for Sunderland. See also James's scheme for a reorganization of the secretaryship to be effected by his son if he ever gained the throne.)
- Keith, Sir R. M. *Memoirs and Correspondence*. Ed. Mrs. G. Smythe. 2 vols. 1849. (Keith was a late eighteenth-century diplomatist.)
- Ker, J. *Memoirs*. 3 vols. 1726. (Has some information about Queensberry, Montrose, and Roxburgh.)
- King, W. *Political and Literary Anecdotes*. 1819. (Has a little information about Addison.)
- Kingston, A. *A Modest Answer to Captain Smith's Immodest Memoirs*. 1700. (See Chapter V.)
- Leeds, Duke of. *Political Memoranda*. Ed. O. Browning. Camden Society, 1884.
- Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III*. Ed. G. P. R. James. 3 vols. 1841. (Vernon's letters to Shrewsbury 1696-1708. Very valuable. Cited as *Vernon Corr.*)
- Lexington Papers*. Ed. the Hon. H. Manners Sutton. 1851. (Lexington was envoy at Vienna 1694-8. The volume illustrates the little knowledge of foreign affairs possessed by William's Secretaries.)
- Lockhart, J. *Papers*. 1817. (Useful for Roxburgh, Montrose, and Queensberry.)
- Lonsdale, Viscount. *Memoirs*. York, 1808. (The Introduction has some interesting remarks about the scarcity of good English diplomatists after the Revolution.)
- Luttrell, N. *A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs*. 6 vols. Oxford, 1857. (Covers the period Sept. 1678-Apr. 1714. Mainly based on

- current reports and news letters. Often useful for fixing precise dates. Gives some details as to Secretaries' staff. Luttrell expresses few opinions.)
- Macky, J. *Memoirs*. 1732.
- Macpherson, J. (Editor.) *Original Papers*. 2 vols. 1775. (Extracts from Nairne and Hanover MSS. Useful for Jacobite intrigues. The documents as to these are probably authentic. How much they prove is another matter.)
- Manchester, Duke of. *Court and Society from Elizabeth to Anne*. 2 vols. 1864. (Mainly letters from the Kimbolton MSS. Has some of Manchester's correspondence.)
- Marchmont Papers*. Ed. Sir G. H. Rose. 3 vols. 1831. (Useful for Chesterfield, Harrington, Newcastle, and Tweeddale.)
- Mary II. *Memoirs, 1689-93*. Ed. R. Doebner. 1886. (Useful for the Cabinet and for Nottingham.)
- Newcastle, Thomas Duke of. *Narrative of Changes in the Ministry 1765-7*. Ed. Mary Bateson. Camden Society, 1898. (Useful for Conway and Grafton.)
- Newton, T. *Works*. 2 vols. 1782. (For Ministerial changes in 1742.)
- North, R. *Lives of the Norths*. Ed. A. Jessop. 3 vols. 1890.
- Omond, G. W. T. (Editor.) *The Arniston Memoirs*. Edinburgh, 1887. (Useful for Tweeddale.)
- Parliamentary Papers, 1844, xiv. 582. 'Report of the Secret Committee on the Post Office.' (Cf. E. R. Turner, 'The Secrecy of the Post', *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xxxiii.)
- Parliamentary Reports, 1792-3, x (103). 'Report of the Committee to inquire into fees received in public offices.' (Valuable.)
- Pepys, S. *Naval Minutes*. Ed. J. R. Tanner. Navy Records Society, 1926.
- Pierce, Z. *Life*. (Autobiography.) 2 vols. 1816. (For Ministerial changes in 1742.)
- Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs de France. Angleterre*. Ed. J. J. Jusserand. 2 vols. 1929. (Covers the years 1648-90. Useful for Sunderland.)
- Reresby, Sir J. *Memoirs*. Ed. J. J. Cartwright. 1875.
- Rooke, Sir G. *Journal 1700-2*. Ed. O. Browning. Navy Records Society, 1897.
- Savile Correspondence*. Ed. W. D. Cooper, Camden Society, 1857. (Diplomatic and other correspondence 1679-86. H. Savile was envoy in Paris 1678-82.)
- Secret Service expenses of Charles II and James II*. Ed. J. Y. Akeman. Camden Society 1851. (Payments made by Henry Guy.)
- Shrewsbury Correspondence*. Ed. W. Coxe. 1821. (Valuable.)
- Sidney, Henry Viscount (Earl of Romney). *Diary and Correspondence*. Ed. R. W. Blencowe. 2 vols. 1843. (The Diary is for 1679-82;

- the correspondence 1679-81, and 1684-89. The work contains Sunderland's apologia, written in 1689.)
- Smith, M. *Memoirs of the Secret Service*. 1699. (See Chapter V.)
- Spence, J. *Anecdotes*. 1820. (Stories of Addison and Craggs.)
- Swift, J. *Prose Works*. Ed. T. Scott. 12 vols. 1897-1908. (Especially the *Journal to Stella* and *Last Four Years of Queen Anne*. But Swift's account of the peace negotiations is not reliable. He is mainly useful for the relations of St. John and Harley.)
- *Correspondence*. Ed. F. E. Ball. 6 vols. 1910-14.
- Waldegrave, James Earl. *Memoirs 1754-8*. (Interesting characters of Newcastle, Pitt, Fox, Robinson, George II, and George III, as Prince of Wales. Also useful for Ministerial changes.)
- Walpole, H. (Earl of Orford). *Reminiscences*. 1818.
- *Marginal Notes written in Dr. Maty's Miscellaneous Works and Memoirs of the Earl of Chesterfield*. n.d.
- *Letters*. Ed. P. Toynbee. 19 vols. Oxford, 1903.
- *Memoirs of George II*. 3 vols. Ed. Lord Holland. Ed. 2. 1847.
- *Memoirs of George III*. 4 vols. Ed. G. R. Barker. 1894.
- *Last Journals 1771-83*. Ed. Doran. (The *Memoirs* and *Last Journals* are the most useful. Walpole is a good authority for Parliamentary debates. He also knew most of the great men of his day. But he tended to disparage all who had attacked his father. His intimacy with Conway makes Walpole's references to that Secretary worthy of particular credence. Walpole is obviously prejudiced against Weymouth; but it might be difficult to prove Weymouth was much better than Walpole made him out to be.)
- Wentworth Papers*. Ed. J. Cartwright. (Papers of Earl of Strafford 1705-39. Useful for Anne's reign. Largely diplomatic but there are scraps of political gossip.)
- Wood, A. *Life and Times*. Ed. A. Clark. 5 vols. Oxford, 1891.
- Wraxall, Sir N. W. *Historical and Political Memoirs*. Ed. H. B. Wheatley. 5 vols. 1884. (Characters of Hillsborough and Stormont. Otherwise of little value.)

C. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES

I. *General Histories and Works on Politics*.

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I have whenever possible mentioned at least one biography of a Secretary, even if its value is small. But when there are more than one I only mention those I have actually found useful. As to other biographies, I only give references to those cited in the notes. A few contemporary biographies are given here for the sake of convenience.

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